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Any political reflection that is of 
possible political significance is 
ideological: in its terms policies, 
institutions, men of power are 
criticized or approved. J.S. Mill 
 
1. Introduction: a gaze into the gaze 
 
This introduction’s title aims to catch the intimate chiasmic nature (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968) of the gaze as subject and object of an action at the same time. 
As pointed out by Gibson and Pick (1963) “the act of looking can be treated as 
a source of stimulation as well as a type of response”. Our gaze, and its use as 
an important communication tool, is at the very basis, along with another 
important social cognitive tool as language, of building complex societies, 
ruled by that complex blend of cooperation and competition, tendency to 
equality and faith in hierarchies, we call politics.  
A growing interest in the study of ‘the political brain’ over the past few years 
can be noted (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Kaplan, Freedman, & 
Iacoboni, 2007; Knutson, Wood, Spampinato, & Grafman, 2006; Zamboni et 
al., 2009). Even if these studies have been accused to be redundant, not 
adding anything else than some colored brain map to what psychologist have 
already discovered by means of questionnaires and experiments (Legrenzi & 
Umiltà, 2009), it has to be acknowledged, on the other hand, that some of 
these studies provided us some more important insights not achievable by the 
mean of classical behavioral research. For example, even if the reduction of 
individual ideological differences into a uni-dimensional left-right spectrum 
is still considered the standard in political psychology (Catellani & Corbetta, 
2008), a study on the neural correlates of political attitudes are showing 
political beliefs distribute themselves within a multi-dimensional (rather 
than uni-dimensional) space (Zamboni et al., 2009).  Indeed, Zamboni and 
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co-workers (2009) identified the dimensions of individualism, conservatism 
and radicalism as important bases underlying political beliefs, revealing that 
these dimensions are related to the activation of specific brain areas. Having 
to judge political statements related to Individualism was found to be linearly 
associated with activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ, 
all these structures involved in mentalizing and in self-other distinction), the 
ones related to conservatism with activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC, involved in cognitive control), and, finally, radicalism related 
statements processing was linearly associated with activity in the posterior 
cingulate (PCC). This region is, involved in emotional salience processing and 
this is coherent with a following finding by Dhont and colleagues  (2011) who 
also showed that people endorsing more radical views (anarchist) exhibit 
higher late positive potentials in an oddball task for political related targets 
evalutively inconsistent with the context stimuli.  
Here I will provide some background about how eyes are the foundation of 
the very first forms of communication in humans and in non-human 
primates. These species have evolved as social species that organize 
themselves in social groups wherein more complex social processes emerge 
(e.g. dominance, hierarchies, coalitions). The relevance of eyes as a powerful 
mean of communication seems to be related to the complex social 
interactions. Primates have evolved powerful social skills in which eyes seem 
to play a first-order role, especially in humans, where cooperation seems to 
be very central. The relevance of the information that may be conveyed by our 
eyes may have shaped an automatic-like, gaze-following behavior. This 
behavior consists in automatically imitating the oculo-motor behavior of a 
conspecific, shifting our attention accordingly. Social cognitive skills as gaze-
following, reflexive social attention, joint attention and theory of mind are 
some of the tools that allowed us to build more complex forms of societies 
where, instead of mere dominance based on physical strength, coalitions 
dynamics have evolved in political organizations. In Western democracies at 
least two abstract, widespread, coalitions usually compete to rule a national 
society. These divisions within many Western societies are often underlined 
by more basic personality, social cognitive, affective and basic cognitive 
processes and provide a powerful matrix of identity identifications that also 
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drive people to very quickly assign others in valence-labeled categories. Here 
we investigate how gaze-following behavior, similarly to other social attention 
reflexive behaviors and similarly to other very basic motor resonance 
processes that occur in action perception (study 1), can be modulated both by 
individual differences within the observers and differences of the observed 
faced either in low level socially relevant features (e.g. cues of dominance or 
trustworthiness in the know-to-be rapid impression formation process in 
social perception) and, more importantly, in high level categories as the 
belonging to an in or out political group. 
I will show these results reporting the single behavioral and neural evidences 
collected in these years of doctoral program. Some studies have been 
published, others are under preparation (both kind of studies can be found in 
the Appendix). Some other studies are still at a very preliminary stage in their 
collection/analysis and I will quickly refer to them in the dissertation. 
However, I will show and discuss all these evidences under the light of 
research on gaze-following behavior and political psychology investigation. 
Finally, I will discuss limitations, opened questions and future directions of 
this research. 
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2. Eyes are the window of our (social) mind (and brain) 
2.1 Cogitamus, ego sumus: the social nature of human brain 
  
“Eyes are the window to the soul” reminds us an old proverb. The Cartesian 
concept of souls as separated from bodies (but this distinction largely 
precedes Descartes himself, and has been surely the backbone of Christian 
thought in general) had large influence on research in Psychology, hidden 
behind terms as psyche, or mind. The development of a Cognitive 
Neuroscience (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002) has helped to go beyond 
this dualism, trying to find the neural underpinnings of our cognitive 
processes (e.g. reasoning, attention, memory). But the limit of this approach s 
that a sort of dualism has been still maintained, keeping apart, and almost 
hierarchically organized, cognition and forms of experience more connected 
to our body and its motor experience or interoceptive states. A challenge to 
this approach has been represented by the study of the importance of 
emotion (Damasio, 1995) and motor experience (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2006; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006) in cognition (but I will come 
back to this issues more extensively later on). It’s not a case that Damasio, in 
the attempt of providing a theoretical framework to a variety of studies, 
which have a common feature in their monistic approach, recalls the thought 
of the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (Damasio, 2003). The peculiarity of 
the philosophy of Spinoza consists not only in his materialistic approach to 
the body vs mind debate, which challenged the Cartesian separation between 
res cogitans and res extensa.  Another important contribution of the Dutch 
17th century philosopher consist in the importance given to the social nature 
of the human beings. Indeed, the Spinoza concept of conatus (Spinoza, 
1677/1988) provides the explanation of why we seek to build social 
relationships, by the mean of positive emotions such love, in order to build a 
bigger and more powerful mechanism than the one provide by our single, 
isolated bodies (and brains, we would add).  
More recent theories on the development of brains seem to perfectly fit with 
an idea of human brain as a tool build-to (and build-by) sociality. The 
evolution of brain seems to be closely interweaved with group size and the 
number of individual's in the innermost circle of friends (Dunbar, 1998). 
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But, within different taxa, only anthropoid primates and humans (not, for 
instance, prosimians) show a robust correlation between group size and 
relative cortex size, as reported by Dunbar and Shultz (2007). Indeed, the 
differences between taxa are explained mostly by pair bonding, which is a 
kind of relationship, which necessitates the active representation of a 
significant other’s perspective (Dunbar & Shultz, 2009).  
But at a certain point of the evolution, it seems that the skill developed for 
pair bonding where applied to develop relationships with not reproductive 
partners and that explains why in anthropoid primates and humans, but non 
within other taxa, relative brain size and social groups correlates. 
Dunbar suggests that the outcome of this evolution is the development of 
high social cognitive skills required in an environment of complex social 
interactions and complex mating strategies. More importantly, Dunbar 
notices how at a certain point of the neocortex evolution, visual areas and 
other cortical areas didn’t gain size isometrically. This observation holds, at 
different degrees, with apes and humans. Henceforth it seems that mind 
reading skills have developed. Mind reading skills are present even in 
monkeys, but they seem to rely more on regularities in behavior than in 
inferring others mental states (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). This more fine-
grained ability seems to be related to the relative more availability of 
resources for processing not online visual information and allows individuals 
to develop complex behaviors as deception. Also, in humans these social 
cognitive skills are the prerequisite of the development of language (see 
Tomasello, 1999). Anyway, making a step backward, visual signaling 
represents an important prerequisite of further cognitive skills developments 
(Emery, 2000).  
 
2.2 Eyes as a communication tool  
 
Primate brain indeed is particular sensitive to visual signals with more than 
25 neocortical areas that are predominantly or exclusively visual in function, 
plus an additional 7 areas that we regard as visual-association areas on the 
basis of their extensive visual inputs (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). Even 
though social relevant visual signals have been found also in other species 
(Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 1998), primates have a unique ability to use 
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intricate visual social signals that appear to have multiple meanings. Among 
them, gaze functions to provide information, regulate interaction, express 
intimacy, exercise social control, and facilitate service and task goal (Kleinke, 
1986). In many species, the perception of direct gaze elicits and may be 
associated to threat and dominance (Emery, 2000; Senju & Johnson, 2009), 
included humans (Linkey & Firestone, 1990). Neuroimaging studies have 
shown as, even in humans, direct gaze may cause amygdala activation and 
rising in arousal (Adams, Gordon, Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003; Whalen et 
al., 2004). Typically developing adults explore faces paying a lot of attention 
on eyes area compared to other facial features (Pelphrey et al., 2002). Eye 
region exploration has, in general, a fundamental role in recognition 
emotions in others. Preference for eyes, within a marked preference for face 
processing from the birth, comes out as early as at 7 weeks of life in infants 
(Haith, Bergman, & Moore, 1977). Fixation patterns of emotional faces 
infants an adults suggest an avoidant gaze behavior at play since the infancy, 
even though a more prominent avoidance of eye contact might be a learned 
response toward others’ anger and fear that emerges later during 
development (Hunnius, de Wit, Vrins, & von Hofsten, 2011). Also, pattern of 
eye fixation are susceptible to individual differences in humans: more 
neurotic people spend much less time in exploring eyes of fearful faces than 
others (Perlman et al., 2009). 
Perceived eye contact in humans modulates perception and cognition in 
various ways. Both neurotypical and autistic children performed better in a 
visual search task when the target were faces with target faces than faces with 
averted gaze (Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005a; Senju, Kikuchi, Hasegawa, 
Tojo, & Osanai, 2008). Also, in a gender discrimination task, participants 
where faster when the faces the had to categorize had straight gaze, rather 
than averted (Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002). Authors 
underline how this finding show that “people’s sensitivity to eye gaze would 
also prompt the emergence of some important social-cognitive effects 
pertaining to the efficiency of the person-construal process”. The effect of 
direct gaze on categorization is so strong that applies to implicit 
categorization as well: Trawalter and colleagues (2008) found that White 
perceivers selectively attended to the faces of young Black men, but only 
when the faces displayed a direct gaze, “suggesting that social category 
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memberships and eye-gaze cues worked jointly to signal target threat 
potential to perceivers, who responded by directing their attention (albeit 
non consciously) to the presumed source of the threat”. 
This result on categorization extends even to the domain of evaluation 
(Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005) being people more likely to judge a face as 
more likeable and attractive when displayed a social engagement signal as 
direct gaze, a result that may be explained by neuroimaging evidences of 
activation of reward system by a an attractive face with gaze directed on us 
rather than averted (Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith, 2001). Coherent with his 
link with arousal, direct gaze can risen it to a point that ma be detrimental for 
the task, as shown by a study in which participants had more interference in a 
Stroop task under the eye contact condition (Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, & 
George, 2010).  
Rhesus monkey brain contains neurons that respond preferentially to the 
sight of human or monkey faces (Perrett & Emery, 1994; Perrett, Rolls, & 
Caan, 1982). Perrett and colleagues (1982) found that a cell population within 
the fundus of the rhesus monkeys superior temporal cortex (STS) responded 
to both monkeys and humans faces two to ten times more strongly than to 
other objects and that the magnitude of the response was relatively resistant 
to changes in rotation, color or size, unless the rotation was to profile. In 
humans, face identity and gaze processing have been found in two different 
regions; fusiform face area and STS respectively. Hoffmann and Haxby 
(2000) have shown that matching faces for gaze and for their identity 
involved two different brain areas, STS and fusiform face area (FFA), 
respectively. Direct gaze, compared to averted, activated approach brain 
system, measured by the mean of hemispheric asymmetry in the frontal 
electroencephalographic activity, but only when participants were facing a 
real person, not when looking at a picture of a face (Hietanen, Leppänen, 
Peltola, Linna-Aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008). In general, neural and behavioral 
evidences have suggested different hypotheses about the involved of the so-
called social brain (Adolphs, 2009), some of them rely on an arousal process, 
while some others suggest the automatic involvement of metalizing 
mechanisms  and their underlying neural processes like midline media 
prefrontal cortex and posterior STS/Tempo-parietal junction (TPJ, see (Senju 
& Johnson, 2009) for a review). Senju and colleagues have proposed, instead, 
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a Fast-track modulation track, which relies on subcortical face processing (de 
Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003), a “quick and dirty” (LeDoux, 
1996) pathway that can modulate gaze processing (Johnson, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1. Fast-track modulator model proposed by Senju and colleagues(2009). 
 
“The fast-track modulator model in that the subcortical pathway initially 
detects eye contact, and then subsequently modulates cortical processing. 
The stimuli that best activate the putative subcortical face processing route 
are consistent with the idea that this route can support the detection of eye 
contact also” (Senju & Johnson, 2009). This model is consistent with the very 
praecox sensitivity of newborns to eye contact as early as they are 4 month of 
age (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002), which suggests that human 
infants are equipped with a bias to detect and orient towards faces that make 
eye contact with them. Compared to theory that states an innate mentalizing 
module, which relies on an eye detection module, this model leaves more 
open the effect of environmental factors on this eye contact to social brain 
pathway. 
Phylogenetically, visual stimuli which just resemble eyes can be found in a lot 
of other animals, like in peacocks plumage, in some kind of moths, 
butterflies, fishes, snakes, wasps, cockroaches and pheasants (Blest, 1957). 
These signs, known as “eye spot”, have an adaptive function because they 
scare possible predators. Indeed some birds avoid to eat eye-spotted moths 
and avert their attention to insects which are not endowed of those (Blest, 
1957).  
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Even though many non human primates are aware of others gaze and can use 
gaze for primitive forms of communication as sharing the attention (see 
Emery, 2000 for an extensive review), it seems that eyes have developed in 
humans in a manner that seems to maximize their communication power. 
Indeed, Kobayashi and Kohshima (1997), have demonstrated that, across 
species, humans have the biggest index of exposed sclera size (SSI) in the eye 
outline and the width–height ratio (WHR).  
SSI means that iris has more moving space and it’s correlated with walking 
height and with body size in general. That’s due to a trade-off between head 
movement and eye movement in order to move the visual field itself as 
demonstrated by a correlation between the eye movement/ total movement 
ratio and SSI (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001).  
Moreover, the human eye sclera in the eye outline is the only one that’s white. 
Other non-human primates show a color (most of them have a brown one) of 
sclera, which seems to allow them to camouflage, rather than highlight, their 
gaze (Kobayashi & Koshima, 2001).  
 
Figure 2. Frequency of species with different color of sclera in the eye outline(2001). 
But it’s interesting to note that, in 9 out of 10 non-human primate species 
analyzed, the color of sclera is higher during the infancy, suggesting that 
infants’ gaze has a more pronounced social relevance. This observation seems 
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to militate in favor of the communicative function of gaze in a species, like 
humans, less concerned of predators and more concerned about cooperating 
with others in order to have a better fitness.  Indeed, humans have a different 
attitude to cooperation, compared to other non-human primates, (Tomasello, 
2009).  
Forming coalitions it’s a feature that seems the have emerged in the primate 
evolution, and it’s still reflected in species so genetically close to humans as 
chimpanzees are. Indeed, chimpanzees are likely to join in groups that 
compete each other (de Waal, 1982). But, as pointed out by Tomasello and 
colleagues (2005) in these interactions anyone seems to follow its own plan 
without a real coordination within the group. Meat sharing after hunting 
looks more like a behavior extorted under threat (Gilby, 2006) or reciprocity 
within the coalition (Mitani & Watts, 2001). Tomasello and colleagues (2005) 
suggest that “it is almost unimaginable that two chimpanzees might 
spontaneously do something as simple as carry something together or help 
each other make a tool, that is, do something with a commitment to do it 
together and to help each other with their role if needed”. For instance, 
Hamann and colleagues (2011) have recently demonstrated that human 
children, but not chimpanzees are more likely to share gains after a  
collaborative rather than a non collaborative task. In general, coalitions and 
alliances hardly pushed primate to be able to read others behaviors 
(Tomasello, 1998)1. What seems to arise from human social cognitive skills 
(or, rather, the reason why more prominent social cognitive skills have 
emerged in humans) is the fact that, while monkeys and apes understand 
conspecifics behaviors more in terms of regularities, humans seem to attuned 
to their intentions  (Tomasello & Call, 1994). 
Another peculiarity of the development of primates is the mother-infant 
interaction (Matsuzawa, 2006; Ross, 2002). “Primates had four limbs to 
grasp objects because they had adapted to the arboreal life. Then, based on 
the continuous ventro- ventral contact, mutual gazing and smiling developed 
in the common ancestors of humans and chimpanzees”(Matsuzawa, 2007). 
Indeed, chimpanzees may show many forms of dyadic interactions since the 
childhood (Maestripieri & Call, 1996), which include the use of eyes 
(Tomonaga et al., 2004).  Anyway, because human infants separate from 
                                                
1 I am assuming this pattern flow just for simplicity but it can easily assumed opposite. 
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their mothers after birth (Matsuzawa, 2007), it can be that  a more distal 
form of communication like gaze would assume a stronger relevance. 
Crucially, while triadic interaction seems to be very common in humans, 
especially from the 9th month of their life (Tomasello, 1999), this kind of 
interaction seems to occur much more sporadically in chimpanzees and 
bonobos (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) . Triadic 
interaction hardly relies on joint attention, which can be mostly reached by 
joint attention and shared attention (Tomasello et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 3. Human children, perform similarly to great apes in tasks within the physical 
domain, but outperform them in the social domain (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-
Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). 
 
Importantly, these above described differences in tendency to cooperate and 
eye morphology yield humans and similar primate species since the very 
early childhood.  The study from Hermann and colleagues (2007) 
demonstrated how, using the Primate Cognition Battery test, after one year of 
exposure in the social world, human children outperformed Chimpanzees 
and Orangutan in Social cognition tasks, even though their performance was 
pretty much the same in the physical cognition tasks. Importantly, one of the 
tasks in which outperformed both the other ape species is exactly the gaze-
following task2. 
                                                
2 Even though, in this experiment the jointed head and gaze cues were not vehicled by a 
conspecific, but by a human, and it may make a big difference. 
3. Even our attention is (reflexively) social 
3.1 Spatial attention: from its cognitive to its social relevance 
 
The relevance of the social to our minds and brains as not left untouched one 
of the sciences field of research in psychology that has mostly focused its 
attention of human minds as individual minds, i.e. cognitive psychology. 
In contrast to behaviorism, which posits that mind is a sort of black box 
inaccessible to scientific research, cognitive psychology attempted to study 
how do mental processes like attention, memory and language work. But 
social psychologist, moving from the Kurt Lewin assumption that behavior is 
a function of the person in their environment (B=ƒ(P,E), were not untouched 
by this paradigm shift in the field of psychology, and began to ask themselves: 
“are the information-processing demands made by social cognition different 
from those made by non-social cognition?” (Adolphs, 2001). Indeed, there’s 
intuitively a huge difference between the physical environment and the social 
one. The latter is definitively much more complex, less predictable, and, 
crucially, more responsive to one’s own behavior. Social cognition is then 
concerned about this intuitively difference required ad hoc processes, from 
perception of, attention to, memory for, and thinking about other people, and 
in a way that involves emotional and/or motivational processing. We can 
imagine this path beginning with the sensory processing of social information 
(visual perception of someone’s face or body posture), stepping to formation 
of inferences and judgments about the social meaning and significance of this 
information. This path, based on innate and acquired memories, current 
context, and future goals and plans finally culminates in the modulation of 
essentially all aspects of cognition and behavior (Adolphs, 2006). 
A famous example in favor of the emergence of specialized social cognitive 
modules (Fodor, 1983) comes from the evolutionary psychology research and 
relies on the fact that the way in which people solve abstract reasoning in the 
Wason selection task, is much different if the content of the task is inherent 
to social rules instead of abstract rules (Cosmides, 1989). Which means that 
logical reasoning is not just an abstract process that applies to everything, 
syntax independent from its semantics. Social content matters. And this 
doesn’t apply just to a high order process as reasoning. The peculiarity of 
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processing other entities endowed with intentionality arises since the early 
stages of perception. Indeed, capacity to recognize biological motion and 
goal-directed action that emerges by around six months of age (Woodward, 
1998). Research suggests that pSTS is particularly sensitive to biological 
motion (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). 
Among the cognitive processes that can acquire a different meaning within 
the social world attention plays an important role, being at the crisscross 
between perception (being driven by visual signals) and other processes like 
learning and memory (we remember better things which are under the 
spotlight of our attention) up to metacognitive processes (“why is this person 
driving my attention there?”). 
Attention is a cognitive tool we developed because, in front of the potentially 
infinite amount of information present in the environment, we have limited 
cognitive resources to deal with that. That’s why in this intense semiotic 
environment, we select only a part of it.  
Attention the product of bottom-up and top-down processes. We are very 
familiar with the competition between these different processes, it’s enough 
to think about the fact that when I have to write a dissertation, I have to drive 
my external attention on the keyboard of my MacBook Pro and my internal 
attention to the amount of knowledge I have in my mind which is related to 
the topic I am writing about. That is that no matter how much nice would be 
the idea to think about a white bear, I have to inhibit it and think about 
attention! But, in the meantime, when I am writing, some Skype pop-up can 
abruptively appear, diverting my attention to it, at least for a moment, unless 
it signals me that a person I was really looking forward to talk to is finally 
available. Another top-down mechanism that can drive our attention is 
relative to our expectations, so knowledge (that may be even implicit to some 
extent) may drive our attention. The distinction between an active and a 
passive capture of our attention can be driven up to William James, in 1890, 
which seem to have foreseen what a huge amount of empirical evidences is 
now teaching to us now. Indeed, it has been largely demonstrated how our 
attention can be automatically captured by certain luminance and contrast 
changes that signal motion (e.g. Theewes, 1995), as well as stimuli that 
appear to be “looming” (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). 
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That’s exactly what is called endogenous cue in the spatial attention studied 
with a paradigm developed by Posner (1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984).  
In one of the task designed by Posner and collaborators (Posner & Cohen, 
1984) a target was presented at 7 visual degrees to the left or right of fixation. 
Before the target, an arrow appeared centrally o the screen. The arrow 
pointed toward the correct target location on 80% of the trials. Which means 
that the subject, during the task, learnt to expect that the target could appear 
at the same location pointed by the arrow. Manual reaction times for the 
detection or discrimination of the target were faster when subjects were able 
to anticipate its location because the attention of the participants was driven 
by their expectation toward one portion of the space.  
But our attention, alternatively, can be captured by the abrupt appearance of 
a stimulus. This happens when a cue signal appears on either on the left side 
or on right side of the screen. In this case, the cue is in no way predictive 
since it has 50% of probability to appear on the same side where the target 
will appear. But even though not predictive, subjects typically perform better 
and faster when the cue is spatially congruent with the target, at least within 
a certain time window (50 – 150 ms).  This form of cuing strongly depends on 
sensory information and is not limited to the detection of supra-threshold 
visual stimuli, but extend to many other visual tasks, including threshold 
detection of luminance and discrimination of shape, size, color, and motion  
(Bashinski and Bachrach,, 1984; Downing, 1988). The enhancement in 
stimulus processing produced by spatial cueing, even without any overt eye 
movement, is thought to reflect the activation of a mechanism that shifts 
attention to the stimulus location before its appearance. I the case of the 
exogenous cuing, beyond a certain time window (>300ms) the facilitation is 
reversed to an inhibition (the so called inhibition of return, IOR), i.e. subjects 
perform more poorly in the incongruent condition (See Klein (2000) for a 
review on IOR). 
Endogenous orienting of attention has been found to be subserved by a dorsal 
fronto-parietal network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) which includes the 
intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) and superior parietal lobule (SPL), and dorsal 
frontal cortex along the pre-central sulcus, near or at the frontal eye field 
(FEF). On the other side, exogenous orienting of attention has been proposed 
to be subserved by a ventral fronto-parietal network, which encompasses 
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temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), cortex the ventral frontal cortex (VFC), 
including parts of middle frontal gyrus (MFG), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
frontal operculum and anterior Insula. 
Importantly to our purpose, the distinction between endogenous and 
exogenous cuing of attention parallels the seminal distinction in psychology 
between controlled and automatic processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), 
being the first associated with awareness, intention, effort, and the capacity 
for interruption (Wegner & Bargh, 1998) while the second is unawareness 
and not voluntarily controllable. Exogenous orienting happens to be, indeed, 
even when the cue is counter-predictive.  
All these experiments on visuo-spatial attention have traditionally used non 
animate stimuli: a quick change of luminosity on a side of the screen in the 
case of exogenous orienting, or a symbolic central cue as in the case of the 
endogenous orienting.  
But a lot of other researches on different fields on attention processes have 
shown that the social nature of the stimuli matter.  
Indeed, the power of stimuli to automatically capture attention (as it happens 
with threatening stimuli or stimuli that suddenly appear on our visual field) 
can be moderated by the state of the perceiver in a relatively top-down 
manner. Elderlyi (1974), for example, has shown that, in a task that required 
ignoring distracter stimuli, Jewish participants performed well unless the to-
be-ignored stimulus was a swastika. Beyond affective states, the expectancies 
and goals of perceivers are also a powerful determinant for how attention is 
focused. For example, in the seminal Loftus and Mackworth (1978) 
experiment it has been found that visual attention was drawn earlier and 
more frequently by “oddball” objects that had a low probability of appearing 
in a scene (e.g., an octopus on a farm) than by contextually expected objects 
(e.g., a tractor on a farm). Indeed, no direct perceptual property of the 
stimulus drives the attention in this study, but is a high-order conceptual 
fluency which plays a role in it (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, 2009). 
Also, recent neuro-physiological evidence showed social categorization to 
have an influence on early attentional processes. Indeed, Ito and Urland 
(2003)  found that white participants’ early waveform components (N100, 
P200) tended to show stronger attention to black than to in-group targets. At 
a later stage in the attentional process, whites’ attention appeared to shift 
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toward members of their racial in-group. Ito and Urland (2005) interpreted 
the early attentional findings as a vigilance process for potentially threatening 
stimuli. In line with this explanation, black men, a social category that is 
often negatively stereotyped by the media, elicit a stronger early vigilance 
effect than other social categories. Chiao and co-workers (2006) showed that 
the performance of biracial (black/white) individuals in a visual search task 
was moderated by whether or not their black or white identity had been 
primed.  This study provided in this way a compelling evidence of the role of 
social categorization in attention and visual search.  These biracial 
individuals were faster in detecting black faces when primed with the white 
side of their identity, compared to when they had been primed with their 
black identity. 
 
3.2 Reflexive social attention 
 
Recently, even the literature on visuo-spatial attention has began to focus its 
attention to the social relevance of some kind of stimuli.  
Driver and colleagues (1999) tried to connect research on social cognitive 
skills development (Baron-Cohen, 1995b; Brothers, 1990) to the literature on 
visuo-spatial attention. The authors, indeed, reckoned that “these two areas 
of research have pursued entirely separate agendas, with entirely different 
methodologies. Mainstream research on attention has rarely considered 
orienting in response to stimuli of special social significance, and studies of 
social attention have not exploited contemporary advances in mainstream 
attention research” (Driver et al., 1999). Indeed, is plenty of evidence for the 
importance of gaze perception in determining the direction of attention. For 
example, Butterworth has shown how it happens even in 3 months infants 
(1991). Nevertheless, despite this evidence of the relevance of gaze perception 
for the attention, the authors noticed how “it is very striking that the topic 
goes quite unmentioned in the extensive literature on visuo-spatial orienting, 
within  mainstream attention research on adult humans” (Driver et al., 1999). 
A lack of attention that seems to have overlooked Brothers’ maxim (1990) 
that the human brain is largely a social brain. In this experiment, the authors 
studied for the first time not only how much our attention can be captured by 
a social cue, but even to which extent this capture can be described as 
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automatic to the point of happening even against the will of the individual to 
inhibit that behavior.  
In order to do that, in a first experiment, subjects were required to perform 
an discrimination test on an object that could be cued or not cued by a still 
gaze appearing either 100ms, 500ms or 700ms before the target. 
 
 
Figure 4. Instead of an inanimate signal as a flash or an arrow, Driver and colleagues 
(1999) have used, for the first time, a social cue as gaze. Subjects were required to do an 
identification task (they had to identify the target either as a T or as an L. 
 
 18 
Even though the gaze cue was not informative at all on the forthcoming 
appearance of the target, subjects were slower in discriminate the target 
when it appeared in a portion of the screen which was the opposite of the one 
cued by the gaze.  Interestingly, and crucially for the automaticity point, the 
effect was at play, at a 300ms stimulus onset asynchrony, even when the gaze 
cue was in fact counter-predictive, i.e. when it predicted the wrong side in the 
75% of cases. This impermeability to our intentions is coherent with the 
definition of automaticity inherited by a long-lasting debate and research on 
control and automatic processes (Bargh, 1992; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  
The reflexivity of gaze following is at odds with the modulation of a deliberate, 
rational reasoning. So, if something is able to modulate this process, this has 
to be a process which is at its turn very important evolutionarily (Confer, 
Easton, & al, 2010). 
The automaticity of this effect represents for the authors, a fodorian module 
for eye detection, as postulated by Baron-Cohen(1995a). That is, each module 
is considered to be encapsulated from other processes, and accordingly to 
operate in an obligatory manner. 
According to Baron-Cohen (1994; 1995a) our Mind Reading System is 
organized in 4 specialized modules that develop in human infants, which 
contained components of the gaze communication system. The four modules 
were an Eye Direction Detector (EDD), an Intentionality Detector (ID), a 
Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM) and a Theory of Mind Mechanism 
(ToMM). The EDD module has its principal function in detecting every kind 
of eye-like stimulus and represent their direction as an Agent which is 
involved in a relation either with ourselves, (Agent-relation-self), with an 
object (Agent-relation-object) or with another person (Agent-relation-Agent). 
The attunement of this EDD module to every eye-like stimulus and its 
informationally encapsulated function are consistent with results found on 
schematic faces. Friesen and Kingstone (1998) conducted a study in which 
participants had to perform a detection, a localization and an identification 
task and the appearance of the target could be preceded, at different SOAs 
(105, 300, 600, 1005) by a schematic face which could cue congruently, 
incongruently or neutrally3 directed gaze. Participants were found to be 
                                                
3 Even if the mutual gaze, which represented the neutral condition, is still a socially 
meaningful signal, so its neutrality is at least questionable. Indeed, the participants’ behavior 
in this experiment is mostly similar between the neutral and the uncued conditions. 
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facilitated in the congruent condition at very short SOAs, which is an 
evidence that speaks in favor of the automaticity of the process. 
 
 
Figure 5. Gaze direction furnishes a plethora of powerful social signals wich can be used 
by another individual to infer either other external (other persons, objects, events) or 
internal states (emotions, intentions) A) Mutual gaze happens when two individuals 
reciprocally focus their attention each on the other. B) Gaze following happens when an 
individual detects that the gaze of another one is not directed toward him/her anymore 
and follows the line of his/her gaze toward an indefinite point on the space C) Joint 
attention is analogous to gaze following except to the fact that the attention of the 
following individual is now on the same object the other is paying attention at D) Shared 
attention is a conjunction between mutual and joint attention, i.e. the two persons both 
reciprocate attention each on the other and jointly pay attention at the same object E) 
Theory of mind probably uses a combination of the previous A-D attentional processes, 
and higher-order cognitive strategies (including experience and empathy) to determine 
that an individual is attending to a particular stimulus because they intend to do 
something with the object, or believe something about the object (Emery, 2001). 
 
Anyway, although many evidence suggest that gaze capture our attention in a 
reflexive manner, many problems still remain open. The absence of IOR, 
which is usually a landmark for exogenous attention capture, has not been 
found to date. Also, some researchers have questioned if the automatic 
capture is a unique feature of social cues. For instance, Tipples (2002) has 
tried to address this issue by using non social cues as arrows and found 
effects, which are similar to the ones found with gaze, coherently with other 
studies (Eimer, 1997; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001; Ristic, 
Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002).  
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This suggests that orienting in response to symbolic cues is not entirely under 
strategic control. Instead of the social nature of the stimulus, it seems that 
attentional capture maybe rather accounted by the asymmetricity of the cue 
which allows spatial correspondence between the central cue and the target 
location to be automatically paired (Lambert & Duddy, 2002; Lambert, Roser, 
Wells, & Heffer, 2006).  
On the other side, some neuropsychological data suggest that, although 
arrows and eyes may drive to similar behavioral results, their neural 
underpinnings may be quite different. A study from Kingstone and colleagues 
(2000) on two split brain patients has shown that the gaze cuing effect is 
lateralized to the face processing specialized hemisphere, while a study from 
Ristic and colleagues (2002) found that the cuing effect from arrows is 
bilateral.  
Also, behaviorally, eyes - but not arrows – bring to a cuing effect even when 
counter-predictive, as shown by Friesen and collaborators (2004). 
Neuroimaging studies from Hietanen and co-workers (2006) found further 
evidence for a different neural mechanism underlying social and non social 
cues. While the cuing effects were found for both gaze and arrows, changes of 
BOLD signal revealed that while gaze-cued orienting recruits occipital 
regions, arrow-cued orienting also recruits parietal and frontal regions. That 
arrow-cues related orienting activates a larger network with respect to gaze-
cue related orienting is also suggested by an event- related potential study 
showing that changes of parietal and frontal attention-directed 
electrophysiological signatures are found for arrow- but not for gaze-cues 
(Hietanen et al., 2008). Using a perceptually ambiguous stimulus presented 
centrally while performing a target detection task in which participants 
perceived the stimulus as an eye in profile or an arrowhead, Tipper and 
colleagues (Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008) were able to 
directly compare the neural mechanisms of attentional orienting to social and 
nonsocial cues while holding the physical stimulus constant. The functional 
magnetic resonance imaging results indicated that attentional orienting to 
both eye gaze and arrow cues engaged extensive dorsal and ventral fronto-
parietal networks. Eye gaze cues, however, more vigorously engaged two 
regions in the ventral frontal cortex associated with attentional reorienting to 
salient or meaningful stimuli endorse the hypothesis that differences in 
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attention to social and nonsocial cues are quantitative rather than qualitative, 
running counter to current models that assume enhanced processing for 
social stimuli reflects the involvement of a unique network of brain regions. 
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4. Social attention and motor resonance 
 
4.1 Mirrors in the brain 
 
In the 1992, Di Pellegrino and colleagues (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) found that neurons of the rostral part of inferior 
premotor cortex of the monkey discharge both when they execute during 
goal-directed hand movements and when the monkey observes specific, 
meaningful hand movements performed by the experimenters. The discovery 
of these Mirror neurons in monkeys triggered a huge amount of studies even 
in humans, where many indirect evidences of a Mirror Neuron System (MNS) 
have been found (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
Interactions between action execution and observation are widely reported at 
a behavioral level (Prinz, 1997). Behavioral, neurophysiological, and 
neuropsychological studies suggest that action execution and observation are 
represented in commensurable formats and share the same neural 
underpinnings (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Buccino et 
al., 2001; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Saygin, Wilson, J., 
Bates, & Sereno, 2004; Wohlschlager & Bekkering, 2002). Imaging studies 
have described somatotopic activations of premotor and parietal cortices for 
action observation (Buccino et al., 2001). TMS studies have shown that the 
excitability of the cortico-spinal system is enhanced during action 
observation and follows somato-topic rules, as only the muscle that would be 
involved in the execution of the observed action is facilitated (Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). 
The MNS and mirror-like neural mechanisms have been proposed to be the 
possible underpinnings of the development of social cognitive skills (Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008). Indeed, 
-“Most of the time, our understanding of social situations is immediate, 
automatic and almost reflex-like”(Gallese, 2007). Also, it offers a 
parsimonious explanation of how we understand the actions of others: by a 
direct mapping of the visual representation of the observed action into our 
motor representation of the same action (Jackson & Decety, 2004). 
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Mirror like mechanism doesn’t seem, indeed, to be confined only to the 
purely motor domain, but it can provide insight also to emotion 
understanding and mentalizing skills more in general: 
 
What makes social interactions so different from our perception of the inanimate 
world is that we witness the actions and emotions of others, but we also carry out 
similar actions and we experience similar emotions. There is something shared 
between our first- and third-person experience of these phenomena: the observer and 
the observed are both individuals endowed with a similar brain–body system. A 
crucial element of social cognition is the brain’s capacity to directly link the first- and 
third- person experiences of these phenomena (Gallese et al., 2004). 
 
In general, the contribution of the motor system in other cognitive processes 
has been postulated even in the case of attention. Indeed, according to the 
Premotor theory of attention (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987) 
there’s a strong link between covert shift of attention and the ocular 
movement mechanism.  
The premotor theory of attention posits an identity between attention and 
ocular movements: localization in the space would be coded by an attentional 
mechanism within a set of motor coordinates which specify directions and 
amplitude, she same mechanism involved in programming and executing 
saccadic movements. In the study from Rizzolatti and colleagues (1987), 
indeed, subjects were cued to attend to one of four possible stimulus 
locations, which were arranged either horizontally or vertically, above, below, 
to the right or left of a fixation point. It’s interesting to note that, among other 
results, authors showed that the incorrect orienting of attention not only 
yielded a large and significant cost, but this cost tended to increase as a 
function of the distance between the attended location and the location that 
was actually stimulated. Also, an additional cost was incurred when the 
stimulated and attended locations were on opposite sides of the vertical or 
horizontal meridian. So, according to the authors, “attention is oriented to a 
given point when the oculomotor program for moving the eyes to this point is 
ready to be executed” and “attentional cost is the time required to erase one 
ocular program and prepare the next one”.  
Ricciardelli and colleagues (2002), capitalized both the literature on 
premotor theory of attention and mirroring motor behaviors to assess if the 
distracting power of the gaze is maximal when the task required participants 
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to respond with their eyes instead of  pushing buttons. The task proposed by 
Ricciardelli and colleagues differs from the previous studies on social 
attention because in this case the subject didn’t have to detect, localize or 
identify an incoming target, but were instructed to perform a saccade on a 
rightward or leftward target according to a signal consisting in a central 
square that could change color into orange or blue, respectively. In this way, 
authors studied the intrusive effect of a distracting gaze stimulus onto the 
instructed saccade was to create a conflict between the direction of the 
instructed saccade and the direction of a distracting, deviated gaze. This 
condition was compared to another one in which the distractor consisted in a 
symbolic arrow cue. 
 
 
Figure 6. Stimuli used by Ricciardelli and colleagues (2002). 
 
Results show that, especially when the distracting gaze shifted 75ms before 
the appearance of the instruction cue, gaze incongruently directed not only 
was detrimental to the task, but it was much more detrimental than the 
symbolic cue, which didn’t bring to a cuing effect at all. This interference 
effect disappears when using stimuli with reverted gaze polarity that impairs 
perception of gaze direction (Ricciardelli, Betta, Pruner, & Turatto, 2009).  
Crostella and colleagues (2009) provided further evidence of this 
somatotopic, interference effect of social cues by showing that, when subjects 
had to perform a task similar to Ricciardelli and colleagues (2002) but 
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responding with a hand pointing, subjects were maximally distracted by a 
pointing distracting cue (see figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Crostella and colleagues (2009) showed that subjects were maximally 
distracted more by an incongruent (i) pointing  cue, compared  to other social (gaze) or 
non social (arrow) cues. On the top of the graph are shown an example of a correct (left) 
and of an incorrect (right) response. 
 
In a similar task readapted in fMRI by Cazzato and colleague, the authors 
found that the neural correlates of these behavioral effects consisted in a 
greater activation of the Frontal Eye Filed (FEF), bilaterally, when subjects 
performing the task with eyes were distracted by a gaze and, conversely, by a 
greater acrivation in the Intra Parietal Sulcus (IPS) (see figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Activity in the bilateral Frontal Eye Field and Intraparietal Sulcus regions 
elicited by the Interferential Effect of the two social distracters during Saccadic and 
Pointing movements. Central panel: 3D rendering of the canonical MNI template 
showing the localization of four regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to the left 
(green) and right (blue) frontal eye fields [FEF] and to the left (pink) and right (red) 
Intraparietal Sulcus [IPS] is reported in the axial section. Left panel: signal plots for the 
interferential effect [IE(inc>cong)] in the right FEF (up) and the left FEF (down) as a 
function of the two biological distracters [G=Gaze / H=Hand] and effectors [Saccade 
/Pointing]. Right panel: signal plots for the interferential effect [IE(inc>cong)] in the 
right IPS (up) and the left IPS (down) for each biological distracter [G=Gaze / H=Hand] 
during saccadic and hand pointing task. In each plot, the level of activity for the four 
conditions represents the average amplitude of the hemodynamic response for the 
[IE(inc>cong)] belonging to the corresponding condition (e.g., Gaze or Hand trials, for 
Saccade) and expressed in arbitrary units (a.u., ± 90% confidence interval). The 
asterisks indicate significant ([G] vs. [H]) difference for left/right FEF and ([H] vs. [G]) 
difference for left/right IPS. From Cazzato and colleagues (2011). 
 
The finding about the distracting power of a pointing hand cue in a pointing 
task and its underpinning in the IPS can be considered coherent with the 
evidences on the close link between specific visual stimuli and specific motor 
actions emerging by both behavioral (Craighero et al., 2002; Liuzza, Setti, & 
Borghi, In Press), and neurophysiological studies on the motor mirroring of 
observed hand (Fadiga et al., 1995; Romani, Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, & 
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Aglioti, 2005; Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, & Aglioti, 2006). The notion according 
to a similar mirror system may exist also for the oculomotor domain is 
supported by the finding that similar, mainly fronto-parietal and temporal, 
cortical regions are recruited during execution and observation of eye 
movements (Grosbras, Laird, & Paus, 2005; Shepherd, Klein, Deaner, & Platt, 
2009). In particular, Shepherd and colleagues found that a subset of 
observed neuron in rhesus monkeys lateral intraparietal area (LIP) fired both 
when the subject or n observed monkey looked in the preferred direction of 
the neuron even if the presence of this observed monkey was completely 
irrelevant to the task.  So, the activation in FEF observed for the incongruent 
vs congruent condition, may reflect an effort of this area, deputed to the 
voluntarily control of saccadic movement, in inhibiting an automatic 
mirroring behavior. 
All together, all these result may suggest that social attention may rely on a 
mirror mechanism similar to the one observed both in monkeys (di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992) and humans (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) which, at 
its turn, seems to underpin the development of important social cognitive 
skills as well as gaze- following does. 
Both these skills, reflexive social attention and motor resonance with 
observed actions, even though automatic, seems to be affected by high order 
factors and, most importantly, by social factors. That is, they are not only 
building blocks of sociality by providing very basic social cognitive skills, but 
they can be, at their turn, modulated by either our experience, our 
dispositions or by the social world we interact with. 
 
4.2 Modulation of motor resonance and social attention: The 
role of experience, social world and individual differences 
 
Bruzzo, Borghi, and Ghirlanda (2008) investigated whether observing actions 
similar to the actions that are part of our motor repertoire influences 
processing perceived actions. They used a priming paradigm and found that 
participants were faster to decide whether an action made sense or not when 
they observed a hand interacting with an object (e.g. grasping an orange) in 
the actor (egocentric) perspective rather than in an allocentric perspective. 
This shows that it is easier to put ourselves in others’ shoes and to resonate 
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while perceiving an action when we share action-relevant characteristics, 
such as the viewpoint with the actor. At a neural level, Calvo-Merino et al. 
(2006) have shown that dancers’ mirror neuron system resonated more when 
observing dancers of their own gender. Also, motor imagery brings to 
increased motor cortex excitability when actions were imagined in first 
person compared to third person (Fourkas, Avenanti, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2006). 
Aglioti and colleagues (2008) also assessed motor cortex excitability when 
athletes, experts and naïve participants observed basketball throw and had to 
predict their outcomes.  Behaviorally, athletes predicted the success of free 
shots at a basket earlier and more accurately than did individuals with 
comparable visual experience (coaches or sports journalists) and novices. 
Moreover, performance between athletes and the other groups differed 
before the ball was seen to leave the model’s hands, suggesting that athletes 
predicted the basket shot’s fate by reading the body kinematics. Both 
visuomotor and visual experts showed a selective increase of motor-evoked 
potentials during observation of basket shots. However, only athletes showed 
a time specific motor activation during observation of erroneous basket 
throws. Results suggest that achieving excellence in sports may be related to 
the fine-tuning of specific anticipatory ‘resonance’ mechanisms that endow 
elite athletes’ brains with the ability to predict others’ actions ahead of their 
realization. 
For its fundamental role in building social cognitive skills, abnormalities in 
MNS functioning have been proposed to underline the social skill impairment 
par excellence, i.e. the Autistic Spectrum Disorder (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 
2006; Rizzolatti, Fabbri Destro, & Cattaneo, 2009), as some structural 
imaging (Hadjikhani, 2005), functional imaging (Dapretto et al., 2005), 
electrophysiological (Martineau, Cochin, Magne, & Barthelemy, 2008; Minio-
Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009; Oberman et al., 
2005; Theoret et al., 2005) evidences seem to suggest. Indeed, Autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
debilitating socio-emotional impairments, whose features include qualitative 
impairments in communication and reciprocal social interaction as well as 
repetitive and stereotyped behaviors (APA, 1994) (APA 1994). 
One characteristic of ASD is the lack of empathy and emotional engagement 
with others (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Gillberg, 1992). Lack of 
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empathy in ASD has been quantified with objective test measures, such as the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001) and the Empathy Quotient Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). Importantly, these scales are useful not only to 
categorically distinguish between a clinical and a normal population, but they 
may be used to assess individual differences as if autism can be defined as a 
trait in which people can differ each other on a continuous dimension. For 
example, people skilled in mathematics are usually higher in AQ than others 
even if they don’t fall into the clinical population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
Sonnby-Borgström and colleagues (Sonnby-Borgström & Jönsson, 2003) 
found that people high in dispositional empathy have less mimicry reactions 
to faces disposing emotions, as measured my Electro Myography (EMG) of 
face muscles involved in the expression of those emotions.  
Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2009) 
showed that somato-motor mirror responses to others' pain are modulated by 
both state and trait differences in empathy. By recording motor-evoked 
potentials (MEPs) induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in 
healthy individuals observing needles penetrating a model's hand, authors 
found a reduction of cortico-spinal excitability that was specific for the 
muscle that subjects observed being penetrated. This inhibition correlated 
with sensory qualities of the pain ascribed to the model. Moreover, it was 
greater in subjects with high trait-cognitive empathy and lower in subjects 
with high trait-personal distress and in those with high aversion for the 
observed movies. Results indicate that somato-motor responses to others' 
pain are influenced by specific onlookers' personality traits and self-oriented 
emotional reactions.  
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Figure 9. Correlation between state (upper scatterplots) and trait (lower scatterplots) 
empathy and sensorimotor empathy, as measured by motor cortex excitability 
suppression when watching a hand penetrated by a syringe compared to a neutral 
condition (e.g. touched by a Q-tip) (Avenanti et al., 2009). 
 
Motor resonance seems to occur differently between females and males, the 
former resonating more electro-physiologically to observed actions more 
than men (Cheng et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2008). Furthermore, Cheng and 
colleagues (2009) found females having significantly larger gray matter 
volume than matched males participants in the pars opercularis and inferior 
parietal lobule, two crucial nodes in the MNS. Beyond the gender difference, 
individual differences in empathy were tightly coupled with larger gray 
matter volume of the pars opercularis across all female and male participants. 
Gender differences may be at least partially accounted to a collinear gender 
difference in autistic traits, since ASD is four times more prevalent in boys 
than in girls (Fombonne, 2002) and males outperform females in the AQ 
scale (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
Similarity it’s an important feature for our behavior within the social world. 
For example, Mitchell and colleagues (2006) have shown that when we 
mentalize about similar others, compared to dissimilar ones, we recruit 
different regions of the medial Prefrontal Cortex, a crucial region in the 
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mentalizing midline network, which is supposed to underlie our social skill to 
infer others mental states.  
Similarity between perceiver and perceived agent has been found to modulate 
our resonance with others. The first form of similarity that can happen to 
occur is the very simple similarity between the observed action and an action 
which is part of our motor repertoire. Knoblich and Flach (Knoblich & Flach, 
2001) presented video clips displaying either themselves or somebody' else 
throwing a dart at a target board and found participants more accurate in 
predicting the outcome when they watched themselves acting. These findings 
are in line with the ideomotor theories (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2001), according to which perceptual features and motor plans rely on 
a common representational code: in other words, the more similar the action 
we see and the action we can perform are, the easier we simulate. 
Being an important tool to imitate others, beyond understanding them, MNS 
has been proposed, within the framework of the new field of Cultural 
Neuroscience (Chiao, 2009; Chiao & Ambady, 2007) as an important mean to 
transmit culture, being Culture itself a set of bodily gestures (Losin, Dapretto, 
& Iacoboni, 2009). Culture, at its turn, is an important matrix to build 
similarities and dissimilarities among humans. Molnar-Szakacs and 
colleagues (2007) assessed the motor cortex excitability during the 
observation of gestures belonging to another culture or the same culture, 
performed either by an cultural in-group member or an out-group one. 
Observers resonated more with the in-group model performing an action 
than with the out-group one. Furthermore, they resonated more with the out-
group model when he was performing a gesture, which belonged to the motor 
repertoire of his culture. 
Interestingly, an opposite pattern has been observed in another study(Desy & 
Theoret, 2007): motor cortex excitability was higher when people looked at a 
hand belonging to an out-group, but the result was confined to the female 
participants. A possible source of difference between the two studies is that, 
in the study Desy and Theoret the stimuli represented actions that were 
neither goal-oriented, nor communicative, while in the study from Molnar-
Szakacs and colleagues observed models performed communicative gestures. 
This is an important difference since mirror neurons in monkeys fire in 
response to goal oriented and communicative actions, but not in response to 
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meaningless actions. It can be that, in the case of the study from Desy and 
Theoret (2007). Even if in this study the authors discuss their results more in 
terms of physical dissimilarity than social dissimilarity, their manipulation 
does not allow to disentangle the two, since the observed hand could belong 
either to a black model o to a white one. The authors found that subjects 
resonated more to the dissimilar, meaningless actions, because in that case a 
motor simulation could have occurred to interpret an ambiguous actions, 
which was even more familiar because was performed by a dissimilar other.   
In a previous study Setti, Liuzza, Burke, Borghi, and Newell (In Preparation) 
investigated to what extent motor resonance increases when participants 
share the same age. The authors used a priming paradigm: heavy vs. light 
manipulable objects followed a hand prime; participants were required to 
decide whether the target-object was heavy or light. They found that both 
young adults and older adults responded faster to hand primes of their same 
gender, but overall they did not respond faster when they observed hands of 
actors of their same age compared to a different age. This suggests they did 
not resonate to others’ actions. A possible reason that age matters and may 
impact motor resonance, but only when the body schema changes 
substantially. Given that from youth to older adulthood only partial changes 
in body schema occur, the difference between the younger and older hand 
may have been too subtle for a difference in motor resonance to be found. In 
addition, the lifting actions alluded to in Setti et al. (In Preparation) study 
may be too simple to be susceptible to a different motor simulation between 
younger and older (see also Poliakoff, Galpin, Dick, & Tipper, 2009), i.e. both 
older and younger adults can easily simulate lifting of the objects used as 
stimuli. 
My colleagues and I (Liuzza et al., In Press) have demonstrated by means of a 
visuomotor priming paradigm how motor simulation in 7–10 year old 
children is strengthened when a light target object is preceded by a child’s 
hand in an action posture compared to an adult hand.  This finding shows 
that both similarity between body schemas and motor familiarity can 
modulate motor resonance. Anyway, as in the case of Desy and Theoret, it is 
not clear if this modulation can be attributed only to physical similarity or 
even to a similarity related to the belonging to a social category (kids) 
dissimilar to the other (adults) which the hand primes could belong to. Eve if, 
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the lack of difference found in Liuzza et al., (in prep) with old participants 
observing young adult vs. old adult hand prime suggest that the social 
identity built on the age seems not to be as relevant as the body schema 
(since old adults and young adults don’t differ in this dimension). 
More importantly, Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 
2010) studied sensorimotor empathy to pain when observing a hand from 
either an out-group or an in-group was picked by a syringe. In this case, to 
rule out the role of a mere physical dissimilarity and familiarity, beyond 
showing hand from black and white models to either black and white 
participants, showed a purple hand. Importantly, in this case, subjects were 
found to have a greater suppression of their motor cortex excitability (an 
index of their empathic reaction) to in-group and to the purple hand 
compared to out-group. This result, which even correlates with a well 
established measure of implicit attitudes (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), opens an important way to look at the relationship between motor 
resonance (and related processes like empathy) and the way we build our 
identities and categorize others in a social world. This happens even in 
socially much less complex species as Chimpanzees, it has been observed that 
a typical motor contagion as the one observed for yawning, can be stronger if 
the observed Chimp belongs to the same group, compared to another 
(Campbell & de Waal, 2011). 
That is, social world has not a cognitive existence in terms of abstract 
categories, beliefs and values, but it modulates the ways in which we react to 
others in a very automatic and physiological way. 
As in the case of mirror system, gaze perception, gaze following and reflexive 
social attention are to be considered crucial skills in our development of 
social cognition (Baron-Cohen, 1995a; Emery, 2000). So, not surprising, even 
these social cognitive skills and abnormalities in their function are considered 
to be related to Autism. Indeed, disturbances related to gaze processing in 
autistic individuals range from eye contact to gaze following.  
While normally developing adults tend to scan eyes and mouth (Mertens, 
Siegmund, & Grüsser, 1993), people with autism tend to avoid eye contact 
(Baron-Cohen, 1988) (Dalton et al., 2005; Pelphrey et al., 2002). Also, 
normal children, compared to autistic, detect gaze contact quicker (Senju, 
Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005a). 
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This difference in preference toward eye contact in autistic people seems to 
be related to a weaker amygdala and fusiform gyrus activation during eye 
contact compared to the activation observed in typically developed people in 
those core area for face and social signals processing (Dalton et al., 2005). 
Also, in an electrophysiological study by Senju and colleagues (2005b) it has 
been found that, during an oddball task in which children had to detect 
changes in gaze direction, eye direction elicited occipito-temporal negativity 
in typically developed children was lateralized to the right (right hemisphere 
seems to be predominant in face processing) and the amplitude of this 
negativity, while more pronounced in the direct gaze compared to the averted 
gaze condition within the typically developing sample, did not differ between 
the two condition within the autistic population. Interestingly, at a brain 
structural level, autistic children are found to have less gray matter in STS, a 
region crucial in gaze processing (Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992) 
and in social cues processing in general (Allison et al., 2000). But differences 
in eye contact are not found only on ASD population: even people with social 
phobia tend to avoid eyes when scanning faces (Horley, Williams, & 
Gonsalvez, 2003). 
Subjects who scored high on a state anxiety score, showed a stronger 
attentional bias toward the art of the screen in which a fearful face with a 
direct (but not averted) gaze (Holmes, Richards, & Green, 2006). In the same 
study, high anxiety subjects were found to have a stronger gaze cuing effect 
with angry faces compared to low anxiety. A result similar to the one of a 
previous experiment by Mathews and colleagues (Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & 
Calder, 2003), in which high anxious subjects were found to be more 
interfered by the incongruent gaze of a fearful face. 
Gaze cuing effect, also, has found to be as much weaker as much subjects 
scored high in autistic traits (Bayliss & Tipper, 2005) as measured by AQ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
This finding is particularly relevant to the hypothesis according to which 
reflexive social attention has an important role in the development of 
building a theory of mind. A result that may be interpreted under this light 
may be the one that emerged from another study (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & 
Tipper, 2005) that found a gender difference in social attention, since female 
were found to be more sensitive to others’ gaze in a gaze cuing paradigm. 
 35 
Another interpretation to this study can be linked to the finding of Shepherd 
and colleagues on monkeys (2006). In this study, authors provided evidence 
of a modulation of social attention by social status. Indeed, low-status male 
rhesus macaques reflexively follow the gaze of all familiar rhesus macaques, 
but high-status macaques selectively follow the gaze only of other high-status 
monkeys. So, high social status may require selective monitoring of only 
other high- status monkeys. Though macaque social status does not predict 
plasma cortisol levels (indexing anxiety), it does predict levels of testosterone 
(Sapolsky, 2004) which, along with the gender differences finding in humans, 
may suggest that individual variation in androgen-linked masculinization 
could have a role in differentiating the strength of reflexive and voluntary 
gaze-following in primates. 
This finding opens an interesting scenario not only on the inquiry on 
individual differences in gaze-following behavior, but also on how the social 
features of another individual might differentially modulate conspecifics 
social attention. 
One of the most important challenges to a possible modulation of social 
attention by high order variables resides on the putative anatomo-functional 
differentiation between brain areas deputed to gaze processing and to face 
processing (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). Also, as we saw earlier, the gaze 
direction processing and the consequent reflexivity of social attention, is 
supposed to work as a fodorian module, i.e. as a function encapsulated, 
impermeable to other kind of information. A strong assumption like that it’s 
at odd with what found about modulation of gaze cuing effect by emotional 
face expression, at least in anxious subjects (Holmes et al., 2006; Mathews et 
al., 2003), but emotions themselves don’t seem to modulate gaze cuing, as 
shown by Hietanen and Leppanen (2003). So, even if information regarding 
gaze direction and face identity or regarding expression appears to be 
processed in different regions of the brain, these types of information can 
influence each other (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Ristic and Kingstone 
(2005) examined behaviorally whether reflexive social orienting was purely 
automatic or sensitive to top-down modulation by showing participants an 
ambiguous stimulus that could be perceived either as representing eyes or a 
car. When the stimulus was first referred to as a car and then as eyes, an 
attentional shift was only present for the eyes condition. However, when the 
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stimulus was first referred to as possessing eyes, and then later as a car, 
attentional shifts were observed for both conditions.  
Frischen and Tipper (2006) provided a compelling evidence that identity of 
the face the gaze belongs to matters in the gaze cuing effect. I this study, faces 
of famous people could appear as distractors among many other trials in 
which unknown people were used as stimuli. Even after 3 minutes from the 
presentation of a famous face, when subjects were presented again that face 
they tended to have a performance conform to the former gaze cue of that 
character. This effect provides evidence that the identity of the face is not 
completely independent with the gaze direction processing at the basis of 
social attention. 
The importance of face identity in gaze cuing effect has been shown even by 
an experiment by Deaner et al.,(2007), which shows that familiar faces drive 
visuo-spatial attention than non-familiar ones, at least in females.  
Also in this case, gender differences can account for some differences in gaze-
following behavior, consistently with Bayliss and colleagues results (2005) 
and with gender differences in motor resonance (Cheng et al., 2007; Cheng et 
al., 2008). But gender of participants interacts even with gender of the 
stimulus, (Khurana, Habibi, Po, & Wright, 2009). Indeed, male participants 
show a stronger gaze cuing effect when the distractor is female than when is 
male, while in female the gender of the character doesn't modulate the gaze 
cuing effect, a result which sheds some light even on the possible role of 
intergroup processing on gaze following behavior. 
This feature has been particularly explored by Pavan and colleagues (2010). 
Their study demonstrated that Gaze cuing is effective on white participants 
(but not in black) only when an in-group face is used as distractor and when 
social categories are salient. 
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5. Social attention and politics: role of situation and 
dispositions in modulating gaze following behavior 
 
5.1 Evolution of politics 
 
Aristotle didn’t hesitate to define human beings as political animals (Zoòn 
politikòn). This statement may seem a trivial matter of fact for us, but how 
politics evolved and why, is still a very controversial issue: 
 
As members of bands or tribes, humans can be quite egalitarian - particularly with 
respect to males. Yet we also develop degrees of despotism which, by mammalian 
standards, are truly staggering. This extreme range of behaviors can be bewildering. 
For a dwindling contingent of scholars, those who insist on unadulterated 
environmentalism, such disparities are taken to mean that our political nature is 
simply nonexistent. For many others, it remains a puzzle that must await the isolation 
of behavior genes in the laboratory. For still another […], it has been a subject of 
unresolved, philosophically oriented debate that seems to polarize the protagonists 
into Hobbesian hawks and Rousseauian doves (Bohem, 1999).  
 
Social cognitive skills and the emergence of coalitions are closely 
interweaved: “Coalitions are functionally crucial to individuals within these 
groups because they enable the animals to minimize the levels of harassment 
and competition” (Dunbar, 1998). 
In the seminal de Waal work, Chimpanzee politics (1982), de Waal describes 
some interesting analogies between our political behavior and the one of 
these great apes. For example, in both species social status is a rewarding 
condition, and in both species individual form social alliances to achieve a 
higher social status. 
This analogies, can have an underlying similar biological foundation, as 
Robert Wright points out in de Waal’s Primates and philosophers, how 
morality evolved (de Waal, 2006):  
 
Given the close evolutionary relationship between human beings and chimpanzees, it 
is certainly plausible that these external behavioral parallels are matched by internal 
parallels - that is, that there is some inter-species commonality in the biochemical 
mechanisms governing the behavior and in the corresponding subjective experience. 
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Facial expressions, gestures, and postures that accompany certain chimpanzee 
behaviors certainly reinforce this conjecture (pp. 84-85).  
 
This importance of social non-verbal behaviors in politics has been pointed 
out in in Primate Politics(1991), edited by Schuber and Masters who, in the 
conclusions of their edited book, wrote:  
 
Like monkeys and apes, we express feelings and communicate social intentions 
through nonverbal cues that are both visible and audible. While communication by 
olfaction (pheromones) and touch also probably play an important role for all primates, 
the group behaviors we call politics are most likely to be associated with gestural cues 
of face and body seen by others or with acoustic signals heard by members of the 
group (p. 245).  
 
Here, we can see you non-verbal behaviors, as the use of gaze to vehicle 
important information, is a good candidate to study even how political 
cognition works. Human politics, not so differently from chimpanzee politics, 
often work by forming coalitions (huge, national-wide ones in the case of 
humans), to achieve a higher status, so these non-verbal behaviors can 
change to the extent an individual belongs to our own or to a different 
coalition.  
A big difference between humans and chimpanzees is that within the former, 
the belonging to one coalition or to another, at least in modern Western 
democracy, is also a function of political dispositions and beliefs, which 
largely vary across cultures and across individuals as well. The nature of 
human political dispositions remains in question. “Are we innately so flexible 
that human behavior can be reshaped ‘at will’ by environmental forces, or do 
some serious problems exist with regard to our definitions and the 
perceptions of our own political nature?” asks himself Bohem (1999). The two 
most important building blocks of human nature, selfish behavior and 
altruism, can indeed be translated in the way humans organize themselves in 
large society by the mean of politics. Positive attitudes toward equality or 
inequality, for example, are assumed to be, the very central in differentiating 
left-wing and right-wing, respectively (Bobbio, 1994). 
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5.2 Political psychology: motivation and cognition, a 
framework  
 
The concept of ideology originated in the late 18th century the science of 
ideas, but it was with Marx and Engels that the term began to be used in ways 
consistent with the actual use. In particular, in Marx and Engel, the term 
ideology ha two important features: (a) a value-neutral sense, in which 
ideology refers to any abstract, internally coherent system of belief or 
meaning, and (b) a more critical sense in which the term captures 
propagandistic belief systems that are typically misleading and systematically 
distorted (Jost & Nosek, 2008). 
A huge amount of research in political psychology has raised since, after the 
second world war, the phenomenon of fascism has began to be studied under 
the lenses of the psychology. In the 1950 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, and Sanford’s(1950) wrote The Authoritarian Personality, in the 
attempt to build a bridge between personality and an ideology which just 
shocked the whole world, leaving behind it millions of deaths. Authors, 
indeed, pointed out that an individual’s belief system “reflects his personality 
and is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the 
ideological environment”. 
Personality itself, as ideology, is not a so plain concept: “Personality includes 
behavioral tendencies and systems, structures and mechanisms that regulate 
affective, cognitive and motivational processes. It involves internal systems 
and processes that guide people towards the attainment of individual and 
collective goals, accounts for coherence and behavioral continuity across 
contexts, and ultimately, explains one’s personal identity” (Caprara, 2007). 
From the seminal work of Adorno and collaborators originate the Right Wing 
Authoritarianism construct (Altemeyer, 1998), which measures individual 
differences authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and 
conventionalism. Even though the ideological distinction between a left and 
right side on the political space is relatively recent in the human history, as it 
born during the French Revolution, at the end of the 18th century, the 
defining features of the right-wing ideology in terms of resistance to change 
and acceptance of inequality have been intertwined since the Middle Ages 
(Jost & Nosek, 2008). In addition to classic and contemporary approaches to 
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right-wing authoritarianism, other less obvious sources of theory and 
research on individual differences associated with dogmatism and 
intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, 
and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) insofar as each of 
these psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of political conservatism. Indeed, as Jost and colleagues wrote 
down (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) “The measurement of 
individual differences is an excellent starting point for understanding the 
psychological basis of political ideology, but we argue that approaching 
political conservatism exclusively from the standpoint of personality theory is 
a mistake”. Jost et al. performed a wide meta-analysis to explore the extent to 
which adopting politically conservative ideology satisfies various social–
cognitive motives. Therefore, authors proposed to analyze political 
conservatism as motivated social cognition in order to integrate theories of 
personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), 
epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror 
management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system 
justification). 
They found several variables as predictive of political conservatism: death 
anxiety, system instability, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity, openness to 
experience, uncertainty tolerance, needs for order, structure, and closure, 
integrative complexity, fear of threat and loss and self-esteem. According to 
these results, authors conclude: “the core ideology of conservatism stresses 
resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs 
that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat”. 
These results have been paralleled by further findings on implicit attitudes 
(Jost & Nosek, 2008) as measured by the IAT for values such as tradition 
versus progress, conformity versus rebelliousness, order versus chaos, 
stability versus flexibility, and traditional values versus feminism.  
It comes clear that linking ideology differences to some more basic cognitive 
and affective motives opens new pathways to study the possible physiological 
correlates of political ideology.  
Oaxley and colleagues (Oxley et al., 2008), published in a study on Science in 
which subjects with strong attitudes toward social protective policies (as  
positive attitudes to military spending, war in Iraq, death penalty and 
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negative to gay marriage, or abortion) were exposed to scary stimuli (as a 
spider on a fearful face, or a sudden noise), while experimenter recorded 
physiological reactions to fear by mean of skin conductance resistance4 and of 
the electromyography activity of the orbicularis oculi startle blink. They 
found that people who endorsed social protective policies, which are usually 
policies endorsed more by conservatives than liberals, had a more marked 
physiological reaction to emotigenous stimuli. One possible limitation of this 
study is that even if we can postulate this coherence with the framework 
provided by political conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 
2003), it lacks of measures that really can help to understand if the effect is 
mediated by more basic cognitive and effective motives as the ones used in 
the study from Jost and colleagues. 
A neurophysiological study which digs a little bit more in depth in the 
relationship between conservatism and its physiological correlates is the one 
carried on by Amodio and colleagues (2007). Since, conservatives have been 
found to be more structured and persistent measures of personal needs for 
order, structure and closure (Jost et al., 2003), while liberals, by contrast, 
report higher tolerance of ambiguity and complexity, and greater openness to 
new experience, which is reflected in differences in the openness dimension 
of the Big Five, as reported by Jost (2006). 
Amodio and colleagues tested how people with different ideologies make it 
with a task in which was required to monitor conflict in a simple Go/NoGo 
task while their electrophysiological activity was recorded in order to study to 
Event-Related Potentials (ERPs), The response-locked error-related 
negativity (ERN), which peaks at approximately 50ms following an incorrect 
behavioral response conflict between a habitual tendency (for example, the 
Go response) and an alternative response (for example, to inhibit behavior in 
response to a No-Go stimulus), and the No-Go N2 component, which is 
believed to reflect conflict-monitoring activity associated with the successful 
inhibition of the prepotent Go response on No-Go trials. They found that, 
behaviorally, as more the subjects where liberal, as much they succeeded in 
inhibiting the correct responses. Also, the amplitude of these ERPs were 
correlated with liberalism. Authors interpreted these finding claiming that 
liberals are not only better at inhibiting a preponderant response, being more 
                                                
4 A measure that assesses the activation of the autonomic nervous system, responsible for the 
sweating which makes the skin less resistant to electricity. 
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flexible, but this behavior was reflected in the a neural process that seems to 
be deputed to cognitive conflict monitoring, which is supposed to be localized 
in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). 
 
 
Figure 10. Amplitude of Error-Related Negativity negatively correlates with 
conservatism. According to source analysis the origin of this component should be 
located in ACC (Amodio et al., 2007). 
 
Those two results have been strikingly mirrored by a structural study from 
Kanai and colleagues (2011), who found that greater liberalism was 
associated with increased gray matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex, 
whereas greater conservatism was associated with increased volume of the 
right amygdala. Indeed, as ACC is deputed to conflict monitoring, Amygdala 
a structure putatively involved in the autonomic nervous system activation in 
reaction to fearful stimuli and possibly its activation could have been 
responsible for the finding from Oxley (Oxley et al., 2008) and colleagues.  Of 
course, being the brain a highly plastic organ, both functionally and 
structurally, no causal relationship can be driven between functioning or gray 
matter volume of these structure and the ideologies. It can be, for example, 
that the higher volume of amygdala in conservatives can be the result of a less 
ability to cope with emotional stimuli, as suggested by research on 
attachment styles and ideology, which suggest that people with an insecure 
anxious-ambivalent attachment style (reviewed in Koleva & Rip, 2009). 
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5.3 Social attention and political ideology 
 
As emerged by the studies shown in the former paragraph, Political 
orientation correlates with a variety of explicit and implicit preferences, and 
even with physiological reactions linked to basic emotional and cognitive 
processes. “This suggests that ideological differences between liberals (or 
leftists) and conservatives (or rightists) are psychologically (as well as 
politically) meaningful” much more than it was supposed to be (Jost & Nosek, 
2008). 
To date, only one experiment tried to capitalize the well known differences 
between liberals and conservatives to investigate how much they are reflected 
in the a process like the one of social attention, which relies much on non 
verbal communication, which seems to be at the very basis of rudimentary 
politics even in non-human primates (Shepherd et al., 2006). 
Dodd et al. (Dodd, Hibbing, & Smith, 2011) used a gaze cuing paradigm with 
a schematic face, whose gaze preceded the target at different onsets (100ms, 
500ms, 800ms, as shown in  Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Procedure used by Dodd and colleagues (Dodd et al., 2011). 
 
In order to have a more exhaustive measure of their political orientation, 
authors used a composite measure of participants’ political ideology. 
Therefore, they did a median split the sample and assessed if the right 
leaning and the left leaning sample differed in the gaze cuing effect at 
different SOAs. They found liberals following the gaze more than 
conservatives, but only at longer SOAs (500ms and 800ms). These SOAs 
don’t reflect any reflexive modulation of attention anymore (e.g. Driver et al., 
1999; Posner, 1980). Indeed, the advantage for trials on the cued versus 
uncued side at the 100ms SOA, which dissipates by around 300ms, and may 
even reverse to become a disadvantage at the longer SOAs (Posner & Cohen, 
1984). Anyway, authors discuss these results claiming that individuals on the 
political right tend to be more supportive of individualism than those on the 
left, a point evident in the philosophy of the influential conservative thinker 
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Ayn Rand”. Moreover, “Conservatives tend to value personal autonomy more 
so than liberals, making them less likely to be influenced by others and, in 
turn, less responsive to gaze cues”. This interpretation is pretty much at odd 
with theories and findings coming from another important line of research 
that attempts to link moral foundations ad political ideology.  
By reviewing previous researches on morality and political ideology, Haidt 
and Graham (2007) found a critical point in those lines of research which 
assumed the ethic of autonomy (as care and fairness, which are actually 
endorsed more by liberals than conservatives) as the only source of morality 
report the ethnographic work of Richard Shweder as a possible alternative 
theoretical framework (1990) has long argued that:  
 
In the ethic of autonomy the moral world is assumed to be made up exclusively of 
individual human beings [...]. Rights, justice, fairness, and freedom are moral goods 
because they help to maximize the autonomy of individuals, and to protect individuals 
from harms perpetrated by authorities and by other individuals. The ethic of 
community [...] sees the world not as a collection of individuals but as a collection of 
institutions, families, tribes, guilds or other groups. The purpose of moral regulation is 
to protect the moral integrity of the various stations or roles that constitute a society or 
a community. [...] Key virtues in this ethic are duty, respect, loyalty, and 
interdependence (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
 
Haidt and Graham proposed five psychological foundations of morality, 
which we label as harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Harm/care deals with our tendency to 
react negatively to people harmed by other people and feel a prosocial need 
towards them. This moral principle has in Empathy its underlying affective 
process. has its evolutionary roots in “the long history of mammalian 
evolution has shaped maternal brains to be sensitive to signs of suffering in 
ones own offspring” (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Fairness is our sensitivity to 
unequal distribution of richness and has its evolutionary roots in “long 
history of alliance formation and cooperation among unrelated individuals in 
many primate species has led to the evolution of a suite of emotions that 
motivate reciprocal altruism” (Haidt & Graham, 2007). These two are the 
moral principles traditionally considered as the core principles by the studies 
on moral reasoning and ideology since the seminal research of Kohlberg on 
the development of moral reasoning (1969) to even the theory of 
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conservatism as motivated social cognition proposed by Jost and colleagues 
(2003). These two principles belong to the ethic of autonomy and are the 
ones typically more endorsed by liberals. Beyond those, Haidt and Graham 
proposed other two principles that express the ethics of community, in-group 
loyalty and authority acceptance, and another principle, called purity, which 
expresses the ethics of sanctity. In-group loyalty consists to the aversion to all 
the values and behaviors (as dissent) that may undermine the unity and the 
cohesion of a community. Loyalty, patriotism and heroism are usually the 
expression of this moral principle, which has its evolutionary roots in a long 
history of living in kin-based groups which has led to special social-cognitive 
abilities backed up by strong social emotions related to recognizing, trusting, 
and cooperating with members of ones co-residing in-group while being wary 
and distrustful of members of other groups. Authority acceptance is related to 
dominance and feelings of respect for and obedience to dominant figures or 
recognized authorities within our groups. Its evolutionary roots reside in “the 
long history of living in hierarchically-structured in-groups, where dominant 
males and females get certain perquisites but are also expected to provide 
certain protections or services, has shaped human (and chimpanzee, and to a 
lesser extent bonobo) brains to help them flexibly navigate in hierarchical 
communities” (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Finally, purity resides on the 
emotion of disgust in reaction to physical as well to moral objects and events. 
Indeed, argue the authors, “disgust appears to function as a guardian of the 
body in all cultures, responding to elicitors that are biologically or culturally 
linked to disease transmission (feces, vomit, rotting corpses, and animals 
whose habits associate them with such vectors). However, in most human 
societies disgust has become a social emotion as well, attached at a minimum 
to those whose appearance (deformity, obesity, or diseased state), or 
occupation (the lowest castes in caste-based societies are usually involved in 
disposing of excrement or corpses) makes people feel queasy. In many 
cultures, disgust goes beyond such contaminant-related issues and supports a 
set of virtues and vices linked to bodily activities in general, and religious 
activities in particular”.  
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Figure 12. Haidt and Graham survey shows how Moral relevance. (1 = not relevant at all, 
6 = always relevant) by foundation differed for extreme liberals and conservatives (Haidt 
& Graham, 2007). 
 
So, interpretation provided by Dodd and colleagues seems to be at odd with 
the findings from Haidt, whereas Conservatives, rather than Liberals, should 
have endorsed ethics based on community. Also, the finding from Dodd and 
colleagues seem to be inconsistent with the findings stressing the fact that 
liberals should be better at managing cognitive conflicts (Amodio et al., 2007; 
Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost et al., 2003). Also, linking the 
conservatism to the Rand ideology is not completely correct in my point of 
view. The thought of Rand can be rather ascribed to the libertarian 
philosophy, a blend of social liberalism (pro minorities, anti-autoritarianist) 
ad economic conservatism (pro-free market). Please notice that this 
distinction is not only philosophical, but is reflected in the psychological 
endorsement of different moral principles, as shown by Haidt and colleagues 
(2009) that, according to their five moral foundations were able to cluster a 
wide sample into four clusters that go beyond the unidimensional Left-Right 
distinction: secular liberals, libertarians, religious leftists and social 
conservatives. 
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Figure 13. Haidt and colleagues have shown that, according to the moral principle 
endorsement, we can create four clusters of people, secular liberals, libertarians, 
religious leftists and social conservatives. H=Harm/Care, F=Fairness, I=In-group 
Loyalty, A=Authority acceptance. 
 
Cluster 1 is clearly the prototypical secular liberals we have described in previous 
publications. People in this cluster had, on average, the highest scores on Harm and 
Fairness, and very low scores on In-group, Authority, and Purity. They had the 
highest scores on Openness to Experience and the lowest scores on Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation”, while “Cluster 4 is clearly the 
prototypical social conservatives we have described elsewhere: they had the lowest 
scores on Harm and Fairness, and very high scores on In-group, Authority, and 
Purity. They had the lowest scores on Openness and the highest scores on Right- 
Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation”(Haidt et al., 2009).  
 
Interestingly, these results point out that exist two other clusters that, rather 
than being just the expressions of moderate, intermediate positions between 
the two, have pretty much unique features: a religious left which, eve though 
similar to liberals in terms of autonomy ethics, endorses more community 
and sanctity principles. Also, a libertarian cluster exists, which is similar to 
conservatives in terms of autonomy principles, but is much lower than 
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conservatives (and similar to liberals) in both community and sanctity 
principle. 
So, the results from Dodd and colleagues, or at least their interpretation, can 
be confused by an uncovered difference in these important principles. Also, 
the simple median split of participants could not really pick up two 
representative samples of the conservative sample. College student samples 
are typically skewed toward liberalism and it can be that the supposed 
conservative sample can have included just moderate liberals or libertarians, 
which may explain better why they followed the gaze less than a liberal 
sample that may have been formed by more extreme liberals and maybe by 
religious leftists (since their measure pick up more the attitudes inherent to 
social justice than the ones on community-based values). 
Also, other important limitation of this studies are linked to the use of a 
schematic, politically neutral face. First because is much less ecologically 
valid than a real face, secondly because some moral principles are more likely 
to be activate if the face belonged to an in-group vs. out-group, causing them 
to modulate social attention behavior by the mean of moral emotions linked 
to in-group loyalty. The same applies to authority acceptance, which can be at 
play only with a dominant in-group member. 
That’s why we (Liuzza et al., 2011) decided to use character faces from 
portrayed well-known, current or former political leaders and opinion 
makers, in order to disentangle the possible modulating role of the actual 
influence on the political landscape and/or the media exposure. For these 
reasons we chose the pictures of the following personalities: Silvio Berlusconi 
(the most important centre-right wing, current prime minister, political 
leader), Bruno Vespa (centre-right wing, opinion maker), Antonio Di Pietro 
(centre-left wing, current political leader) and Romano Prodi (centre-left 
wing, former prime minister, no longer active as political leader). We 
recruited participants on the basis of a questionnaire assessing political 
preference and voting behavior (see below for more details), 15 participants 
were assigned to the left wing 13 subjects to the right wing group (See the 
paper in Appendix for more details) In this case the criterion was not a 
simple median split but, since we used a self-reported 1 to 7 scale to self 
report their political orientation (where 1=extremely left-wing, 4= centrist 
and 7= extremely right wing) and coded the voted parties accordingly (e.g. 
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communist parties as “Partito Comunsita dei Lavoratori” were coded as 1 and 
xenophobic parties parties as “Forza Nuova” were coded as 7), we assigned 
people who averaged more than 4 (the political centre) to the right-wing 
sample and people who scored below this threshold to the left-wing one. In 
this way, the political orientation of the participants could interact with the 
political orientation of the stimuli.  
In this study we capitalized together the findings about the permeability of 
motor resonance to social and disposition factors along with evidences about 
social attention by using the paradigm previously used in this lab (Cazzato et 
al., 2011; Crostella et al., 2009; Ricciardelli et al., 2002) to study the gaze-
following behavior. This task, eve if oculomotor in its nature (since provides 
an index of the automatic oculomotor imitation of a conspecific gaze), studies 
a behavior which is at the basis of social attention (Emery, 2000), an sheds 
some lights on the premotor components of social attention itself. 
The study was performed in a quiet room with medium illumination. Subjects 
sat on a comfortable chair in front of an LCD monitor, positioned at about 57 
cm from their eyes. Eye position and eye movements were measured 
monocularly in real-time by means of an infrared video-based system.  
Each trial started with the appearance of a black central fixation square 
presented on a light gray background, and of two larger black squares 
presented at 10.2º of eccentricity in the left and the right visual field. The 
fixation square was presented on the between-eyes point of the face of a 
political character with straight gaze. After 575ms, the color of the central 
square changed to either blue or red). This was the imperative signal for the 
participants to make a fast and accurate saccade toward the left (change into 
blue) or the right (change into orange) target square. The colored cue 
remained visible until the end of the trial. 75ms before the onset of the 
instruction-cue (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) the distracting character 
made a left- or right-ward saccadic movement. This interval was chosen 
because we demonstrated that gaze following behavior is maximal at this 
interval (Crostella et al., 2009; Ricciardelli et al., 2002). At the data collection 
time (i.e. between 24th of July, 2009 and 24th October, 2009) the index of the 
trust in Berlusconi, varied between 55% (August 2009) and 60% (October 
2009), as emerged by the ‘‘CRESPI Ricerche’’ phone CATI method survey 
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(available at http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/) on a 1,000 people 
sample stratified for sex, age, geographic area and population center size. 
For each character-face we prepared a RGB digital photography (6.76º x 
6.76º). The original pictures were collected by searching in Internet and 
modified by means of the Adobe Photoshop software (Adobe Systems 
Incorporated). To enhance their saliency, the stimuli were animated by two 
frames presented in rapid sequence. The first frame (lasting 500 ms) was 
replaced by a second frame lasting 875 milliseconds. The first frame depicted 
a straight gaze. The second frame depicted a gaze that could be oriented 
leftward or rightward. The direction of the character gaze and that one 
indicated by the instruction-cue could be congruent (e.g. both leftward) or 
incongruent (e.g. one leftward and the other rightward). Importantly, 
subjects were instructed to ignore the distracting stimulus and to focus their 
attention on the central square color change. Subjects were tested in four 
separate blocks, each associated with a character face. In each block, the two 
instruction cues (leftward or rightward) and the two distractors (congruent or 
incongruent) were equally probable and were presented in a random 
sequence. Each of the 4 possible combinations was equally probable and was 
repeated 12 times. Thus, a total of 48 trials per block was run. We analyzed 
the participants’ directional accuracy by focusing on the first horizontal 
saccade that followed the instruction cue and had an amplitude larger than 2º. 
Saccadic RTs were also collected. Only RTs for correct trials were considered. 
The trials in which there was no clear evidence that a saccade occurred were 
excluded (725 out of 5376, 13.5%). A trial was rejected from the analysis 
described below if the latency was either less than 100ms (anticipations) or 
greater than 500ms (delays). The proportion of rejected trials was 3.4% of the 
total trials. 
As mentioned above, a lot of interest has been raised on how personality can 
be linked to ideology and voting behavior (Caprara, Francescato, Mebane, 
Sorace, & Vecchione, 2010; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, & 
Zimbardo, 2003; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Jost & Nosek, 2008). By using 
questionnaires that captured the five factors models (Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, (Digman, 
1990)), these author showed that conservative and liberal voters differed each 
other even if with some subtle differences. Indeed, across US and Italy, 
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conservatives tended to be higher in conscientiousness, ad lower in openness, 
compared with liberals. But, while in Italy right-wingers showed to be higher 
in extraversion (Caprara et al., 2003), the opposite happens in the US. 
Moreover, in Italy, Agreeableness seems to be another core feature of liberals 
compared to conservatives, while in the US there’s not such a difference. 
Interestingly, the differences among voters seem to be paralleled among the 
politicians themselves, as recently demonstrated on a sample of both female 
Italian voters and female members of the Italian Parliament (Caprara et al., 
2010). Also, Caprara and colleagues (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 
2002), compared the responses provided on a Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ, 
Caprara, Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993) about themselves and 
about each politician and found a greater similarity between voters’ self-
reported personality and their appraisals of politicians belonging to their 
preferred coalitions than with their appraisals of the politicians of the 
opposite coalitions (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Caprara and colleagues 
(2007) directly assessed the similarity between voters and politicians by 
providing a unique index of similarity which ranged from 0 to 1 and showed 
that not only, despite of the cultural differences in the relationship between 
voters personality and political preferences and even in the appraisal of 
conservative vs. liberal politicians between the to nations, in both cases 
voters perceived themselves as more similar to the preferred politicians and 
this result was replicated while taking into account voters’ future and actual 
electoral behavior, providing a compelling evidence to the congruency model 
posited by Caprara & Zimbardo.  Results like these may be interpreted related 
to assimilation and dissimilation processes (Sherif & Hovland, 1961), which 
exaggerate similarities with liked people and dissimilarities with disliked 
ones. This findings drove Caprara and Zimbardo (Caprara & Zimbardo, 
2004) propose a congruency principle  which rules the relationship between 
voters and politicians:  
 
Voter–politician congruency operates as the humanizing glue linking affect, cognition, 
and action at different stages of political transactions. First, it operates in how voters 
activate schematic knowledge to appraise politicians’ personality, selecting those 
attributes perceived to be most relevant to the political office, the current political–
economic conditions, and then subsuming under them other. Next, it operates in how 
politicians, through their “media image crafters,” convey to the public the set of 
expressive behaviors that form an image highlighting those traits the electorate most 
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values and shares. Further, it operates in how the self-reported personalities of leaders 
and followers are similar but differ from their opponents’ self-reported personalities. 
Finally, it operates in how the distinctive personality characteristics reported by 
leaders and followers of opposite coalitions can be traced back to common values at 
the roots of ideals of their respective political agendas. This congruency element 
underscores the commonality of feelings, thoughts, values, and intentions of partisans, 
while accentuating the contrast with opponents. (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004).  
 
These results are particularly interesting to our purposes, in the light of the 
findings about how similarity can affect several social cognitive processes, eve 
at a neural level, from mentalizing (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 2006) to empathy, (Cheon et al., 2011; Harada, Li, & Chiao, 
2010; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010; Mathur, Harada, 
Lipke, & Chiao, 2010) to motor resonance (Liuzza et al., In Press; Molnar-
Szakacs et al., 2007). 
To capitalize the knowledge provided by these findings, we asked participants 
rated themselves and separately each the four political characters on the Five 
Factors of personality (Energy/Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Emotional stability, Openness) using a list of 25 
adjectives (Caprara & Perugini, 1994). The list included five markers of: 
Energy/ Extraversion (happy, determined, dynamic, energetic, active); 
Agreeableness (cordial, generous, loyal, sincere, unselfish); 
Conscientiousness (efficient, scrupulous, precise, conscientious, diligent); 
Emotional stability (optimistic, self-confident, solid, relaxed, calm); and 
Intellect/Openness to experience (sharp, creative, innovative, modern, 
informed). The adjectives were selected from a larger list of adjectives that 
have previously been identified in the Italian lexicon as being among the 
most frequently used to describe human personality and also the most 
representative of each of the dimensions of the Big Five. Each adjective was 
rated for how characteristic it was of each target on a 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 5 
(‘‘very much so’’) scale. We measured the perceived personality similarity in 
personality traits with each character by adopting procedure used in other 
studies (Caprara & Vecchione, 2007)et al., 2007, (Vecchione, Gonzalez Castro, 
& caprara, In Press). We started computing the Euclidean distance between 
the ratings for the self and the four political characters for each item (e.g. the 
square root of the squared difference of item 1 referred to self and item 1 
referred to Berlusconi). We obtained a normalized dissimilarity score by 
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summing the Euclidean distance of all the items and divided it for the 
maximum value (being 4 the maximum distance for each item, and having 25 
items, we divided the sum for 100). This procedure allowed us to obtain a 
dissimilarity score between the voter and each politician. Dissimilarity scores 
of 1 and 0 indicate maximal difference and absence of difference, respectively. 
By subtracting the dissimilarity score from 1, we obtained the perceived 
similarity score which ranged from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (complete similarity). 
This score was entered in the correlation analyses.  On the basis of accuracy 
results (for further details on results, see Appendix) we found that the 
stronger catching power of the in-group political character gaze on voters 
occurred only in the right-wing voters, who were influenced by Berlusconi 
and Vespa more than by Di Pietro and Prodi (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Influence of the political characters’ gaze on the voters’ oculomotor response. 
On the y axis is represented the interference index, deducted by the difference between 
the accuracy (percentage of correct responses) in congruent minus incongruent trials. 
Error bars represent Standard errors of mean (SEM). We reported significance (* = p 
<.05, ** = p<.01) only for the post-hoc comparisons between the characters’ interference 
effect within the groups(Liuzza et al., 2011). 
 
Interestingly, some out-group characters’ gaze did not induce significant gaze 
following effects in right-wing voters (p =.24, for Prodi). On the other hand a 
lack of significant gaze following was found for Berlusconi’s gaze left-wing 
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voters (t(13)= 1.24; p = .23). We ran the same analysis on the interference 
effect on RTs. In this case, all the characters induced a significant 
interference effect in both groups (ts >.2.76, ps <.05). 
Even though these two characters have been judged as having a different 
media exposure and power in the political landscape (not surprisingly, since 
Berlusconi was the leader of the centre-right coalition and Prime minister in 
charge at the time of the experiment), they do not differ each other in their 
gaze interference power, suggesting that the result might have to deal more 
with the group affiliation than with the status. By contrast, no significant 
effects of in-group political characters’ gaze were found in left-wing voters. A 
possible explanation of the difference between left-wing and right-wing 
voters may involve personality differences in in-group loyalty (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007). 
Furthermore, conservatives are thought to be more sensitive to authoritarian 
figures and rely more on authority acceptance (Altemeyer, 1998; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007). It is thus possible that they followed the ruling group, more 
than simply the group they felt affiliated to. Since, at the time of data 
collection the center-right group was fundamentally ruling the country, this 
alternative explanation cannot be disregarded. Finally, the gaze interference 
effect exerted by the right wing leader was correlated to the voters’ perceived 
similarity (see Figure 15), in keeping with the evidence that Berlusconi is the 
leader that mostly capitalized on the personalization of politics strategy that 
has characterized several modern democracy systems in recent years 
(Catellani & Corbetta, 2008).  
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Figure 15. On the y axis, the similarity scores, ranging from 0 (not similar at all) to 1 
(completely similar) computed as described in the Methods. On the x axis, the 
interference index deducted by the difference between the accuracy (percentage of 
correct responses) in congruent minus incongruent trials. 
 
Unlike studies that investigated the behavioral and neural correlates affected 
by political variables by focusing on the dispositions of the participants, we 
demonstrate that a sophisticated blend of situational and dispositional 
factors underlies the capture of reflexive gaze following exerted on voters by 
the gaze of politicians.  
 
5.4 Gaze following as an implicit measure 
 
Implicit attitudes measurement techniques, even if not necessary unveil an 
attitude we are unaware of, can be defined as implicit to the extent the way 
they measure them is not under voluntarily control (Fazio & Olson, 2003).  A 
variety of different implicit measurement techniques have been employed. 
One such technique involves various priming procedures that have proven 
useful in the past as a mean of assessing what is activated from memory by 
the presentation of some attitude object (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
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Kardes, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 
1989; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). For example, Fazio et al. 
(1995) found that showing participants photos of black versus white 
undergraduates had a priming effect in facilitating or interfering with the 
judgment of the connotation of an evaluative adjective.  This priming implicit 
measure doesn’t differ so much by the probably best known one, the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), developed by Greenwald et al. (Greenwald et al., 
1998). IAT assesses the strength of an association between a target concept 
and an attribute dimension by considering the latency with which 
participants can employ two response keys when each has been assigned a 
dual meaning. The participants’ task is to categorize stimuli as they appear on 
the screen. (See an example on Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16. An example of a typical IAT trial in which subjects are required to press a 
button to categorize the stimulus as a member of the category African American OR as a 
good adjective (when it appears a word instead of a picture) and another button to 
categorize the stimulus as a member of the category European American OR a bad 
adjective. 
 
For it’s automatic nature that can potentially give some clue about the 
possible attitude toward a politicians (or at least our political similarity with 
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him/her), gaze-following behavior can be a good candidate to be a sort of 
embodied implicit measure (Fiske & Taylor, 2008).  
In the following research, we relied on an our behavioral paradigm (Liuzza et 
al., 2011) to assess gaze following behavior of voters with respect to two 
Italian candidates (Emma Bonino and Renata Polverini) of the most 
important political coalitions (the center-left and the center-right) who ran 
for the governorship of the Lazio Region during the month that preceded the 
local elections (March 2009). Participants of the study also underwent to 
some explicit measures as their voting intentions, in order to assess the 
extent to which the gaze following effect is predictive of voters’ proneness 
toward one of the two candidates. In particular, we predicted that the more 
voters tend to follow the gaze of a given candidate, the more they are likely to 
vote for her. We also measured participants’ implicit attitudes toward the two 
candidates, using the IAT, a measure that has already shown to predict 
election outcomes (Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008). We 
predicted that both these measures have incremental validity over each other 
in predicting the likelihood to vote for one of the two candidates. 
In this case, Fifty-four participants took part in both the gaze-following 
paradigm and the IAT. 
The most important result of this study is represented by the fact that an 
automatic behavior as the gaze-following vehicles important cues about the 
preference toward a group or a single politician. This result, compared with 
the one relative to a well-known implicit measure as the IAT, is particularly 
striking, since the gaze following is a behavior apparently independent by the 
association between the semantic representation of a group or of a single 
person and an emotional valence. To rule out that a significant part of the 
predictability of the gaze-following behavior can be explained by the strength 
of this semantic-affective link measured by the IAT (Fazio & Olson, 2003), we 
entered both these measures in a multiple regression analysis. The results 
(see Figure 17) showed that the gaze behavior effect remained significant 
even after an implicit measure of attitudes toward the candidates had been 
partialled out.  
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Figure 17. Relationship between the strength participants followed the gaze of one 
candidate compared to the other and the IAT (in Pearson’s r) and their independent 
strength (in Beta) in predicting voting intention. 
 
The implicit attitudes itself has also a unique contribution, coherently with 
results from previous studies (Arcuri et al., 2008). Not surprisingly, the IAT 
has a stronger predictability (R2=.32) than the gaze following effect since, as 
underlined by Fazio and Olson (Fazio & Olson, 2003), it can be only partially 
be considered implicit because the subjects can be aware of what is 
measured, even though the way in which is measured is indirect. Even though 
the variance explained by the gaze-following behavior toward the two 
candidates is smaller (R2=.06), it represents an original contribution because, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study which uses an automatic oculomotor 
behavior to predict voting intention.  
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5.5 The neural correlates of the gaze-following modulation by 
political similarity 
 
Our first behavioral study on this topic suggested us that gaze following 
behavior can be modulated at least by a sort of political similarity that 
underlies the quick identification of a member of a political group as an in-
group or an out-group. This act of categorization may be made consciously or 
unconsciously (Perdue et al., 1990). 
Anyway, once established the outcome behavior, still little is known about the 
process, which causes, or at least is related to, this behavior. A huge debate 
has raised o the effective utility in looking at the neural correlates of certain 
behaviors and processes in order to unveil ho d these processes really work. 
(Legrenzi & Umiltà, 2009). Critics of this so called “neuromaniac” approach 
that distinguishes especially the social neurosciences, claim that results like 
the ones provided by correlational techniques based on subtractive methods 
like fMRI are, in the best of the hypotheses, redundant.  On the other side, 
other authors (Cacioppo & Visser, 2003; Cacioppo & Decety, 2011) consider 
the use of neuroimaging techniques as useful to unveil subcomponents of 
processes that could not be observed at a mere behavioral level.  
In the case of our study, for instance, a lot of issue would remain open if not 
addressed through a neuro-imaging technique, which would allow us to open 
the “black box”. 
In the behavioral study, no one of the explicit measures (which encompassed 
familiarity, emotions and hierarchical status) provided us any clue about 
which are the processes that may underlie the effect we found.  
First of all, it would be interesting to assess if the gaze-following network 
found in a previous study (Cazzato et al., 2011), would the same for the 
incongruent minus congruent condition between the two groups. Indeed, if 
the hypothesis of Amodio and colleagues of a stronger activity of ACC in 
monitoring a conflict in liberals (2007), we should find this area included in 
left-wing but not right-wing participants or, if present in both, a stronger 
activation in the former group than in the latter when performing an analysis 
on ACC as Region of interest (ROI). 
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Also, it would be interesting to note if the region, which is supposed to exert 
the final control on the saccadic behavior (i.e. FEF) reflects the different 
behavior for the in-group vs. the out-group participants. 
If a difference in within the basic neural network subserving the gaze-
following behavior was found, the data provided by neuro-imaging technique 
may be useful in providing us some more clue about which cognitive, 
affective or social process would modulate it. 
 We suspect that similarity and affiliation may play an important role. We 
know that intergroup processing affects a huge amount of social processes 
and their correlates, from social perception to empathy and mind reading in 
general (see Amodio, 2008 for a review). At a very basic level, the simple 
perception of an in-group member, compared to an out-group. For example, 
Hart and colleagues (Hart et al., 2000) showed by fMRI that amygdala reacts 
more to racial out-group than in-group faces. Anyway, this result is the 
outcome of a second presentation of the stimulus, so has to be interpreted 
more to a stronger bilateral amygdala adaptation to the in-group faces than 
for the out-group. Golby and colleagues (2001) found individually defined 
FFA regions in 19 subjects as reacting more to in-group than to the out-group. 
Another putative process that may underlie our behavioral findings can be 
linked to dominance. Even if the ratings about the questionnaire about the 
influence of each politician on the political landscape didn’t correlate to the 
strength of the gaze following behavior, it can be that, being all the stimuli 
pretty much powerful in the political landscape, the explicit judgment would 
not have been sensitive enough. Neural activation differences can, instead, 
provide some cue, even if should be always taken very cautiously, about the 
possible involvement of hierarchy processing. Indeed, there’s some evidence 
in the processes that may subserve hierarchy dominance (see Chiao, 2010 for 
a review). Studies on patients with brain within the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, for example show deficits in arrange of socio-emotional tasks, but 
have an intact social status recognition (Karafin, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2004). 
Other neuroimaging studies reveal a distinct network of brain regions 
associated with social status inference which encompass the inferior parietal 
lobe (IPL), dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC and 
VLPFC), and portions of occipito-temporal lobe (OG), including fusiform and 
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Lingual Gyri (Chiao et al., 2009; Marsh, Blair, Jones, Soliman, & Blair, 2009; 
Zink et al., 2008). 
To explore these hypotheses, we (Cazzato, Mancuso, Liuzza, Caprara and 
Aglioti, in prep, see Annex) first divided 28 participants in two groups, left-
wing (N=14) and right-wing (N=14), on the basis of a questionnaire in which 
they reported their political orientation and their voting behavior, as in 
Liuzza et al.(2011). Procedure was the same one used in Liuzza et al. (2011). 
The stimuli slightly differed because this time we wanted to better control, 
beyond the difference between in-group and out-group, the difference 
between politicians and non-politicians, to better address if an effect related 
to the belonging to political world which supposedly may boost the perceived 
dominance and/or similarity). So, we selected the following stimuli: Silvio 
Berlusconi (right-wing political leader), Bruno Vespa (right-wing opinion-
maker), Pier Luigi Bersani (left-wing political leader) and Giovanni Floris 
(left-wing opinion-maker). 
In this study, accuracy data failed to give significant results. This is probably 
due to the fact that, for methodological reasons concerning data analysis in 
fMRI (see Appendix for more details), before starting the fMRI acquisition 
each participant was asked to perform outside the scanner a training task in 
which they had to learn with 100% accuracy on 48 consecutive trials. So, the 
most critical dependent variable, i.e. accuracy, was minimized. So, 
participants didn’t show a clear behavioural result, if not just in the first 
functional session, and only for the inverse efficiency, a composite measure, 
which accounts both for reaction times and accuracy, as explained in the 
paper in Appendix. Anyway, we were interested to check if even in front of a 
lack of behavioural findings, we could neural markers for the bigger effort in 
inhibiting gaze following for in-group compared to out-group. The contrast 
for the main effect of congruency showed the expected network found in 
previous experiments (see Fig. 18). 
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Figure 18. Main effect of congruency, i.e. Interference effect (IE). Clusters showing 
higher activity in the incongruent than congruent condition irrespective of observed-
faces and political affiliation of voters are rendered on 3-dimensional (3D) views of the 
SPM template.  
 
This contrast revealed the activation of dorsal and central attentional fronto-
parietal networks. The regions included the Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) i.e. 
the Frontal Eye Fields (FEF) bilaterally, and posterior parietal regions as the 
right Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) and bilateral Precuneus. Frontal regions 
also included the Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG), the Supplementary Motor 
Area (SMA) extending to the middle portion of the Cingulate Cortex in the 
right hemisphere and left Insula. Furthermore, right parietal portion 
included Supramarginal Gyrus (SMG) extending to Superior Temporal Sulcus 
(STS). Finally, a wide cluster in bilateral occipital areas spreading bilaterally 
from the Calcarine Scissure to the Lingual Gyri was also activated. These 
regions were used as regions of interest to assess any differential influence of 
distracter/instruction signal incongruence on the brain responses (SPM 
thresholds are set to p(FWE-corr) = 0.05 at voxel level). 
As predicted, left FEF activation mirrored the political similarity between 
voters and politicians (see Figure 19).  
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Figure 19. The relative plot shows the mean Interference Effect [IE(inc<cong)] of the 
Right- and Left-wing Faces in Right- and Left-wing participants. A significant interaction 
was observed in this ROI: Right-wing In-group faces [R-F = Right-wing Faces] interfered 
on shifts of attention more than the Out-group Left-wing faces [L-F = Left-wing faces] 
distracter. Exactly the opposite pattern was found for Left-wing voters. The level of 
activation is expressed in arbitrary units (error bars: ±90%confidence interval). 
 
This means that, even though behaviorally opaque, the effect is at play at a 
neural level: stronger activation of FEF may reflect, indeed, a stronger effort 
in inhibiting the reflexive oculomotor imitation. Also, the fact that FEF is 
more strongly activated in left-wing voters may suggest that these voters 
don’t show a behavioral effect only because the neural mechanism of 
inhibiting an automatic behavior is more efficient in liberals, as suggested 
even by the higher N2P and ERN amplitudes found by Amodio and 
colleagues (2007) in liberals than conservatives which paralleled also a more 
accurate behavior.  
In order to understand the possible processes, which modulated gaze 
following in a politically congruent manner, we performed analysis on the 
simple face observation. The main effect of face observation (incongruent and 
congruent conditions collapsed) activated a wide network (see Figure 20) 
which encompasses, among the others, Inferior Occipital Gyri (which 
includes occipital Face Area, OFA) bilaterally, areas falling within the frontal 
lobe, (Precentral and Middle Frontal Gyri), and within the parietal cortex 
(Superior Parietal Cortex, bilaterally and the left Inferior Parietal Lobe). 
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Figure 20. Clusters showing higher activity in the incongruent plus congruent condition 
irrespective of observed-faces and political affiliation of voters are rendered on 3-
dimensional (3D) views of the SPM template. 
 
These regions were used as regions of interest to assess any interaction 
between the observations of character according to the same or different 
political affiliation. (SPM thresholds are set to p(FWE-corr) = 0.05 at voxel 
level). 
Interestingly, in right wing voters, faces evoked a higher activation in left 
Superior Parietal Lobe for politicians versus Opinion makers (see figure 21) 
 
 
Figure 21. Brain responses in left Superior Parietal Lobe elicited by the “Observation” of 
Ingroup and Outgroup Faces only in Right-wing voters. Observation effect of the Right- 
and Left-wing Faces in Right-wing Participants only for Left SPL (MNI coordinates: -34, -
54, -60). We depicted a “cross” on Left Precentral Gyrus to indicate no significant 
modulation for this area. A significant interaction was observed in L SPL ROI: Right-
wing In-group faces enhanced greater FO effect more than Out-group left-wing faces. 
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Interestingly, this effect was also specific and greater for Right-wing Leader Berlusconi 
than In-group Opinion-maker and Out-group Faces. The level of activation is expressed 
in arbitrary units (a.u., ±90% confidence interval). 
 
These results are striking if we consider that this area has been found 
involved in social status hierarchy inferences in humans(Chiao et al., 2009). 
His finding suggest that, even if at an explicit level stimuli weren’t considered 
different, the implicit hierarchy evaluation may differ, at least in right-
wingers. The fact that the result is confined to these subjects is very 
consistent with he hypothesis that people endorsing conservative values are 
more sensitive to authority. 
So, by using a neuro imaging technique, we were able to extent our findings 
and our knowledge about the modulation of a very automatic gaze-following 
process by higher level social cognitive dimensions. Also these data gave us 
some clue that different dispositions underlying ideological differences are 
reflected by differential neural processing of authority ranking, one of the 
most important forms of human sociality (Fiske, 1992). 
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6. A broader view 
6.1 Participants dispositions 
 
In all the studies presented here - and in other studies in progress - we 
collected the subjects self-rated personality traits by using a list of 25 
adjectives (Caprara & Perugini, 1994) that included five markers of: Energy/ 
Extraversion, Agreeableness; Conscientiousness; Emotional stability and 
Intellect/Openness to experience. Previous studies on behavior showed 
gender differences and autistic-trait differences in reflexive social attention 
(Bayliss et al., 2005; Bayliss & Tipper, 2005). According to these findings it 
may be speculated that Agreeableness may be correlated to gaze following, 
since this trait can be conceptually assimilated to and strongly correlates with 
empathizing (Nettle & Liddle, 2008). Also, other studies have shown that 
individuals with high AQ scores tend to score low on the traits of extraversion 
and agreeableness and high on the trait of neuroticism (Austin, 2005; 
Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2006). There’s some evidence 
that even extraversion may be, even if more weakly, related to empathizing, 
so we would expect even a contribution from this trait to gaze-following 
behavior. To my knowledge, nobody has addressed how personality traits, as 
measured by the five factors model affect gaze-following behavior. Especially 
for the case of Agreeableness and Extraversion, this data can be important in 
linking this behavior to the development of social cognitive skills.  
Another study addressed a different relationship between personality and 
gaze cuing, i.e., how the predictability of one’s gaze can affect our perception 
of the personality. Indeed, Bayliss and Tipper (2006), performed a gaze cuing 
experiment in which some faces never shifted the gaze in a predictive manner. 
They found that faces whose gaze never indicated the target location were 
judged as being less trustworthy than were faces exhibiting cooperative gaze 
behavior. The processes underlying the encoding of facial identity and the 
formation of person impressions from the face are dissociable: evaluation of 
trustworthiness is not unpaired in prosopagnosic patients (Todorov & 
Duchaine, 2008), which suggests even a subcortical processing of this 
dimension (Johnson, 2005). Also, trait judgment appears within the 100ms 
of exposure and can predict election outcomes (Chiao, Bowman, Gill, & 
Santos, 2008; Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov, 2005). The rapidity of this 
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process makes it very likely to modulate a fast process as the reflexive social 
attention.  Some preliminary evidence came from a study in which the 
perceived dominance of a face was manipulated (Jones et al., 2010) and was 
found that dominant faces (e.g. male masculinized male) cause greater gaze 
cuing than non dominant ones. 
Beyond the Fig Five related adjectives questionnaires, all the considered 
subjects (with the exception of sub-sample of 26 American participants) 
fulfilled self-reported political orientation. The final sample included a total 
of 175 subjects.  
A first correlational analysis to check the relationship between personality 
traits and ideology revealed that, as predictable, Openness correlated with 
liberalism (N=175, r = .19, p = .01). This result, indeed, replicates pretty 
much previous findings (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007; Ekehammar, Akrami, 
Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; McCrae, 1996). Unexpectedly, Emotional stability 
(the inverse of Neuroticism), correlated with conservative ideology (N= 175, 
r=.23, p=.001). This result may be surprising on the light that an 
aforementioned review by Koleva & Rip (2009) reported conservatism as 
endorsed more frequently by people with an insecure attachment style. Also, 
as reported by the study from Oxley and colleagues (2008), conservative 
attitudes seem to be related to fear. Anyway, a recent survey, whose results 
are available online, seem to suggest similar patterns (one from the Pew 
Research Center, available online: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/301/are-we-
happy-yet). 
 This survey reports, indeed, that Republican voters usually report a higher 
level of happiness. Carney and colleagues, who found neuroticism correlating 
with liberalism, found a similar result also. A study from Napier & Jost 
(2008) specifically addressed this effect. Specifically, in three studies using 
nationally representative data from the United States and nine additional 
countries, they not only found that conservatism is indeed associated to 
greater subjective well being, but also that the relation between political 
orientation and subjective well-being is mediated by the rationalization of 
inequality rather than a cognitive motive like need for cognition. A third 
study showed that increasing economic inequality (as measured by the Gini 
index) from 1974 to 2004 has exacerbated the happiness gap between liberals 
and conservatives, apparently because conservatives (more than liberals) 
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possess an ideological buffer against the negative hedonic effects of economic 
inequality. Future studies may be needed to unveil to which extent this 
hypothesis would be experimentally testable, providing a causal, rather than 
merely correlational, explanation. 
We entered all the individual differences (which can be clustered in 
demographic, traits and ideology) in a forward model multiple regression 
with gender and age as demographic variables, the five personality dimension 
measured by the 25adjectives (Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Openness and Emotional Stability) and the self-reported 
ideology. The model that better predicted the gaze following (R2= .03, F(2, 
534)=8.30, p < .001) included the political orientation (ß = .10, t = 2.26, p 
= .02) and, importantly, subjects Agreeableness (ß = .14, t = 3.32, p = .001). 
The result on Agreeableness confirms our hypothesis that, agreeableness, 
being an dimension which is closely connected to empathizing system (Nettle, 
2010) whose dysfunction, along with high systemizing, contribute to the 
understanding of autistic traits and to their links to gender differences 
(Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003).  The 
result about orientation, independently from the kind of stimulus, can either 
be interpreted as a lack of conflict monitoring in conservatives as well as a 
higher social sensitivity related to an higher endorsement of community 
principles as in-group loyalty and authority acceptance. Unfortunately, we 
haven’t used measures that addressed the endorsement of these moral 
principles. Anyway, with the exception of a smaller American sample, all the 
other samples fulfilled the Right-Wing authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 
1998), which measures also authority acceptance and conventionalism, which 
can be related to the two community related principles. A forward multiple 
regression on this sub-sample of subjects, with RWA as further predictor, 
indeed, revealed a predictive model (R2 = .04, F(2, 404) =  7.70, p = .001) in 
RWA (ß = .13, t =  2.58, p = .01), but not political orientation per se, strongly 
predicts gaze-following behavior, along with Agreeableness (ß = .14, t =  2.92, 
p < .005). This result suggests the hypothesis that the endorsement of certain 
moral principles seems to play a role that may be later reflected in a 
behavioral worse performance in this task. Anyway, this hypothesis has to be 
tested further with stimuli which may be a good control in terms of hierarchy, 
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since all of the stimuli used, belong to powerful people within the Italian and 
American societies. 
 
6.2 Stimuli low-level features 
 
Following stimuli were used in studies not reported above: Umberto Bossi 
(right-wing leader of La Lega), Jerry Scotti (an Italian showman) Hillary and 
Bill Clinton (two democratic party US politicians), John McCain and Sarah 
Palin (two conservative US politicians).  
Each of the stimuli received the ratings described above on several 
dimensions (emotions, influence, exposure). Also, for each face (except for 
Bossi), we collected data from two samples of independent Italian and 
American raters (N=12, N=16 respectively) who rated how each one of the 
American and Italian stimuli respectively evoked gut instinct judgment of 
Dominance, Trustworthiness, Competence and Approachability on a Likert 1 
to 5 scales. 
Rating in each dimension for each stimulus (See Table 1) was inserted as 
predictor for the dependent variable (gaze following behavior). 
 
 dom com app tru 
Berlusconi 3.69 3.31 3.00 2.75 
Vespa 4.38 2.94 1.75 2.31 
Di Pietro 3.25 2.88 2.94 2.69 
Prodi 3.19 3.69 3.00 3.31 
Bonino 2.75 3.44 4.00 3.63 
Polverini 2.56 3.13 3.75 3.38 
Bersani 3.63 3.50 2.38 2.69 
Floris 2.31 3.13 3.38 3.13 
Clinton B 3.25 2.83 2.67 2.33 
Clinton H 3.75 3.08 2.58 2.33 
McCain 3.08 2.50 2.50 2.42 
Palin 2.58 2.17 2.17 2.33 
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Table 1. Mean ratings from an independent sample on the perceived traits of each face in 
each of the dimensions of interest on a I to 5 Likert scale (dom=dominance, 
com=competence, app=approachability, tru=trustworthiness). 
 
These variables were inserted in a forward multiple regression model, which 
revealed a significant model (R2 = .04, F(2, 506) =  11.94, p < .001) in which 
dominance (ß = .17, t =  3.12, p < .005) and trustworthiness (ß = .27, t =  4.89, 
p < .001) are the best predictors. These influence of dominance in gaze 
following behavior is a further demonstration that people are highly sensitive 
to individuals whose low level facial features cue dominance (Jones et al., 
2010), as it happens with non-human primates (Shepherd et al., 2006). The 
finding about perceived trustworthiness is not only even stronger, but is quite 
new in the literature either on motor resonance, reflexive social attention and 
gaze following.  
The evaluation of trustworthiness from emotionally neutral faces engages the 
amygdala (Todorov & Engell, 2008), a subcortical brain region critical for the 
evaluation of novel stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; 
Vuilleumier, 2005). Crucially to interpret our data in a prior study from 
Engell and colleagues (2007), participants were presented with blocks of 
novel faces and asked after each block to indicate whether a test face was 
presented in the block. Although this task did not demand explicit evaluation 
of the faces, activation in the amygdala changed as a function of the 
trustworthiness of the faces, as assessed by judgments of a group of 
participants different from the participants in the fMRI study. The judgment 
of trustworthiness, also, seems to rely on a subcortical pathway of face 
processing as shown in a study with prosopagnosic patients who even if 
unable to explicitly recognize faces, provided trustworthiness ratings very 
similar to the ones provided by a control group (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008). 
This neuroimaging data are coherent with the speed of the trustworthiness 
judgments, which have shown to happen within the first 100ms (Willis & 
Todorov, 2006), or even 38ms (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006).  The time course 
and the structures involved make the trait inferences processes a good 
candidate to modulate a fast process as gaze following and reflexive social 
attention which, also, are supposed to rely on a subcortical pathway (Klein, 
Shepherd, & Platt, 2009). 
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The relation between perceived trustworthiness and gaze following as well as 
the relation between dispositional agreeableness and gaze-following converge 
to suggest the function of gaze following as a social skill that’s particularly 
important to a species like humans, who are at the same time the most 
cooperative among the primates (Tomasello, 2009) and have the eye 
morphology which seems to be shaped by this strong need to cooperate 
(Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001). 
Anyway, these findings have a strong limitation because some of the stimuli 
(especially Hillary and Bill Clinton) were rated by a sample that in its most 
part (more than 50%) knew them and so may have not answered on a basis of 
purely gut instinctive basis. Also, we lack of similar ratings for other two 
stimuli, Umberto Bossi and Jerry Scotti.  
 
6.3 Stimuli high-level features 
 
Finally, we performed an analysis on the high-level features of the stimuli 
and their interaction with similar features of the participants. Which is, 
actually, the main hypothesis that informed all the present line of research. 
To this purpose, we coded both the stimuli and the voters according to their 
broad political affiliation (o=liberals, 1=conservatives, centrist and 
independents were not coded at all) and entered them as fixed factors data in 
a Univariate Analysis of Variance. The analysis revealed a significant effect 
(F(1, 516) = 12.06, p < .001) of the voters’ group (which parallels the finding 
that conservatives follow the gaze of politicians more than liberals), a main 
effect of the stimulus ideology which approaches significance (F(1, 516) = 
3.66, p = .056) and the crucial interaction between participants affiliation 
and stimuli affiliation which approaches significance as well (F(1, 516) = 3.53, 
p = .06).  
To check if other high order stimuli perception processes influenced the data, 
we inserted media exposure as a covariate, since familiarity has showed to 
strengthen reflexive social attention (Deaner et al., 2007). Importantly, once 
added this covariate, the main effect of stimulus orientation (F(1, 512) = 4.11, 
p = .04) , as well as the crucial interaction (F(1, 512) = 4.11, p < .05), reached 
significance.  
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Since low level features which drive traits inferences and participants 
agreeableness also predict the gaze-following behavior, we repeated the 
Univariate analysis of variance with agreeableness, inferred trustworthiness 
and dominance as covariate and, still, we found the crucial interaction 
significant (F(1,493)= 4.07, p = .04, see Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22. After controlling for agreeableness (AS), inferred trustworthiness (trust) and 
inferred dominance (dom), the crucial interaction between participants political 
affiliation and stimuli political affiliation has been found to be significant. This 
interaction is explained by the fact that conservative voters (green line) are more 
distracted by conservative characters (1) then liberal characters (0). Also, the magnitude 
of the interference of conservative characters on conservative participants is higher then 
the interference of the same characters on liberals. 
 
Post-hoc T-Test revealed that, while liberals didn’t show any difference in 
gaze following toward conservative vs. liberal faces (t(304)= -.03, p = .97), 
the difference is significant within the conservative sample (t(209)= -2.25, 
p=.03). 
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Also, conservative stimuli interfered to conservatives’ task performance more 
than to liberals’ task performance (t(264)= -3.74, p <.001). All of these values 
differed significantly from zero (ts > 6.9, ps < .001), meaning that all of the 
political groups of distractors evoked a significant gaze-following effect in all 
of the political groups of participants. It means that these findings don’t 
replicate the lack of gaze following found in high status monkeys when 
attending at lower status ones (Shepherd et al. 2006), even though in a single 
study ran in Verona (Italy) among political activists and local politicians from 
the PD (Democratic Party, centre-left), PDL (People-s Freedom Party, centre-
right) and Lega Nord (extremely right-wing), it emerged that left-wingers 
don’t follow the gaze of right-wingers leaders (Berlusconi from PDL and Bossi 
from Lega) significantly (t(15) = 1.66, p >.1). Curiously, in the US, 
conservative participants didn’t show a gaze following effect at all, (ts < 1.6, 
ps > .1), bit this result can be due to the small sample size (N=8). 
Finally, I entered all the variables which have shown to significantly predict 
the gaze-following behavior in a unique hierarchical regression model in 
which, at each step, I entered different clusters of determinants (individual 
differences, low-level stimuli features, high level stimuli features in 
interaction with the same). 
 
Model R2  Change Statistics 
  ∆R 2  ∆ 
F  
df1 df p of ∆ 
F  
Individual differences (A, RWA) 0.037 0.037 7.
2
1 
2 376 0.001 
Inferred traits (dom, tru) 0.077 0.04 8.
0
4 
2 374 < .001 
Political similarity  
(OrStim, OrStimXOrVot) 
0.092 0.016 3.
2
1 
2 372 0.041 
 
Table 2. Change statistics from the hierarchical regression model (A=Agreeableness, 
RWA= Right wing authoritarianism, dom= inferred dominance, tru=inferred 
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trustworthiness, OrStim= political affiliation of the stimulus, OrVot=political affiliation 
of the voters) participants’ ones).  
 
As evident from the Table2, the main contribution to this behavior is 
provided by individual differences and inferred traits. The contribution of 
individual differences is also linked to ideology, since it includes RWA, along 
with a personality trait linked to pro-sociality as Agreeableness. A huge 
contribution is provided also, by low-level features which drive our 
impression formation about the personality of people. Also, this finding is not 
completely surprising since these dimensions can have an adaptive function 
since trustworthiness judgment is crucial for a cooperative animal like us and 
dominance inference is still important in a social animal that, even if more 
motivated to achieve equality (Bohem, 1999), still relies on less or more 
pronounced hierarchies in his society. 
What overall analysis confirms is that, controlling for familiarity, the 
interaction of high-order dimensions as our social identity and the social 
identity of conspecifics in a complex domain as politics poorly relies on 
physical features and has a nature which is mostly semantic-affective (unlike 
other more basic social identity as race, ethnicity, gender or age). It is 
important to notice that, even if one possible limitation of the studies taken 
alone can be that they are limited to few stimuli, the final analysis includes 12 
different stimuli (14 when inferred traits are not taken in account), which is a 
sample that may be considered more reliable in order to infer conclusions 
about the mechanism under investigation.  
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7. A gaze to the future 
 
7.1 Gaze following behavior as an implicit measure 
 
An interesting result we found in the experiment ran during the local 
elections campaign points to two possible important related characteristics of 
this process: its capability to be, at least partially, predictive of voting 
intention and it’s likelihood to not only change, but eventually precede 
changes in explicit attitudes this process may be linked to.  
The first suggestion can be addressed in a setting similar to the one used by 
Todorov and colleagues (2005). In this study, authors asked naive 
participants to evaluate candidates for the U.S. Senate (2000, 2002, and 
2004) and House (2002 and 2004) on competence and found that the 
candidate who was perceived as more competent won in 71.6% of the Senate 
races and in 66.8% of the House races. Inferences of competence not only 
predicted the winner but also were linearly related to the margin of victory. 
We could show subjects candidates who competed each other (for instance 
second turn competitors for city mayor elections and assess if the stronger 
gaze following behavior for one compared to the other a) predicts the real 
outcome of the previous elections (of course, participants should not know 
neither the identity nor the political affiliation of the candidate and also) b) 
predicts their own vote in a simulated election. Inferred trait judgment may 
be useful to assess which inferred trait would eventually mediate this effect.  
IAT has been found to predict formation of attitudes in undecided 
participants which had to vote on the enlargement of a U.S. military base in 
Vicenza (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008). Indeed, they found implicit 
association predicted their future choice better than explicit ones in 
undecided (but not in decided) participants. Moreover, being both implicit 
and explicit attitudes taken at two different times, authors showed how the 
former predicted change in the latter in the undecided sample but not in the 
decided one. Analogically, it would be measured gaze following toward some 
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candidate in undecided voter and check if this behavior predicts future voting 
behavior in a similar vein. 
 
7.2 The role of dominance and similarity in gaze-following 
and politics 
 
As pointed out in different experiments, the real nature of the processes 
underlying our results are still to be provided, even if the results on the 
neural correlates gave us some clue.  
Research on gaze direction and face processing has traditionally suggested 
that these two processes are independent by means of both behavioral 
(Frischen & Tipper, 2004) and anatomo-functional evidences (Hoffman & 
Haxby, 2000).  
Despite of this previous evidence some of the most recent findings are 
showing that identity processing should not be functionally independent 
from identity processing neither in monkeys (Shepherd et al., 2006), nor in 
humans (Deaner et al., 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2006; Khurana et al., 2009) 
(Liuzza et al., 2011).  
My line of research contributed to understand that this modulation happens 
even in presence of more complex features of our identity as an identity 
immersed in a social and political world. Anyway, these findings still lack of a 
causal anatomo-functional prove that gaze-following behavior can be 
modulated by the elaboration of faces and their complex identities. The best 
way to test a causal hypothesis like that would be to study a clinical case of 
patients impaired in identity face processing (associative prosopagnosia) 
because of a brain lesion that may involve face processing areas like FFA and 
the right occipital face area (rOFA). Alternatively, an online repetitive TMS 
paradigm (online rTMS) can be used to cause a transient virtual brain lesion 
by artificially activating pools of neurons on the cortex under the coil. Right 
OFA is an area easy to be temporally interfered by the release of 15Hz  
impulses at the 60% of output intensity at the appearance of the target 
(Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2009). Online rTMS on rOFA 
has shown to interfere to face processing (Pitcher et al., 2009; Pitcher, Walsh, 
Yovel, & Duchaine, 2007). I hypothesize that interfering to face processes 
may dampen all the differences in gaze following linked to the face identity. 
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Since inferred traits, as well as emotions, would still modulate gaze 
processing by the mean of a subcortical way, these dimensions may be strictly 
controlled. A better control of the stimuli may also allow us to better clarify 
the role of the two putative processes that may play an important role in our 
findings: status and social similarity. 
Data from non-human primates suggested us that social status may play a 
crucial role in modulating gaze following in the domain of politics, which is, 
by definition, the domain which emerged from the competitions between 
coalition to achieve an higher social status within a society to be able to take 
crucial decision about the distribution of resources (that, in a complex social 
animal like us, can be either material or symbolic). Even if in this case we 
haven’t tested social status at an individual level, it would have happened that 
the competing group, and the individuals who belonged to that group, would 
have been perceived as belonging to inferior status, as suggested by studies 
showing that stereotypes can even yield to a de-humanization of some out-
groups (Harris & Fiske, 2006a; Harris & Fiske, 2006b). Alternatively, the 
group in power would have perceived itself and its members as higher status, 
and the others a lower status. This would predict a lack of gaze following in 
response to an out-group distractor only among the ruling group. 
Furthermore, since in some experiments we used non-politicians, we 
hypothesized that those would have perceived as lower status compared to 
politicians. This last hypothesis doesn’t seem to be supported by our 
behavioral data, as we saw, even if a differential activation that a higher 
activation in IPS when observing politicians compared to opinion makers, 
suggested an automatic activation of social status inferences in an area 
traditionally involved in magnitude comparisons (Chiao et al., 2009).  
Anyway, our results don’t even suggest a group hierarchy effect related to the 
actual ruling group. Indeed, when a lack of gaze following has been found in 
my studies, it was present in the left-wing group (which at that time was at 
the opposition, both at a national and local level in the places we collected our 
data). When found in conservative, this lack was present only for a single 
former politician (Prodi), so we cannot really rule out if it has to be explained 
I terms of his political social identity, or to an additive effect of his affiliation 
and his lower status within the actual political landscape. This is to say that, 
as a future direction, I want to better test this status hypothesis.  
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To do that, it would be important also to assess the subjects perceived status, 
as assessed not only by more objective socio-economic status measures (SES), 
but by more subjective ones, as suggested by a recent review from Kraus and 
colleagues (2011), in a recent review on studies on social class. So, I can use 
members of low status groups vs. high status groups. Alternatively, to assess 
status at an individual level, I could recruit subjects belonging to high 
hierarchical groups (priests, soldiers, boy-scouts) and show them individual 
higher or lower in their status. This study would be interesting to be done in 
fMRI since, if a parametric activation in IPS in function of the status of the 
person observed would be at play and functionally connected with structures 
involved in the gaze-following. 
The second putative process at play in the modulation of gaze following 
behavior can be related to a pure social similarity process. To investigate his 
process cleared from other confounding variable linked to semantic 
knowledge on a famous character and from other personality cues from the 
low-level features, we may use controlled stimuli from unknown who subjects 
are informed being similar or dissimilar on the basis of political attitudes, 
values or personality similarly to what done by Mitchell and colleagues 
(2006). 
Also, it would be interesting to assess the possible neural correlate to se if, 
even in a task in which face processing should be irrelevant, medial prefrontal 
cortex activation, as an important contribution to the midline mentalizing 
system (Amodio & Frith, 2006), would be differentially involved when 
looking at a similar vs. dissimilar face across these different domains (from 
attitudes to personality). 
Since there’s some evidence suggesting that conservatives differ from liberals 
in terms of in-group loyalty, I would explore this hypothesis by using primes 
that may subjects endorse more collectivistic values. There’s a huge 
literature, indeed, showing that cultural values shape psychological processes 
is in how people define themselves and their relation to others in their 
environment (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Penng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 
2001; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995). These classic 
cultural priming studies have shown that bi-culturals primed with an 
individualistic orientation were more likely to describe themselves using 
general descriptions (e.g. I am honest), whereas bi-culturals primed with a 
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collectivistic orientation showed a stronger propensity to describe themselves 
using contextual self descriptions (e.g., When talking to my mother, I am 
honest)(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Remarkably, 
individuals from both individualistic and collectivistic nations (e.g., U.S. and 
Hong Kong) have shown similar effects of cultural prime on self concept 
(Gardner et al., 1999). Taken together, these behavioral studies demonstrate 
that regardless of nationality or cultural affiliation, people can readily acquire 
and carry knowledge of multiple kinds of cultural schemas simultaneously. 
Hence, when primed to orient more towards either an individualistic or 
collectivistic schema, people will think about themselves in a way that is 
consistent with the cultural schema temporarily brought to mind. As 
suggested by Haidt and Graham (2007), conservatives endorse more 
community-based, interdependent oriented values. So, I would like to test if, 
even in people who don’t strongly identify as liberals or conservatives or don’t 
strongly endorse community oriented vs. individual oriented values, a 
cultural priming which may bring them to focus more on the individual as 
individual vs part of a group may boost gaze following 1) in general 2) only for 
very relevant in-groups (e.g. family) 3) in in-groups in general. 
Crucial to this hypothesis is the possible role of Oxytocin a) in social 
cognition in general (Andari et al., 2010; Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, Berger, 
& Herpertz, 2007; Rodrigues, Saslow, Garcia, John, & Keltner, 2009) b) in 
promoting in-group favoritism in particular (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, 
Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011) c) in promoting trust (Baumgartner, Heinrichs, 
Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, 
& Fehr, 2005). Of course, these hypotheses may be not mutually exclusive. 
We may test if intranasal oxytocin inhalation may boost gaze-following a) in 
general b) only for in-group members c) only for trustworthy people.  
The first hypothesis may confirm the role of gaze following in the 
phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of social skills. The 
second would support the hypothesis of the peculiar role of gaze following 
within our own group, or, in the terms of the anthropologist Alan Fiske 
(1992), within a communal sharing form of sociability. The third would 
militate in favor of the role of inferred trust in strengthening the gaze-
following. We could explore this relationship going beyond the automatic 
inference of trustworthiness, trying to build the trustworthy reputation of a 
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peer in a simulated Trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In the 
Trust Game, two anonymous players are involved in dividing a certain 
amount of money. The first player (trustor) has two options. One option is to 
divide the money according to a predetermined scheme; the other option is to 
trust the second player (trustee) and to give him/her the choice to divide the 
money. The latter option potentially leads to a higher pay-off for both players. 
If trusted, the second player has two options: (1) reciprocate the trust given 
by the first player (e.g. 11 for first player and 10 for second player) or (2) 
defect and maximize personal gains (e.g. 5 for first player and 17 for second 
player). We may predict that, after a Trust game, a trustworthy partner gaze 
would interfere to our saccadic task when looking at an incongruent direction 
more than an untrustworthy peer would do. 
All together, these future research would provide us a clear and final picture 
of an amazing process that always remind us the chiasmatic nature of our 
being social and in society. 
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Social and cultural neuroscience: at the intersection between brain and social sciences  
 
In spite of the intrinsically social nature of human beings, research in Cognitive 
Neuroscience has mainly focussed on the individual. Only recently have studies started to 
explore the neurobiological basis of our social abilities and their evolution and thus gave 
birth to Social Neuroscience (SN), a new research field at the intersection of the Social 
sciences and Neurosciences. SN mostly inquires how evolutionary pressure has favoured 
the emergence of the specialized social brain networks that allowed humans to build up 
complex societies. Related to SN is the field of cultural neuroscience (CN) a discipline 
aimed at understanding how society and the Culture shape our minds and brains. 
Scepticism about the possibility of studying the above complex behaviours using the 
reductionist and oversimplifying methods of Neuroscience has been expressed by 
traditional scholars of brain and mind. However, we believe that the increasing sensitivity 
of neuroscience techniques and theoretical approaches will ultimately allow us to 
understand the neuroplastic processes that allow social interactions to shape of our brains. 
It has been demonstrated,, for example that even very basic behaviours like reflexive social 
attention, are influenced by higher-order variables such as social status and political 
affiliation. This shows how our tendency to form groups on the basis of dispositions, 
preferences and ideologies can affect fundamental cognitive processes. We believe that 
neural ad behavioural implicit markers of social preferences and bias complement and 
extend the knowledge deriving from surveys based on explicit responses.  Thus, the SN 
and CN new approach, promises to be very important for both neuroscience and social 
psychology. L’ambiente dell’essere umano, e in misura minore anche quello di molti altri 
animali, specie dei primati non umani, è fortemente sociale. Tuttavia, la complessità 
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dell’ambiente sociale umano richiede che l’essere umano sia anche un animale politico 
(Zoòn politikòn, come ebbe a definirlo Aristotele. Solo da poco le scienze che studiano la 
mente e il suo rapporto con il cervello hanno iniziato a tener conto della natura sociale 
dell’essere umano (per le prime rassegne sull’argomento si leggano Brothers, 1990, 
Cacioppo e Bernston, 1992 Adolphs, 1999). Il tema di cosa significhi avere una mente che 
consenta all’uomo di essere un animale politico in tutti i sensi non ha ancora ricevuto 
l’attenzione adeguata da parte della ricerca neuroscientifica e sociale. Queste discipline, 
all’inizio, si sono concentrate sui processi cognitivo-sociali, ossia su quei processi 
cognitivi (percezione, memoria, attenzione, categorizzazione, inferenze) finalizzati 
all’elaborazione di stimoli sociali (volti, stati mentali altrui). Si sono quindi soffermate 
principalmente sulle condizioni di possibilità del nostro stare in società: ad esempio, 
inferire stati mentali dalla direzione dello sguardo altrui, quindi rendere possibile una 
comunicazione al fine di cooperare oppure di competere1. Tuttavia, solo recentemente, è 
stata presa in considerazione la relazione inversa: possono variabili di natura sociale, 
culturale o politica influenzare le nostre abilità socio-cognitive?  
I comportamenti sembrano, infatti, essere modulati da fattori sociali, che quindi potrebbero 
agire come variabili confondenti. Ad esempio, il gruppo di Michael Platt e colleghi ha a 
lungo studiato il comportamento dell’inseguimento automatico dello sguardo altrui, 
prerequisito di altre abilità socio-cognitive che vanno dall’attenzione condivisa (si veda il 
contributo di Ricciardelli e colleghi su questo stesso numero di Sistemi Intelligenti) alla 
teoria della mente (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In base alle predizioni del modello modularista 
adottato da Baron-Cohen, l’inseguimento dello sguardo altrui sarebbe un comportamento 
automatico, funzionalmente e neuralmente “incapsulato”, dunque impermeabile a 
                                                
1  Sulla supremazia della cooperazione nell’animale umano si legga l’ultimo libro 
curato da Tomasello, 2009.  
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informazioni di natura sociale che non riguardino direttamente la codifica dello 
spostamento dello sguardo.  
Tuttavia, il gruppo di Michael Platt e colleghi ha scoperto come questo comportamento 
possa perdere la sua natura riflessa quando macachi maschi di status sociale alto osservano 
individui di status sociale basso, mentre i membri di quest’ultima categoria sociale 
inseguono sempre lo sguardo di individui a loro familiari, indipendentemente dallo status 
sociale. Dai risultati di questo studio emerge con chiarezza quanto sia importante tener 
conto di variabili sociali. 
Lo stesso gruppo ha scoperto che negli esseri umani la familiarità di un volto rafforza 
l’inseguimento automatico dello sguardo, almeno nelle donne (Deaner, Shepherd et al. 
2007). Il perché di questa differenza tra maschi e femmine è tutta da indagare e le risposte 
possono andare dall’impatto del testosterone nel funzionamento del cervello sociale (si 
veda la discussione in Deaner, Shepherd e Platt, 2007 per maggiori dettagli) a ipotesi che 
individuano nella cultura e nei ruoli di genere assegnati da essa una possibile ragione per 
una maggiore sensibilità delle donne ai segnali sociali.  Sempre più condivisa è la 
constatazione che la cultura abbia un forte impatto nel funzionamento dei processi mentali 
e delle reti neurali da cui dipendono. In questo clima le neuroscienze culturali si stanno 
affermando come disciplina autonoma  (Chiao e Ambady, 2007, Chiao, 2009). Il concetto 
di cultura non va, però, necessariamente inteso in senso statico (Vogeley and Roepstorff 
2009) e coestensivo di identità macroscopiche come Oriente e Occidente. Anche 
l’ideologia, in quanto sistema di valori (Jost, Federico et al. 2009) può essere vista come 
una “matrice di identità culturale” che a sua volta è in grado di modulare (o almeno 
correlare con) comportamenti, processi cognitivi e affettivi.   
 
Attenzione sociale riflessa modulata dall’orientamento politico 
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Lo spostamento automatico dell’attenzione nella direzione in cui guarda un’altra persona 
può essere considerato come un effetto di mirroring oculo-motorio (Bristow, Rees e Frith 
2006) specie se consideriamo che processi attentivi e oculomotori sono molto legati a 
livello della loro rappresentazione neurale (Corbetta et al., 1998), in accordo con la teoria 
premotoria dell’attenzione (Rizzolatti et al., 1987) (a questo proposito si veda il contributo 
di Ricciardelli e Riggio, in questo volume). 
Dodd, Hibbing e Smith (2010) hanno cimentato soggetti sani in un compito di attenzione 
in cui la consegna sperimentale era quella di premere un pulsante posto a destra nella 
tastiera quando vedevano apparire un quadrato nella parte destra dello schermo, oppure un 
pulsante sinistro quando vedevano il quadrato apparire nella parte sinistra. I soggetti 
dovevano compilare anche dei questionari per rilevarne l’orientamento politico.  Gli autori 
di questo studio, apparso recentemente su Attention Perception and  Psychophysics hanno 
dimostrato che i soggetti di sinistra tendono a rispondere più lentamente quando una faccia 
schematica guarda in direzione incongruente rispetto a quella in cui apparirà lo stimolo 
target 500 o 800 millisecondi più tardi. Quelli di destra, invece, sembrano essere assai 
meno sensibili allo sguardo altrui. Gli autori spiegano questo risultato basandosi sulla 
teoria politica della pensatrice conservatrice Ayn Rand (discussa in Burns, 2010), secondo 
la quale i conservatori supportano un’ideologia che deifica l’individuo e quindi sarebbero 
meno sensibili ai segnali sociali. C’è da dire che, in verità, il pensiero di Rand è più 
ascrivibile all’ideologia libertarian2 che al conservatorismo in generale. Infatti, gli studi di 
Jonathan Haidt sui fondamenti morali dell’ideologia politica (Haidt e Graham, 2007), 
evidenziano come, in base al questionario sui fondamenti morali (si veda il sito 
                                                
2  Si ricordi che nel contesto politico americano il libertarismo, che in Europa  è 
quasi sinonimo di anarchia, è un’ideologia che coniuga posizioni estremamente favorevoli 
al libero mercato in campo economico e posizioni antiautoritarie che contrastano 
l’intervento dello stato in qualsiasi aspetto della vita, mentre i conservatori auspicano un 
forte intervento dello stato in difesa dell’ordine pubblico e della morale. 
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www.youmorals.com), i libertari possano formare un gruppo a sé stante (Haidt, Graham e 
Craig, 2009). Anzi, in base agli studi di Haidt i conservatori tradizionali darebbero più 
importanza a valori legati a una visione comunitaria o interdipendente della società 
(Shweder, Much, Mahapatra e Park, 1997), come la lealtà al proprio gruppo. La scelta di 
una faccia schematica lascia inesplorata invece una dimensione importante nello studio di 
fenomeni come l’attenzione sociale riflessa3: il tipo di interazione che intercorre tra i 
soggetto e lo stimolo.  L’esperimento in questione non permette di comprendere come i 
fattori disposizionali dei soggetti interagiscano con le caratteristiche sociali dello stimolo, 
quali la sua identità sociale (se appartiene al proprio gruppo o a un gruppo avverso), o se 
occupa uno status sociale più o meno elevato nella gerarchia di un gruppo.  
 
Disposizioni e orientamento politico 
In uno studio del gruppo di Amodio, suggestivamente intitolato “Neurocognitive correlates 
of liberalism and conservatism” e pubblicato su Nature Neuroscience nel 2006, gli autori 
dimostrano come in un compito in cui bisogna inibire una risposta prepotente (nel senso di 
automatica e difficilmente sopprimibile) i soggetti di sinistra se la cavino meglio. Inoltre, 
le ampiezze di alcuni indici eletrofisiologici (Potenziali Evento Relati, ERP) correlati al 
monitoraggio del conflitto correlano con l'orientamento politico dei soggetti. Ne emerge un 
quadro in cui l’orientamento politico progressista, spesso correlato anche con tratti di 
personalità - come l’apertura mentale - o con stili cognitivi - come una maggiore tolleranza 
dell’ambiguità (si veda Jost, 2009 per una rassegna), vada di pari passo con una effettiva 
capacità di monitorare e gestire il conflitto tra risposte in competizione tra loro e con il 
“marcatore neurale” di questo comportamento. 
                                                
3  anche se è alquanto dubbio, come ammettono gli stessi Dodd e colleghi, che in un 
intervallo di 500 millisecondi o superiore si possa ancora parlare di comportamento 
riflesso 
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Un altro dato che cerca di dare una spiegazione fisiologica della differenza tra destra e 
sinistra è quello pubblicato nel 2008 da un gruppo che coinvolge studiosi di dipartimenti di 
Scienze politiche, Psicologia, Psichiatria e Genetica comportamentale (Oxley, Smith et al. 
2008). In questo esperimento, ai soggetti con forti posizioni favorevoli o contrari alle 
politiche protettive nei confronti della nazione, della famiglia e delle tradizioni venivano  
presentati degli stimoli, visivi o auditivi, capaci di indurre paura (ad esempio, un ragno su 
un volto di una persona spaventata, oppure un suono improvviso). Venivano, quindi, 
misurate delle risposte fisiologiche come la conduttanza cutanea (che misura lo stati di 
attivazione del sistema nervoso autonomo) o l’attività elettirca del muscolo facciale 
preposto allo sbattere delle ciglia. In questo modo, gli autori hanno potuto rilevare che gli 
individui con atteggiamenti più favorevoli a politiche come l’aumento delle spese militari, 
la guerra in Iraq, la pena di morte e più sfavorevoli a temi come l’immigrazione, i 
matrimoni gay, il controllo di armi, l’aborto o la poronografia  presentavano le risposte 
fisiologiche più marcate. 
Proprio questo studio è stato uno dei maggiori obiettivi polemici del celebre pamphlet 
Neuromania (2010) in cui Paolo Legrenzi e Carlo Umiltà attaccano i nuovi filoni di ricerca 
proliferati soprattutto a partire della diffusione della risonanza magnetica funzionale 
(fMRI) nello studio dei correlati neurali dei processi mentali. Gli autori dedicano un 
paragrafo proprio alla “neuropolitica”, sostenendo che “una semplice correlazione, e non 
certo stupefacente, nel senso che chi prova più paura [...] è anche più aperto nei confronti 
dell’altro, più chiuso rispetto ai bisognosi”(Legrenzi e Umiltà, 2001, p. 97). Le ampiezze 
della contrazione dei muscoli coinvolti nella reazione emotiva allo stimolo (ad esempio 
quelli degli occhi)  e l’aumentata capacità della pelle di condurre elettricità a causa della 
sudorazione, a sua volta regolata dal sistema nervoso autonomo, sono misure abbastanza 
dirette, che non derivano, come nel caso dell’fMRI, da complesse modellizzazioni o 
Liuzza – Aglioti  7 
confronti statitistici tra migliaia di voxel4. Inoltre, tale correlazione sembra essere tutt'altro 
che ovvia, visto che mette in relazione una risposta fisiologica a stimoli emotigeni 
abbastanza di base, politicamente neutri, con atteggiamenti su temi molto complessi, che 
riguardano le politiche per proteggere o meno una certa comunità. Insomma, che tra la 
paura fisiologica e la paura sociale (che si traduce poi in domanda di sicurezza) ci sia una 
relazione significativa al di là dell’estensione per metaforizzazione del significato della 
parola paura all'ambito della politica, non ci sembra una cosa da poco. Ancor più cruciale, 
invece, è il nodo dell’interpretazione da dare a questa correlazione. Da questo punto di 
vista, è vero, il dato dell’esperimento di Oaxley condivide con molti studi di fMRI il fatto 
di poter trarre solo conclusioni sulla correlazione tra due variabili, e non sulla loro 
causalità. I due autori di Neuromania denunciano infatti, giustamente, come nell'abstract 
dell’articolo gli autori sembrano suggerire che questa evidenza è da intepretare come una 
predisposizione biologica ad avere determinate posizioni politche. Tuttavia, come 
riconoscono anche Umiltà e Legrenzi, gli autori dello studio sono molto più cauti nella 
discussione, riconoscendo la natura correlazionale dei loro dati e ipotizzando che il 
rapporto tra la paura fisica e quella sociale potrebbe non essere causale né in un senso né in 
un altro, ma potrebbe essere spiegata da una sorta di “fattore latente” da cui potrebbero 
dipendere entrambe. Forse, questo fattore latente andrebbe ricercato in una dimensione 
come la personalità, la quale emerge dall'interazione tra disposizioni stabili - anche 
biologiche - e l’ambiente.  
D'altronde, molti dei più recenti studi sulla psicologia della politica sottolineano proprio 
come ad esempio alcuni tratti misurati da uno dei più usati test per l’analisi della 
                                                
4  Unità minima di analisi della fMRI, corrispondente a cubetti ci circa 3 millimetri cubici in cui 
viene ripartita la scansione del cervello per analizzarne l’attività in specifiche aree. 
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personalità  (Big Five) tendano a spiegare la maggior parte delle scelte politiche degli 
elettori (Caprara e Vecchione, 2007). 
 
A cosa possono servire le neuroscienze sociali? 
Il dibattito è aperto. La tesi di Neuromania è, sostanzialmente, che le neuroscienze sociali 
non aggiungono nulla a quello che la psicologia già aveva scoperto con i suoi metodi 
tradizionali. Se partiamo dagli studi sui correlati neurali della cognizione sociale, invece, 
scopriamo che l'elaborazione di stimoli di natura sociale è differente da quella di stimoli di 
natura non sociale, proprio perché ad essi sono dedicate strutture cerebrali almeno 
parzialmente differenti. Una caratteristica importante dell’elaborazione di stimoli sociali, 
ad esempio, è la loro intima connessione con la dimensione affettiva (Fazio e Towles-
Schwenn, 1999; Fazio, 2001). A ciò si ispirano molti dei più famosi test per misurare gli 
atteggiamenti impliciti come l’Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee e 
Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek e Banaji, 2003), ampiamente utilizzato non solo per 
studiare bias razziali, ma anche per predire il comportamento di voto (Arcuri et al., 2008; 
Galdi, Arcuri e Gawronski, 2008). Lo IAT è un compito di categorizzazione in cui ai 
partecipanti vengono presentati dei volti, che devono essere classificati come appartenenti 
a due categorie (es: “bianchi” o “neri”), oppure delle parole, che devono essere giudicate 
come positive o negative, usando gli stessi tasti del computer per i due compiti. Se si ha un 
atteggiamento negativo verso un determinato gruppo, si tende ad essere più lenti quando si 
usa lo stesso tasto sia per attribuire quel volto a quella categoria sia per giudicare una 
parola come positiva (es: “gioia”). Ad esempio, Avenanti, Sirigu e Aglioti (2010) hanno 
sottoposto a IAT sia partecipanti bianchi che partecipanti neri e hanno trovato che 
entrambi questi gruppi esibivano una preferenza implicita per il proprio gruppo (anche se 
questo bias è più marcato per i bianchi). Quando si osserva la mano di un membro del 
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proprio gruppo penetrata da un ago, la soppressione dell’eccitabilità corticospinale5 è tanto 
maggiore quanto più si ha un atteggiamento implicito favorevole al proprio gruppo (e 
sfavorevole all’altro). Va rilevato che gli atteggiamenti espliciti non correlavano con lo 
IAT, né con la soppressione dell’eccitabilità corticospinale dovuta all’empatia per il dolore 
altrui. Questo esperimento dimostra come con tecniche di neuro-indagine si possano 
espandere le nostre conoscenze sui bias impliciti, che probabilmente condizionano i 
comportamenti quotidiani e persino la nostra reattività di fronte al dolore altrui. Dati come 
questi non devono però essere confusi con una predisposizione innata al razzismo. 
Probabilmente sono i modelli culturali che circolano nella società (Fazio and Olson 2003) 
a causarli e alcune prime evidenze dimostrano che si possano anche attenuare (Lebrecht, 
Pierce, Tarr e Tanaka, 2009). 
Quindi, i metodi delle neuroscienze applicati allo studio di fenomeni che interessano 
l’uomo nella sua natura eminentemente sociale, non solo possono aiutare a comprendere 
meglio alcuni fenomeni, ma in alcuni casi possono anche fornire strumenti utili alla 
politica, ad esempio per combattere discriminazioni che spesso si apprendono e si mettono 
in atto in maniera implicita, non visibile (neanche alla nostra stessa coscienza), ma non per 
questo meno insidiose. Sempre che la politica abbia voglia e interesse ad affrontare questi 
problemi.  
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Introduction
According to standard cognitive theories, language is processed
amodally [1,2] and in higher-order anatomo-functional systems
largely unrelated to sensory and motor networks [3]. However,
growing behavioral [4–7], neuroimaging [8–10], neurophysiologi-
cal [11–15] and neuropsychological [16–20] evidence indicates that
sensorimotor simulation is at play during a variety of language
related tasks. Such evidence brought experimental support to the
Embodied Cognition framework [21] according to which action-
related concepts are represented within the same brain circuitry
responsible for executing the actions linked to the expressed
concepts. Beside action-related concepts, also language may be
embodied [22,23,24], and common representational formats may
underpin linguistic and sensorimotor processes [25,26]. Strong
support to the experiential-simulative account of language process-
ing comes from studies on action simulation and posits that the
automatic and rapid [27] reactivation of the sensorimotor copy of
an action is crucial to enable one to understand its linguistic
meaning [22]. Coherently, deficits in reactivating the sensorimotor
copy of an action should bring about, for example, impaired
performance in semantic tasks. Although the robustness of the
classical dissociation between apraxic and aphasic deficits (e.g. [28–
30]) is not at stake here, many studies have shown that such a
pattern has indeed been observed in a variety of patients showing
sensorimotor deficits associated to Parkinson disease [31,32,20],
cortico-basal degeneration [18], subcortico-frontal diseases [33], left
frontal atrophy [34] and motor neurone disease [16,17].
Many of the studies on embodied language processing have
focused thus far on the semantics of single words (nouns or verbs) (for
instance [12,35–37]). Language comprehension, however, is inher-
ently linked to processing whole sentences that are typically made of
different semantic units (at least two, noun and verb) and are
organized according to specific syntactic rules. Only recently, have
researchers begun to investigate the link between motor knowledge
and sentence processing based on grammatical cues [7,38–41].
Relevant to this issue is the case of sentential negation, the basic
syntactic feature that reverses the truth value expressed by a
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sentence. Two recent fMRI studies have explored the effect of
action negation on brain activity [39,41]. Tettamanti and
colleagues [39] showed that passively listening to negative action
related sentences brought about a selective decrease of the BOLD
signal in the same fronto-parietal network that was activated by
the affirmative form of the same sentences. This decrease was not
observed when participants were engaged in abstract sentences
listening. In a similar vein, the visual presentation of hand action-
related verbs induced higher neural activity in the motor and
premotor cortices when the stimuli were positive rather than
negative imperatives [41].
S-p TMS studies showed that imagination [42,43] or direct
observation of actual [44–48] or implied [49–51] actions induced
an increase of MEPs amplitude. Such a facilitation effect was
highly specific for the muscles that would be involved in actual
execution of the observed action [43–47,50,15] and was likely due
to the activity of the fronto-parietal mirror system [48,52,53]. This
may seem at odds with neurophysiological and behavioral results
showing that listening to limb action verbs (e.g., grasp or kick)
inhibits the corticomotor representation of the limb involved in the
execution of the represented action [14]. However, while the
former condition typically provides explicit cues about the
properties of a specific action (e.g., movement direction or the
specific muscle involved in the action), verbs may typically involve
a number of different ways of performing a given action.
Therefore, while the facilitation during direct observation may
derive from a resonant mirror mapping between model and
onlooker, the inhibition during higher-order linguistic derivation
may arise from the competition between different motor schemata
associated with what is heard or read [14]. In the present study we
tested, for the first time using TMS, whether reading sentences
that negate or affirm the execution of an action would
differentially influence the excitability of the cortico-spinal system.
Using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) we tested the
effect of sentential negation on the reactivity of the motor system
by assessing any selective modulation of the cortico-spinal
excitability during reading affirmative and negative hand action-
related sentences. We recorded the amplitude of Motor Evoked
Potentials (MEPs) from a hand muscle (First Dorsal Interosseus,
FDI) of healthy participants who silently read affirmative and
negative polarity, hand action-related and abstract sentences.
Furthermore, to functionally characterize any neurophysiological
effect contingent upon linguistic negation, we used paired-pulse
(pp-) instead than single pulse (sp-) TMS. It is worth noting that,
while the effect of sp-TMS may take place at both the motor
cortex and the spinal cord level [54], pp-TMS provides a reliable
index of selective motor cortical activation. Indeed the MEP
facilitation to pp-TMS likely occur at the cortical level and reflects
the activation of excitatory cortical interneurons without affecting
spinal circuits [55]. Moreover, we chose to use the pp-TMS
procedure also on the basis of a previous study showing that pp-
TMS (and not sp-TMS) was able to detect modulations of the
cortico-spinal system contingent upon processing of hand-action
related nouns and verbs [35]. The task was based on the visual
presentation of written sentences in order to test the cortico-spinal
excitability while subjects were reading the whole sentence (i.e.
compositional mechanisms of language) instead of hearing the
verb, as in [14].
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The experimental procedures were approved by the Fondazione
Santa Lucia Ethics Committee (24/11/2008) and were carried out
in accordance with the principles of the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants
Fourteen individuals (8 males) participated in the study (mean
age 2362.5 SD). All participants were Italian native speaker, were
right-handed according to the Standard Handedness Inventory
[56] and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All
participants gave their written informed consent prior to their
inclusion in the study and were naive as to its purpose. Participants
were compensated for their time, and specific information
concerning the study was provided to them only after they had
finished all experimental sessions. None of the participants had a
history of neurological, psychiatric, or other medical problems or
any contraindication to TMS [57]. No discomfort or adverse
effects during pp-TMS were noticed or reported.
Stimuli
During the experimental sessions participants were presented
with Italian four-words sentences (see Table 1 for a complete list of
stimuli). The sentences were chosen from a set of 60 sentences used
in a previous study [39] and adapted to the purpose of the study.
The sentences could refer to either abstract activities or hand-
action related actions (‘‘Io sogno la pace’’ which translated in
English reads as ‘‘I dream the peace’’, ‘‘Io colgo la mela’’ which
translated in English reads as ‘‘I grasp the apple’’). Each sentence
was presented in both affirmative or negative polarity (‘‘Io spremo
il limone’’ which translated in English reads as ‘‘I squeeze the
lemon’’ and ‘‘Non spremo il limone’’ which translated in English
reads as ‘‘I don’t squeeze the lemon’’). It is important to note that,
in Italian, the negative version of these sentences implicitly
includes reference to the first person and thus affirmative and
negative sentences are matched for length and reference to the
agent of the action. To further control for any possible difference
between motor hand-related and abstract items that could affect
sentence reading speed we controlled that the frequency of the
verb, frequency of the object complement, number of the syllables
of the verb, number of syllables of the sentence were accurately
matched between categories (according to the corpus provided by
the CoLFIS (Corpus e Lessico di Frequenza dell’Italiano Scritto)
elaborated by the Computational Linguistics Insititute, National
Centre of Research (CNR) and available at http://www.ge.ilc.cnr.
it/lessico.php on a database of 3.798.275 words). Conversely to
control that items of the two categories differed for their
imageability and motor relatedness we asked an independent
group of 20 individuals (mean age 27.1563.87 SD) to rate each
experimental item, by marking a 1 to 7 Likert scale, for 1) how fast
is the sentence in evoking a mental image, a visual representation,
a sound or other perceptual experiences, and 2) how much
movement is implied by each sentence (all mean values of these
measures are reported in Table 2 and Table S1 of the Supporting
Information). Crucially for the purposes of our experiment, action
related sentences were more imaginable (6.0660.89 SD vs
2.4461.06 SD; t(19) = 18.40, p,0.001) and more motor related
(5.7461.14 SD vs 1.0860.15 SD; t(19) = 18.04, p,0.001) than
abstract ones.
Electromiographic Recordings and Transcranial
magnetic stimulation. Electromyography (EMG) - MEPs to
pp-TMS of the left motor cortex were recorded from the right
FDI. Silver/silver chloride surface electrodes were placed over the
muscle belly (active electrode) and over the associated joint or
tendon of the muscle (reference electrode). A ground electrode was
placed on the right wrist. A CED Power 1401 (Cambridge
Electronic Design Ltd, Cambridge, UK) was connected to an
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Isolated Amplifier System Model D360 (Digitimer Limited,
Hertfordshire, UK) and interfaced with CED Spike 2 software.
The second-order Butterworth filter was set between 20 and
2.5 kHz (sampling rate, 10 kHz). Signals were displayed at a gain
of 1000. Auditory feedback of the electromyography signal was
used to help subjects maintain voluntary muscle relaxation during
electrophysiological preparation.
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (pp-TMS). The
optimal scalp position (OSP) for inducing MEPs in the right
FDI muscle was found by moving the coil in steps of 1 cm over the
left primary cortex until the largest MEPs were found. Then, the
position was marked with a pen on a bathing cap worn by
participants. The coil was held tangential to the scalp with the
handle pointing backward and laterally at 45u from the midline.
Resting motor threshold (rMT) was defined as the lowest stimulus
intensity that evoked at least 5 MEPs out of 10 consecutive
magnetic pulses with an amplitude .50 mV. During the
experimental blocks, two pulses of TMS were delivered over the
individual OSP by connecting two Magstim Model 200
stimulators with a Bistim module (The Magstim Company),
producing a maximum output of 1.75 T at the coil surface
(stimulus attenuation, 22%; duration, 1 ms; rise time, 110 ms). The
two pulses were delivered by means of a 70 mm figure eight
stimulation coil (Magstim polyhurethane-coated coil). In standard
pp-TMS protocols, a conditioning stimulus (CS) below the rMT, is
followed at short interstimulus intervals (ISIs) by a suprathreshold
test stimulus (TS). At ISIs of 7–20 msec the CS produce an MEP
facilitation which is thought to take place at the cortical level
reflecting the activation of excitatory cortical interneurons without
affecting spinal circuits [55]. In our study, the CS stimulus was set
to 80% of the rMT while the TS pulse was set at 120% of rMT.
Mean rMT was 506SD 9% of maximum stimulator output. The
time delay between the first conditioning pulse and the test one
was set to 10 ms as this interval has been proven to measure the
effect of facilitatory interneuron connections [55]. EMG recording
started 100 ms before the test magnetic pulse in order to control
for the absence of muscular preactivation in each trial. MEPs’
peak-to-peak amplitudes (in millivolts) were collected and stored in
a computer for off-line analysis.
Procedure
Participants sat with their right and left arm and hand resting on
a pillow on their lap. The participants were comfortably seated in
a dimly lit room at a distance of 80 cm from a computer screen.
Eighteen abstract and eighteen motor (nine positive and nine
negative) sentences were randomly presented within each of the
two experimental blocks, intermingled with the presentation of
nine black squares which enabled us to measure the baseline
cortico-spinal excitability of the hand muscle (45 trial per block for
a total of 18 trials per condition). At the beginning of the
experiment, subjects were instructed to pay attention to the visual
stimuli presented on the screen as, during the inter-trial interval,
Table 1. List of all experimental stimuli.
Abstract Hand action-related
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Io invidio la bellezza Non invidio la bellezza Io afferro la maniglia Non afferro la maniglia
I envy beauty I don’t envy beauty I grab the handle I don’t grab the handle
Io sogno la pace Non sogno la pace Io spremo il limone Non spremo il limone
I dream the peace I don’t dream the peace I squeeze the lemon I don’t squeeze the lemon
Io rispetto il patto Non rispetto il patto Io avvito il bullone Non avvito il bullone
I respect the deal I don’t respect the deal I screw in the bolt I don’t screw in the bolt
Io tollero lo sgarbo Non tollero lo sgarbo Io impugno la spada Non impugno la spada
I tolerate the rudeness I don’t tolerate the rudeness I clasp the sword I don’t clasp the sword
Io perdono la colpa Non perdono la colpa Io colgo la mela Non colgo la mela
I forgive the guilt I don’t forgive the guilt I pick the apple I don’t pick the apple
Io ricordo il passato Non ricordo il passato Io ritaglio la foto Io ritaglio la foto
I remember the past I don’t remember the past I cut out the picture I cut out the picture
In italic the English translation of each sentence used as stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016855.t001
Table 2. List of frequency, length and subjective ratings’ mean values of all stimuli.
V F O C F V No S S No S IMAG MOT R
Hand Action-related sentences 70.5673.7 99.86127.8 2.760.5 7.260.8 6.1±0.9 5.7±1.1
Abstract content sentences 353.56517.7 294.36212.0 2.860.4 7.260.8 2.4±1.1 1.1±0.2
T value 1.33 1.92 0.62 0 18.4* 18.03*
P value 0.21 0.08 0.55 1 ,0.001 ,0.001
Values represent mean 6 standard deviations of stimuli of all experimental conditions.
In italic T-tests and p values. In bold means that differ significantly between abstract and hand-related sentences. V F = Verb Frequency; O C F = Object Complement
Frequency; V No S = Verb Number of Syllables; S No S = Sentence Number of Syllables; IMAG = Imageability; MOT R = Motor Relatedness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016855.t002
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they would be asked questions concerning the last read sentence
(ITI 10 s). For example subject could have been asked whether the
sentence was positive, negative, whether the last word ended with
an ‘‘a’’ or not and to answer to questions about the meaning of the
sentence as ‘‘Do you grasp the apple?’’, ‘‘Do you respect the
deal?’’. The choice of the duration of this inter-trial interval was
based on research [58] that showed no change in cortico-spinal
excitability after repetitive TMS at 0.1 Hz for 1 h. This procedure
allowed us to rule out that effects of TMS per se influenced the
results. Each trial started with a fixation cross lasting 10 s followed
by the presentation of the sentence or the fixation square which
lasted 800 ms. During the presentation of each sentence (or black
square) a paired-pulse TMS was delivered at randomly variable
time intervals ranging between 500 and 700 ms after stimulus
onset. The decision to stimulate the cortico-spinal system in this
time window was based on Pulvermu¨ller’s neurophysiological
research showing early (200 ms) EEG modulations over central
sites during action related-verbs and nouns reading respectively,
and later (500–800 ms) high frequency (30 Hz) modulations
recorded from central sites (C3/C4) for action verbs compared
to nouns [12]. A schematic representation of two different-stimulus
category trial events is shown in Figure 1.
Data Analysis
MEP amplitudes that fell 3 SDs above or below each individual
mean for each experimental condition or single trials contaminated
by muscular preactivation were excluded as outliers and precon-
tracted trials, respectively (5% of total). Raw MEP amplitudes for
each condition were normalized (divided) by baseline MEP
amplitudes. Normalized MEP amplitudes were entered in a 2
(sentence Type: Abstract, Hand-related) X 2 (Polarity: Negative,
Positive) repeated measures ANOVA. Post-hoc analysis was
performed with Duncan test. All statistical tests were performed
with the software STATISTICA 8 (StatSoft, Tulsa, OK, USA).
Results
Analysis of MEP amplitudes revealed a main effect of Polarity
(F(1,13) = 4.94, p=0.045, g2 = 0.27) which was accounted for by
smaller MEP amplitudes during reading positive than negative
sentences (0.976SD 0.12 vs 1.016SD 0.13, note that in Figure 2
the MEP amplitudes are reported with respect to the baseline
value, normalized MEP-1). The sentence Type main effect was
non significant (F(1, 13) = 2.88, p=0.113, g2 = 0.18). Importantly,
the sentence Type by Polarity interaction was significant
(F(1,13) = 5.77, p=0.032, g2 = 0.31) (see Figure 2).
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the interaction was entirely
accounted for by a suppression of cortico-spinal excitability during
hand related positive sentences. Indeed, reading positive hand
related sentences induced lower cortico-spinal excitability
(0.936SD 0.13) with respect to both reading positive abstract
sentences (1.026SD 0.09, p= 0.047, Cohen’s d =0.88) and
negative hand related sentences (1.046SD 0.14, p= 0.030,
Cohen’s d =0.84). Furthermore, the almost significant trend
showed by the T-test against baseline (value 1) (t(13) =22.13,
p=0.053) indicated that the MEP suppression during reading
positive hand related sentences was a genuine inhibition of the
cortico-spinal excitability. All other conditions did not differ from
one another (all ps.0.15) and did not differ from baseline (ps.0.1).
Discussion
Cortico-spinal signatures of motor simulation are found
when reading action-related but not abstract sentences
The first result of our study is the decrease of MEP amplitudes
when subjects silently read positive action-related sentences
compared to positive abstract sentences. This is in keeping with
a previous sp-TMS study where subjects listened to auditory
verbal stimuli and they received a single pulse at the end of the
verb [14]. Our pp-TMS results expand previous knowledge by
Figure 1. Experimental Procedure. Timeline and subjects’ posture during the experimental procedure. Paired-pulse Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (p-pTMS) was delivered on average 600 ms (6100 ms) after each sentence appeared on the screen. Stimulation intensity was based on
individual resting motor threshold (rMT) for the first dorsal interosseous (FDI). The Conditioning Stimulus (CS) was set at an intensity of 80% of rMT
while the Test Stimulus (TS) at 120% of rMT with an Inter Stimulus Interval (ISI) of 10 ms over FDI Optimal Scalp Position (OSP).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016855.g001
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demonstrating that the effect has to do more with to cortical
interneurons than with modulations at any other level of the
cortico-spinal pathway [54]. Moreover, unlike a previous study
using auditory presentation of single words [14], we used visual
presentation of sentences that allowed us to test language
processing at the sentence level and thus the effects of the
compositional mechanisms of language more than the processing
of the single verb [14]. This latter aspect of our study is crucial in
order to test the theories postulating that sensorimotor simulation
contributes to language processing.
Lack of action simulation during processing of negative
polarity, hand action-related sentences
The key result of our TMS study is that sentential polarity
selectively modulates cortico-motor reactivity only when the
sentence refers to hand actions. Psycholinguistic studies show
slower reactivity to stimuli referred to in a negative sentence
suggesting a sort of experiential based language comprehension
[59]. Studies on the neural basis of negation were performed
mainly using functional neuroimaging techniques [60,61]. An
fMRI study focusing on the neural basis of bilingualism, for
example, reported that neural activity in parietal and frontal
regions was higher when listening to negative action-related
sentences with respect to positive ones [61]. However, the study
did not use non action-related, control stimuli. Moreover, the
effect was present only when processing the participants’ second
language and it was interpreted as being related to the difficulty of
the task and not in terms of motor simulation vs. no-simulation
[61]. More recently, two fMRI studies specifically tested the effect
of sentential negation in relation to the language-mediated
embodiment of actions [39,41]. Passive listening of action-related
or abstract sentences uttered in affirmative or negative polarity
demonstrated that processing of negative action-related sentences
brought about a reduction of neural activation and cortical
connectivity in a left-hemispheric frontoparieto-temporal network
[39]. Using a region of interest (ROI) analysis, it has also been
shown that visual presentation of negative polarity, imperative
action-related verbs induced a reduction of neural activity in
motor and premotor regions [41]. Our study complements and
expands previous fMRI results for a number of reasons.
By using a pp-TMS procedure we have been able to highlight
the specific role played by facilitatory cortico-cortical connections
in the action simulation process associated to the representation of
grammatical features. More specifically, we found a suppression of
MEP amplitudes during positive hand action sentences reading
compared with baseline.
Many of the previous findings on the involvement of the motor
system in action-related word comprehension have been explained
by an associative learning model [11,37,62,63] which posits that
action-related verbs automatically co-activate neuronal ensembles
dedicated to language and actions. This co-activation would be
developed during individuals’ ontogenesis as we learn to utter
action-related verbs while performing the same actions. However,
we show here that such ‘‘language-to-motor’’ neural spread of co-
activation is not observed when reading negative forms of action
verbs.
Assuming that effective use of cognitive and neural systems is
based on the implementation of the exact amount of resources
required by the task at hand, it has been postulated that language-
mediated motor simulation occurs only when the action is within
the linguistic focus [7,64]. The Linguistic-Focus Hypothesis, in
fact, postulates that engagement of the motor system during
Figure 2. MEP amplitudes in all experimental conditions. MEP amplitudes are represented with respect to their baseline value of excitability
recorded during the observation of a black square (normalized MEP-1). Motor potentials evoked during positive hand action related sentences were
significantly inhibited with respect to the ones evoked during positive abstract sentences and with respect to baseline. MEPs were modulated by
linguistic polarity during hand action related sentences comprehension but not during abstract sentences. Vertical bars denote standard error means.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016855.g002
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language comprehension is mediated by the focus of the linguistic
message [64]. Taylor and Zwaan [64] used an action compatibility
effect experimental paradigm (ACE, [4]) in which participants had
to read sentences like ‘‘The runner/was very/thirsty./A fan/
handed him/a bottle/of cold/water/which he/opened/quickly’’
in a self paced manner and had to turn a knob in order to proceed
in reading the sentence either in a clockwise or in a counter-
clockwise direction. The action described in the sentence could
either match or mismatch the action that subjects had to perform
in order to proceed in reading the sentence. For instance, since
opening a bottle of water requires a clockwise action, reading a
sentence which describes this action, should induce slower reading
times when the knob has to be turned in a counter-clockwise
direction because the motor resonance, activated by the verb,
interferes with the action to perform in order to execute the task.
Importantly, adverbs should modulate the ACE effect only if they
deal with the action itself by increasing the linguistic focus on the
motor content of the sentence. In fact, their results showed that
when a verb was modified by an adverb, compatible motor
responses were facilitated when reading the adverb only if the
adverb primarily modified an action-related feature (e.g., quickly
and slowly) and not when some other element of the referential
situation was modified (e.g. happily, eagerly, or nervously). Within
this theoretical framework, we propose that sentential negation is a
powerful grammatical cue that could suppress the sensorimotor
simulation of the (negated) action. The neural counterpart of such
mechanism may be the lack of reduction of cortico-motor
resonance for negative action verbs.
Psychophysical studies on the effects of the representation of
linguistic negation suggest that the temporal characteristics of the
experimental task (i.e. fast or delayed decision) have different
effects on the processing of ‘what is negated’ [65]. On the basis of
this and other behavioral findings [66], Kaup and colleagues
[66,59] have proposed a two-step model of negation processing in
which comprehenders first create a representation of ‘what’ is
negated and than shift their attention towards the actual state of
affairs (the state implied by the negation) at a later point in the
comprehension process. On the basis of their data, the first step
seems to occur within the first 1500 ms after the sentence onset,
the second step should occur after 1500 ms or later. Interestingly,
the fine-grained temporal resolution provided by TMS allowed us
to provide neural indexes of the lack of simulation contingent
upon negation even in the time window where affirmative and
negative sentences should not differ on the basis of the model
proposed by Kaup and colleagues [59] (500–700 ms after stimulus
presentation).
Conclusions
In conclusion, our results demonstrate a selective modulation of
the cortico-spinal excitability during: i) reading positive action
related sentences with respect to positive, non-action related
sentences; and ii), more importantly, reading positive hand action-
related sentences compared with action-related negative sentences.
Thus, we show that negation does not play a non-specific role in
sentence representation but it does act as a gate that inhibits
cortico-spinal sensorimotor simulation.
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a b s t r a c t
We investigated motor resonance in children using a priming paradigm. Participants were
asked to judge the weight of an object shortly primed by a hand in an action-related pos-
ture (grasp) or a non action-related one (fist). The hand prime could belong to a child or to
an adult. We found faster response times when the object was preceded by a grasp hand
posture (motor resonance effect). More crucially, participants were faster when the prime
was a child’s hand, suggesting that it could belong to their body schema, particularly when
the child’s hand was followed by a light object (motor simulation effect). A control exper-
iment helped us to clarify the role of the hand prime. To our knowledge this is the first
behavioral evidence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Implications
of the results for the development of the sense of body ownership and for conceptual
development are discussed.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The body mediates all the interactions we have with objects and other organisms in our world. Our own body determines
our perception of objects, for example perception of slant and distance change if we are carrying a heavy backpack (Proffitt,
Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003). We also use our body to perceive and understand other people’s actions, for example we
process perceived actions that we can perform and ones that we cannot perform differently (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser,
Passingham, & Haggard, 2006). Highly important for our sense of body is the capability to differentiate our own body from
the body of others (Borghi & Cimatti, 2010). There is evidence that our brain ‘‘resonates’’ when we see others performing
actions. This ‘resonance’ mechanism is modulated by the similarity between the actions we observe and the actions we
are able to perform. The neural underpinnings of motor resonance are thought to reside in the mirror neuron system
(MNS) and canonical neuron system, discovered originally in the monkey premotor cortex (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi,
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Murata et al., 1997). Mirror neurons fire both when a grasping action is perceived and performed;
canonical neurons fire when a given action is performed and when the subject sees an object that the action can be per-
formed upon. Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies suggest that a similar system and resonant mechanisms are also
present in humans (for a review see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These mechanisms are modulated by the similarity be-
tween the perceived actions and the actions we are able to execute. Brain imaging and behavioral studies have shown that,
when participants observe others dancing, climbing, or playing basketball, resonant mechanisms are evoked, and that this
motor resonance is stronger when expert athletes rather than novices observe other experts (e.g. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani,
& Urgesi, 2008; Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009; Pezzulo, Barca, Bocconi, & Borghi, 2010). Behavioral
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evidence has shown that, when the actions observed are part of the motor repertoire of the perceiver, actions are recognized
more easily (Knoblich & Flach, 2001). These findings are in line with the ideomotor theories (Hommel, Muesseler, Ascher-
sleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997), according to which perceptual features and motor plans rely on a common representa-
tional code: in other words, the more similar the action we see and the action we can perform are, the easier we simulate.
Bruzzo, Borghi, and Ghirlanda (2008) investigated whether observing actions similar to the actions that are part of our
motor repertoire influences processing perceived actions. They used a priming paradigm and found that participants were
faster to decide whether an action made sense or not when they observed a hand interacting with an object (e.g. grasping
an orange) in the actor (egocentric) perspective rather than in an allocentric perspective. This shows that it is easier to put
ourselves in others’ shoes and to resonate while perceiving an action when we share action-relevant characteristics, such as
the viewpoint (egocentric or allocentric) with the actor.
We think it would be worth to distinguish between motor resonance and motor simulation, given that in the literature
contrasting definitions have been provided (for a brief overview see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; for different definitions see Gal-
lese, 2009; Jeannerod, 2007).
In this paper we will use the term ‘‘motor simulation’’ to refer to the fact that observing objects activates a simulated
motor action. In other words, observation of graspable objects, such as notebooks and dictionaries, should activate a motor
simulation, the underlying neural basis of which is probably the canonical neuron system. Motor simulation refers to the
process of internally simulating an action when perceiving an object that can be acted upon (first person perspective). Motor
resonance, the neural basis of which is the mirror neuron system, instead, would be activated during observation of others
interacting with objects – for example, when we observe somebody lifting a dictionary with the hand. Our mirror neuron
system seems to resonate with differing intensity depending on the similarity between the actions we observe and the ac-
tions that are part of our motor competence. For example, Calvo-Merino et al. (2006) have shown that dancers’ mirror neu-
ron system resonated more when observing dancers of their own gender. Motor resonance refers to the overlap of
characteristics between the perceiver’s actions and the perceived actions.
In spite of the large body of evidence obtained (Aglioti et al., 2008; Buccino et al., 2001; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzol-
atti, 1995; Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, & Aglioti, 2006), somemechanisms underlying motor resonance are still poorly understood.
Results have shown that motor resonance increases when participants and the observed actor share the same culture (Mol-
nar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007) and perspective (Bruzzo et al., 2008), and when they have a similar motor com-
petence (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). So far, however, few studies (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Lepage & Théoret, 2006; Martineau,
Cochin, Magne, & Barthelemy, 2008) investigated the extent to which this motor resonance process changes during the life-
span, in conjunction with our bodily modifications. The present study aims to fill this gap, investigating to what extent motor
simulation and motor resonance processes occur in children.
We addressed this issue using a visuo-motor priming paradigm, in which a hand prime was followed by a target-object.
Behavioral evidence with visuomotor priming paradigms has shown that observing an effector in potential interaction with
an object re-activates our perceptual and action experience with it (Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, et al., 2007; Borghi, Bonfiglioli,
Ricciardelli, et al., 2007; Vainio, Symes, Ellis, Tucker, & Ottoboni, 2008): for example, Borghi and colleagues (Borghi, Bonfiglioli,
Lugli, et al., 2007; Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Ricciardelli, et al., 2007; Setti, Borghi, & Tessari, 2009) have demonstrated that an action-
related prime (i.e. a static grasping hand) can activate information regarding how to manipulate (e.g. using an unimanual or a
bimanual grasp; a precision or a power grip) target objects or nouns referring to them. Along the same line, neuroimaging stud-
ies have shown that observing static pictures of the same objects being grasped or touched is sufficient to selectively activate
the frontal mirror region (Johnson-Frey et al., 2003); further TMS evidence confirms that a grasping hand in (implied) motion
affects the primary motor area (Urgesi et al., 2006). In a developmental study, Kalenine, Bonthoux, and Borghi (2009) have
shown how action primes (e.g. a hand in grasping posture) can prime basic level concepts (e.g. ‘saw’) more effectively than
superordinate concepts (e.g. ‘tool’) in children from the age of 7 (even if the developmental pattern is not clear).
In a previous study Setti, Liuzza, Burke, Borghi, and Newell (in preparation) investigated to what extent motor resonance
increases when participants share the same age. The authors used a priming paradigm. A hand prime was followed by heavy
vs. light manipulable objects; participants were required to decide whether the target-object was heavy or light. They found
that both young adults and older adults responded faster to hand primes of their same gender, but overall they did not re-
spond faster when they observed hands of actors of their same age compared to a different age. This suggests they did not
resonate to others’ actions. A possible reason for the absence of the motor resonance effect with people of the same age could
be due to the simple fact that humans are not sensitive to the age differences. An alternative reason is that age matters and
impacts motor resonance, but only when the body schema changes substantially. Given that from youth to older adulthood
only partial changes in body schema occur, the difference between the younger and older hand may have been too subtle for
a difference in motor resonance to be found. In addition, the lifting actions alluded to in Setti et al. (in preparation) study may
be too simple to be susceptible to a different motor simulation between younger and older (see also Poliakoff, Galpin, Dick, &
Tipper, 2009), i.e. both older and younger adults can easily simulate lifting of the objects used as stimuli.
In the present studywe used a similar paradigm to investigate the extent to which childrenwere sensitive to the difference
between children’s and adults hands. Few studies have investigated if theMNS is at play since childhood. Among them Lepage
and Théoret (2006), for example, have demonstrated that, in children aged between 4 and 11 years, action observation re-
duces the magnitude of the mu (8–13 Hz) rhythm which is considered to reflect the activation of the mirror fronto-parietal
system. Martineau et al. (2008) compared EEG activity during the observation of videos showing actions or still scenes in
autistic children and neurotypical children between 5 and 7 years of age (3 girls and 11 boys, aged 5 years 3 months–7 years
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11 months). The authors found similar mu suppression during observation of human actions in the group of healthy children
but not in autistic children. Similarly, it has been found (Cattaneo et al., 2007) that normally developing children between 5
and 9 years old, but not autistic spectrum disorder children of the same age, show an electro-myographic activity coherent
with the observed action. This indicates that there is evidence of motor simulation activity in young neurotypical children.
Here, analogously to the study from Setti et al. (in preparation), we used a priming paradigm and a weight judgment task
with children aged 7–10. The prime was a hand in grasping posture (either belonging to a child or an adult actor) or a hand in
no-grasping posture (fist) and targets were heavy or light objects, the task required participants to decide if the target object
was heavy or light. Based on the aforementioned evidence we hypothesized that a motor simulation would be activated
while observing objects, and that a motor resonance process would be activated while observing others hands in potential
interaction with objects.
We formulated the following predictions:
a. If observing objects activates a motor simulation (first person perspective, canonical mirror system), then heavy
objects should be processed slower than light ones, given that in real life lifting heavy objects requires more time
and effort than lifting light ones.
b. If observing actions with objects activates a motor resonance (mirror neuron system), then objects preceded by hands
in a grasping posture should be processed faster than objects preceded by fist hand primes.
c. Because motor resonance should be modulated by the similarity between an observer and a model performing an
action, we predicted that children would be more susceptible to motor resonance when the actor has the same body
schema as the viewer. Therefore, we predict that, when the prime is an action that is portrayed by a child’s hand, reac-
tion times should be faster.
d. If, as we hypothesize, a child mirror neuron system is more likely to resonate when the hand prime is similar to the
subject’s hand, the difference between the light and heavy objects should be more pronounced when preceded by a
child hand prime than by an adult’s hand prime.
e. Finally, if an interaction between action posture, age of the prime and weight of the target occurs, we aim to assess in
what direction the presence of the prime modulates performance compared to a baseline without any prime. In other
words, we hypothesize that, without any prime, we should observe the same pattern of results that we would observe
in presence of a dissimilar prime or of a non-action prime. To this purpose, we ran a control experiment, in which no
prime preceded the target stimuli.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Participants
Sixty-one children (28 Female; mean age = 8.46 years old; range = 7–10; st. dev. = 1.09) volunteered to take part in the
study with their parents informed consent conforming to the Declaration of Helsinki. They had self-reported good vision
and hearing and they all reported to be right handed. None of the participants suffered from neurological illness. This age
group was chosen as the study by Kalenine et al. (2009) suggests that children at this age are already susceptible to vi-
suo-motor resonance, however this particular study did not directly compare action primes with perceptually similar no-ac-
tion primes (action primes were compared with scenes). In addition a study by Mounoud, Duscherer, Moy, and Perraudin
(2007) suggests that actions are part of an automatically activated conceptual knowledge of certain kinds of objects (i.e.
tools) from age five. However none of these studies directly address visuo-motor resonance.
2.2. Stimuli
We used three pictures of familiar light objects (empty box of matches; block notes; mobile phone) and three pictures of
familiar heavy objects (dictionary; brick; gymweight) as targets (Fig. 1A). The pictures were black and white and were edited
Fig. 1. (A) An example of hand primes used in the Experiment 1. (B) Target stimuli used in the Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects were asked to judge them as
heavy or light.
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with Adobe Photoshop. Their average size was 13  10.5 and pictures were presented to participants at a distance of 57 cm
from the screen. Pictures used as primes displayed a hand in grasping or no grasping position (fist) on a neutral background.
The actor portraying the grasping or no grasping action could be female or male and the hand could belong to an adult or
child (Fig. 1B). Both the female and male child actors were 4 year-old and the female and male adult actors were 25 and
28 respectively.
Fig. 2. (A) Experiment 1: response times (in ms) for heavy and light objects when preceded by a Child or an Adult hand in Grasp or Fist posture. Asterisks
mean that the p Newman–Keuls post hoc is significant (p < .05; p < .01; p < .005). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (B) Experiment 1:
accuracy (percentage of correct responses) for heavy and light objects when preceded by a Child or an Adult hand in Grasp or Fist posture. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.
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2.3. Design and procedure
The gender of the prime was matched with the gender of participants. Every target stimulus was presented 16 times, and
every hand prime 24 times, for a total of 96 trials.
Participants were seated at approximately 57 cm from the computer screen (DELL laptop XPS M1530, monitor 19 in.) and
they were presented with a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by a visual image of a hand (prime) for 700 ms, followed by
the picture of an object that could be heavy (e.g. dictionary) or light (e.g. matches box). Their task was to respond by pressing
the ‘m’ key with the index finger of their right hand if the object was heavy and the ‘z’ key with the index finger of their left
hand if it was light (half of the participants responded heavy with the left hand and half with the right hand). The experiment
lasted less than 10 min and it was programmed and delivered with E-Prime software.
2.4. Results
The Mean participant error rate was 12% (0.09 SD). We excluded eight participants from the correct RT analysis because
their accuracy in one of the experimental conditions was less than 50%. Participants’ response times (RTs) over or above two
SD from the subject’s RT grand mean were removed from the analysis (5.3%).
We entered the percentage of errors in a 2  2  2 ANOVA with Age of the prime (child vs. adult), Kind of prime (grasp vs.
no grasp) and Weight of the target (heavy vs. light) as within participant variables. We found no significant main effect.
Importantly, there was no effect of the target weight, nor interactions (F(1,60) < 1.81, ps > .18, see Fig. 2B). Table 1 also re-
ports the sensitivity (d prime) and the response bias (beta). Furthermore, mean accuracy scores and mean RTs for each sub-
ject did not positively correlate (r = .17, p > .12). Since we could conclude that there was not speed-accuracy trade off at
play, we focused our analysis on RTs.
Correct RTs were entered in a 2  2  2 ANOVA with Age of the hand prime (child vs. adult), Kind of prime (grasp vs. no
grasp) and Weight of the target (heavy vs. light) as within participant variables. We found a significant main effect of the
Kind of prime (grasp vs. no grasp, (F(1,52) = 5.48, p < .05), participants performing faster when primed by a hand in action
posture (grasp) than when the hand prime posture did not portray the grasping action (fist) (739 ms ± 98 SD vs.
759 ms ± 120 SD) respectively). We also found that the main effect of the Age of the hand approached significance
(F(1,52) = 2.98, p = .09), due to the fact that participants tended to be faster when primed by a child’s hand as opposed to
an adult one (743 ms ± 103 SD vs. 755 ms ± 113 SD). The Kind of prime interacted significantly with the Weight of the target,
(F(1,52) = 10.1, p < .005). Newman–Keuls post hoc test revealed that, within the action prime condition (i.e. when a hand in a
grasp posture preceded the target), participants were faster to process light objects than heavy ones (722 ms ± 104 SD vs.
Table 1
Response bias in Experiments 1 (in each prime condition) and 2.
Experiment 1 Response ‘‘heavy’’ Response ‘‘light’’
Adult grasp
Target heavy .86 .14
Target light .11 .89
D prime 2.29
Beta 1.15
Adult fist
Target heavy 0.88 0.12
Target light 0.13 0.87
D prime 2.34
Beta 0.94
Child grasp
Target heavy 0.89 0.11
Target light 0.12 0.88
D prime 2.38
Beta 0.97
Child fist
Target heavy .90 0.10
Target light 0.11 0.89
D prime 2.47
Beta 0.92
Experiment 2 Response ‘‘heavy’’ Response ‘‘light’’
Target heavy .94 .06
Target light .19 .81
D prime 2.45
Beta 0.44
The table reports the proportions of responses in each condition, the sensitivity (D prime) and the
response bias (Beta) for each prime condition.
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757 ms ± 121 SD, p < .02). Furthermore, light objects were processed significantly faster (p = .03) when primed by an action
hand posture than when primed by a fist (ps < .03).
Importantly, we found a significant three way interaction between Kind of prime, Age of the hand prime and Weight of
the target, (F(1,52) = 4.97, p = .03, see Fig. 2A). Newman–Keuls post hoc test revealed that the interaction was due to the fact
that the response to light targets primed by a child hand in an action posture was faster (699 ms ± 164 SD) than all the other
conditions, ps < .02).
3. Experiment 2
The most important result of Experiment 1 consisted in the facilitation found when kids observed a child’s hand prime. As
to the target-objects, we did not find any difference in RTs between Light and Heavy Objects when they were preceded by an
adult hand or by a hand prime that did not display an action (fist). Since we did not have a non-prime condition, we could not
establish if the difference in RTs between Light and Heavy targets found in the Child grasp prime condition had a pattern
which reflected or differed from a baseline without any prime. To clarify this point we ran a control experiment in which
we presented only the target-objects without the hand prime. If observing objects activates a motor simulation (probably
mediated by the canonical neurons system) even in absence of a hand prime, then we should find an advantage of light over
heavy objects.
3.1. Participants
Twelve children (seven Females; mean age = 8.92 years old; range = 6–13; st. dev. = 2.23) volunteered to take part in the
study with their parents informed consent conforming to the Declaration of Helsinki. They had self-reported good vision and
hearing and they all reported to be right handed. None of the participants suffered from neurological illness.
3.2. Stimuli
The target-stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1 but the hand primes were not presented.
3.3. Design and procedure
The design was the same as that of Experiment 1, but without the prime. Every target stimulus was presented 16 times, so
every condition (heavy target, light target) included 48 observations. The experiment lasted about 5 min.
3.4. Results
The Mean participant error rate was 13.11% (0.33 SD). We excluded one participant from the correct RT analysis because
the accuracy in one of the experimental conditions was less than 50%. Participants’ response times over or above two SD
from the subject’s RT grand mean were removed from the analysis (5.2%).
We compared Mean correct RTs of the Weight of the target (heavy vs. light) by a two tailed paired sample T test and we
did not find any significant difference (mean light = 745 ms ± 155 SD vs. mean heavy = 702 ms ± 167 SD, t(10) = 1.30,
p = 0.22, Cohen’s d = 0.27, see Fig. 3A). This result confirms that, similarly to a baseline condition in which no prime precedes
the target, the lack of a dissimilar prime (an adult hand) as well as of a similar prime which does not perform any action (a
child fist) does not cause any difference in the speed of processing of heavy vs. light objects.
Even though the RTs for the heavy objects seem to be faster than in the Experiment 1, the Equal Variances Not Assumed T-
Test showed no difference between the two experiments (t(12.24) = 0.96; p > .3).
In order to rule out the speed-accuracy trade off, we compared mean accuracy (percentage of correct responses on the
total number of trials per condition) of the Weight of the target (heavy vs. light) by a two tailed paired sample T test and
we found that participants performed worse with light (80%) than with heavy (94%) objects (t(11) = 2.90, p < .05, see
Fig. 3B). This result, even if significant, is convergent with the RTs result (as is evident by looking at Fig. 3A and B) and rules
out a trade off between speed and accuracy. The difference we found n accuracy seems to be due to a response bias toward
‘‘heavy’’, as shown in Table 1.
In order to assess whether any specific item was at the grounds of this difference, we conducted an analysis of variance
with the target object as a factor. This analysis showed an effect of the stimulus (F(5,55) = 5.48, p < .001). Newman–Keuls
post hoc test revealed that this was due to one single target, the notebook, which has an accuracy rate (67%) which was sig-
nificantly (ps < .05) worse than any other stimulus percentage rate (all above 83%). The same does not apply to the first
experiment, where the significant analysis of variance (F(5, 300) = 2.50, p < .05) of the single stimuli is not explained by
the worst performance of a single item compared to others, but just by a worse performance with the brick compared to
the gym weight (85.3% vs. 90.6%, p < .05).
In Experiment 2 we performed a second T-test on the accuracy scores removing the notebook stimulus. In this case, no
significant difference between heavy and light targets occurred (t(12) = 1.89, p = .08).
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We followed the same procedure with RTs and the T-test confirmed that no difference between heavy and light targets
was at play (t(10) = .47, p = .64).
4. Discussion
The present study investigated motor simulation and motor resonance in children from age 7 to 9. We hypothesized that
motor resonance would be more pronounced when the actor was a child, because of the difference in body schema between
children and adults.
4.1. Motor simulation and motor resonance in children
4.1.1. Motor simulation
Heavy and light stimuli did not differ in RTs; this suggests that no automatic motor simulation of object lifting, triggered
by the simple object observation (and with the probable mediation of the canonical neurons system), was found. This dif-
ference was not observed, neither when the target objects were presented in isolation, as we showed in a control experiment
(Experiment 2), nor when they were preceded by an adult hand prime or a child hand prime that did not imply an action
(fist).
More importantly, Experiment 1 results showed that response times were faster when graspable objects were preceded
by a visual hand prime in an action rather than in a no-action posture (fist). This indicates that observing a static hand dis-
playing a grasping position followed by an object activates a motor simulation. Importantly, this simulation is not triggered
by the generic observation of a hand, but by the observation of a hand displaying an implicit action. This confirms and ex-
tends to children results that have been previously found in adults (e.g. Borghi, 2005; Borghi, Bonfiglioli, Lugli, et al., 2007).
4.1.2. Motor resonance and motor simulation
We found that children’s responses were facilitated when the hand prime was a child’s hand. This effect interacted with
the Kind of prime (action posture vs. no-action posture) and with the Weight of the target. Children were faster when a
Fig. 3. (A) Mean response times of the Experiment 2. (B) Mean accuracy in the Experiment 2. (p < .05).
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prime depicting an action portrayed by a child preceded a light object, possibly because the internal simulation of a grasping
action is stronger when the actor is also a child. In addition the simulation is quicker/easier when the object is light than
when it is heavy (the action of lifting a light object is less demanding than lifting a heavy object). Significantly, this difference
between heavy and light target was not observed in any other condition, nor when the objects were presented without the
prime (Experiment 2). This interaction allows us to determine that our results are not simply due to world knowledge;
rather, they are due to motor resonance effects. Indeed, the faster RTs obtained with light objects with a child hand prime
is due to the fact that participants tend put themselves in the shoes of other children. If they were due to knowledge, targets
preceded by adult’s hands should be processed faster than those preceded by child’s hands, given that it is intuitive that, due
to their bodily characteristics, adults lift objects more easily than children. Therefore our results allow us to reject a possible
alternative explanation, according to which children responded by trying to assess whether the object on each trial would be
light or heavy for the particular hand shown in that trial’s prime. This strategy could explain the advantage of the grasping
over the fist prime, but it would not explain why children responded faster when they saw a child’s hand in the grasping
posture than when they observed an adult’s hand in the grasping posture. Therefore we can conclude that our results are
due to a motor resonance effect.
We suggest that this motor resonance occurs because participants (i.e. children), shared their body schema with the
child-actor portrayed in the prime. This interpretation is in line with the absence of motor resonance linked to age in Setti
et al. (in preparation). The discrepancy between the present study, in which children are presented with children’s and adults
hands, and Setti et al. (in preparation) study, in which younger and older adults are presented with younger and older adults’
hands, suggests that the changes in body schema later in life may be not as radical as from childhood to adulthood, therefore
not producing an age effect in motor resonance. Alternatively the lack of a differential resonance effect between younger and
older adults in our previous study may be due to the fact that both older and younger adults can easily simulate lifting the
particular objects we used as stimuli. However the results of the present work favor the interpretation in terms of body sche-
ma similarities, as here a difference in motor resonance was found even if we assume that both children and adults can sim-
ulate the lifting actions.
4.2. Theoretical implications of the present study
First, our study has implications for literature on conceptual development. Since the seminal work by Piaget (1952), a
variety of studies with different paradigms (property verification; feature production) have shown that children’s conceptual
knowledge is grounded in perception and action (Borghi & Caramelli, 2003) and that interaction with objects has a direct
impact on categorization (Smith, 2005). In addition, studies with priming paradigms show that from approximately 5 years
of age children automatically activate action-related information when perceiving a tool (Mounoud et al., 2007) and that a
hand in a grasping posture can prime basic level concepts (e.g. ‘saw’), more effectively than superordinate concepts (e.g.
‘tool’) from the age of 7 (even if the developmental pattern is not linear). Taken together this series of studies suggests that,
when perceiving an object, children simulate the corresponding actions evoked by the object, and that, when observing a
hand, a grasping action with a single object is simulated. The present study, however, is the first to provide behavioral evi-
dence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Further work is needed to understand the development of the
mechanisms underlying these two processes and to precisely disentangle their relationship with body schema changes dur-
ing the lifespan.
Regarding the neural underpinnings of the visuo-motor simulation during development, the earliest indirect evidence
available to date of an MNS in infants comes from a study by Shimada and Hiraki (2006). This study demonstrated by means
of near infrared spectroscopy the presence of action execution and observation matching system in 6-month-old human in-
fants. Lepage and Théoret (2007) recently proposed that the development of the MNS can be conceptualized as a process
whereby the child learns to refrain from acting out the automatic matching mechanism that links action perception and exe-
cution. Such development could be viewed as a process leading from mandatory reenactment to a covert simulation of the
observed motor acts, most likely through the maturation of prefrontal inhibiting mechanisms. In our study we found evi-
dence of both motor simulation and motor resonance in children, from 7 years on. This suggests that in 7-year-olds an auto-
matic matching mechanism is no longer present, given that the activation of the resonant processes is modulated by the
similarity in body schema between the actor and the agent. Further studies are needed, to understand when this modulation
process – which implies the recognition of the differences between our own body and others’ body – starts.
Finally, our study gives us some hints on the development of the notion of self. Recent studies and theoretical proposals
have explored the existing relationship between the sense of body ownership (e.g. de Vignemont, 2011) and the sense of
agency, i.e. the ability to control our own actions. Tsakiris, Longo, and Haggard (2010) have shown with an fMRI study that
activation of midline cortical structures was linked to the sense of sensory-driven body ownership, whereas sense of agency
activated the Pre-Supplementary Motor Area. Even if there is no evidence for overlap between the neural circuits involved in
body ownership and agency, being able to perform a voluntary action intuitively seems to be the precondition for developing
the sense of possessing a unitary body. When we respond to external stimuli the body is perceived simply as a collection of
fragmented and not integrated body parts. Once we act on objects, instead, we begin to perceive our body as a functional
whole, clearly distinct from others’ bodies (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). Developing a sense of body ownership implies
recognizing that this body is unique, and that it moves in a coherent and unitary way (Tsakiris et al., 2010). Crucially for the
present study, an important part of the acquisition of the sense of our body concerns the ability to distinguish ourselves from
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others, and this ability is grounded in action. The fact that we found an effect of age-related motor resonance in children,
whereas it was not present with younger and older adults (Setti et al., in preparation), opens some interesting scenarios.
It suggests that children at this age have developed a clear social sensitivity and that this social sensitivity is truly grounded
and embodied (Semin & Smith, 2008): children record and differently resonate to the differences between kinds of bodies,
and in particular between their own body and the body of adults. The alternative explanation, that a child’s hand could por-
tray social identity features (Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2007) not shared by adults, i.e. that the children respond faster to mem-
bers of their own in-group, is less clearly supported by the data. Namely, it would explain the advantage obtained with kids’
hands compared to adults’ hands, but it would not explain the pattern found in the interactions (in particular faster response
times to light objects when the prime is a child hand implying action). Further studies will allow us to better understand how
the process of motor resonance develops in time and during our life. This is crucial, also in light of the fact that the motor
resonance process informs us about complex relationships between the sense of our own body and our social awareness,
between embodiment and sociality.
4.3. Conclusions
The present study shows by means of a visuomotor priming paradigm howmotor simulation occurs in 7–10 year old chil-
dren. In addition, it shows that motor resonance in children is strengthened when a light target object is preceded by a child’s
hand in an action posture compared to an adult hand. These findings provide new insights relevant to the development of the
mirror neuron system and the role of congruence between the observer and the actor’s body schema in facilitating motor
resonance.
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Introduction
Possibly because of their unique morphology, human eyes are
specially adept to mediate fundamental non-verbal communica-
tion skills [1]. In particular, gaze direction powerfully modulates
social interactions at both explicit and implicit levels [2]. Detecting
the gaze of other individuals reveals where they are attending
[3,4,5], signals potential sources of reward or danger and activates
basic motivational-emotional, approach-avoidance responses [6].
The reflexive shift of visuo-spatial attention is considered an early
social cognitive ability leading to the later developmental ability to
infer others’ mental states [7,8]. Social attention may rely upon a
neural network where subcortical nodes mediate crude and largely
unconscious, fast orienting responses to interpersonally relevant
stimuli and cortical nodes subserve slower and conscious, context-
dependent appreciation responses [9].
Gaze-mediated attentional capture is a fundamentally adaptive
function that may be triggered automatically and thus be
comparatively impervious to the influence of higher-order socio-
cognitive variables. Tellingly, however, low- social status male
rhesus macaques reflexively follow the gaze of any familiar rhesus
macaques, but high-status macaques selectively follow the gaze of
other high-status monkeys [10].
Social attention relies on gaze following behavior, the automatic
tendency to imitate the oculomotor behavior of others [11,12,13],
which is at the very basis of the development of other social
cognitive skills [14]. This automatic imitative behavior seems to be
subserved by a neural mirroring mechanism [15] similar to the one
at play in during action observation in monkeys [16]. Relevant to
the present study is that, albeit automatic, the motor resonance
triggered by perception of others’ actions seems to be modulated
by the similarity between the observer and the model [17,18].
Humans have developed large-scale political behavior, a very
complex form of social behavior that requires an even more
complex form of social knowledge and cognition [19]. Evidence of
simpler political behavior in chimpanzees [20] and capuchins [21]
suggests that we may have evolved in ways that maximize our
capabilities for small-scale interactions. At least in western societies
people are involved in multiple political activities, participate to
elections, and join political groups. Choosing a party or a political
group generically gives us a social identity [22]. Affiliation allows
us to categorize rapidly and effortlessly other individuals as in-
group and out-group. This act of categorization may be made
consciously or unconsciously [23]. In fact, categorization of people
into in-groups and out-groups has been observed after just
milliseconds of mere exposure to persons or ideas about persons,
with little or no effort, intention, awareness, or conscious control
[24].
Beyond the mere affiliation, political ideology seems to have
important social psychological functions [25]. Jost and colleagues
[26], for instance, have described political conservatorism as a
form of motivated social cognition which includes personality traits
as authoritarianism [27] and ideological rationalizations as social
dominance orientation [28]. These psychological differences
between ideologies have been found to be reflected also in general
neurocognitive functions [29] and in tasks where the sensitivity of
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e25117
the attention to social signals as the gaze of a schematic character
[30] is tested. Furthermore, research on the moral foundations of
ideology [31] has shown that conservatives, compared to liberals,
endorse more moral values as loyalty to authority and to their own
group.
Here we expand monkey studies [10] by investigating in
humans whether reflexive attention might be influenced by social
identity variables. To this aim, we explored whether reflexive gaze
shifts were influenced by political affiliation, a process that allows
conscious or unconscious, rapid categorization of individuals as in-
group or out-group [23].
We tested 28 participants who were assigned to a left-wing
(N = 15) or right-wing (N = 13) group on the basis of a
questionnaire assessing their political orientation and voting
behavior. Participants were required to perform a saccade towards
a left- or a right-sided black square (target) when a black central
square turned into red or blue respectively (imperative, instruction
signal). The black square was positioned between the eyes of a
political character face gazing straight to the participant. 75
milliseconds before the imperative central square color change, the
character made a left- or right-ward saccade, either congruent or
incongruent with the direction cued by the imperative signal. The
character faces used in the present study, portrayed well-known,
current or former political leaders and opinion makers, in order to
disentangle the possible modulating role of the actual influence on
the political landscape and/or the mediatic exposure. For these
reasons we chose the pictures of the following personalities: Silvio
Berlusconi (the most important centre-right wing, current prime-
minister, political leader), Bruno Vespa (centre-right wing, opinion
maker), Antonio Di Pietro (centre-left wing, current political
leader) and Romano Prodi (centre-left wing, former prime-
minister, no longer active as political leader). We used the
difference in the accuracy between congruent and incongruent
trials as an index of the interference of the models’ gaze on the
onlookers’ oculomotor response.
To explore whether the influence of political affiliation on
reflexive gaze following is linked to dispositional factors (e.g. the
perceived similarity between oneself and specific political charac-
ters), we capitalized on social psychology studies emphasizing the
relationship between the voters’ personality characteristics and
their political affiliation [32]. We focused on a conceptual
framework that highlights the similarity between personality traits
of voters and of same- or different-affiliation political leaders. In
particular, we predicted that higher perceived similarity with a
politician induced stronger gaze following behavior in a voter.
Participants rated how much each item in a list of 25 adjectives
representative of each dimension of the Big Five [33,34] described
themselves and four different political characters. Differences
between the ratings concerning self (the voter) and others (each of
four characters) provided a measure of the perceived similarity
between voters and politicians.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The experimental procedures were approved by the Fondazione
Santa Lucia Ethics Committee (14/05/2008) and were carried out
in accordance with the principles of the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants
Twenty-eight subjects (12 males, mean age = 25.25; SD = 2.89)
gave their written informed consent to participate in the study. All
had normal or corrected to normal vision with no history of
neurological or psychiatric disease and were naı¨ve to the purposes
of the study. On the basis of a questionnaire assessing political
preference and voting behavior (see below for more details), 15
participants were assigned to the left wing (9 females) and 13
subjects to the right wing group (7 females). The two groups were
matched in age (t(26) = .03, p = .97), education (t(26) = .38, p = .70)
and interest in politics (t(26) = 1.59, p = .12).
Stimuli and Procedures
Eye movement recording. The study was performed in a
quiet room with medium illumination (about 64 cd/m2). Subjects
sat on a comfortable chair in front of an LCD monitor, positioned
at about 57 cm from their eyes. Eye position and eye movements
were measured monocularly in real-time by means of an infrared
video-based system (ASL 504 Remote Tracker, Applied Science
Laboratories, USA). The experiment was created with E-Prime
software (version 1.1, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh,
PA) running on an IBM compatible computer. Each trial started
with the appearance of a black central fixation square
(0.21u60.21u in size) presented on a light gray (about 47 cd/m2)
background, and of two larger black squares (0.43u60.43u)
presented at 10.2u of eccentricity in the left and the right visual
field. The fixation square was presented on the between-eyes point
of the face of a political character with straight gaze. After 575 ms,
the color of the central square changed to either blue or red). This
was the imperative signal for the participants to make a fast and
accurate saccade toward the left (change into blue) or the right
(change into orange) target square. The colored cue remained
visible until the end of the trial. 75 ms before the onset of the
instruction-cue (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) the distracting
character made a left- or right-ward saccadic movement. This
interval was chosen because we demonstrated that gaze following
behavior is maximal at this interval [11,12,13]. The characters
used as distractors where: Antonio Di Pietro; Romano Prodi;
Silvio Berlusconi; Bruno Vespa. It is also important that, at the
data collection time (i.e. between 24th of July, 2009 and 24th
October, 2009) the index of the trust in Berlusconi, varied between
55% (August 2009) and 60% (October 2009), as emerged by the
‘‘CRESPI Ricerche’’ phone CATI method survey (available at
http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/) on a 1,000 people
sample stratified for sex, age, geographic area and population
center size.
For each character-face we prepared a RGB digital photogra-
phy (6.76u66.76u). The original pictures were collected by
searching in internet and modified by means of the Adobe
Photoshop software (Adobe Systems Incorporated). To enhance
their saliency, the stimuli were animated by two frames presented
in rapid sequence. The first frame (lasting 500 ms) was replaced by
a second frame lasting 875 milliseconds. The first frame depicted a
straight gaze. The second frame depicted a gaze that could be
oriented leftward or rightward. The direction of the character gaze
and that one indicated by the instruction-cue could be congruent
(e.g. both leftward) or incongruent (e.g. one leftward and the other
rightward). Importantly, subjects were instructed to ignore the
distracting stimulus and to focus their attention on the central
square color change. Subjects were tested in four separate blocks,
each associated with a character face. In each block, the two
instruction cues (leftward or rightward) and the two distractors
(congruent or incongruent) were equally probable and were
presented in a random sequence. Each of the 4 possible
combinations was equally probable and was repeated 12 times.
Thus, a total of 48 trials per block was run. We analyzed the
participants’ directional accuracy by focusing on the first
horizontal saccade that followed the instruction cue and had an
Politicians and Gaze-Following Behavior in Voters
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amplitude larger than 2u. Saccadic RTs were also collected. Only
RTs for correct trials were considered. The trials in which there
was no clear evidence that a saccade occurred were excluded (725
out of 5376, 13.5%). A trial was rejected from the analysis
described below if the latency was either less than 100 ms
(anticipations) or greater than 500 ms (delays). The proportion of
rejected trials was 3.4% of the total trials.
Measures of Voters’ dispositions and personality. Parti-
cipants filled out a self-report questionnaire in which the
following measures were recorded: i) socio-demographic varia-
bles, as gender, age, and education level; ii) interest in politics
as attested by frequency of discussion on the topic with their
a) family members, b) colleagues at work, c) acquaintances, and
d) friends (from 1 = ‘‘never’’ to 5 = ‘‘every day’’). A single index of
interest in politics was obtained by averaging the five ratings;
iii) political orientation along a 7 point Likert like scale where 1
represents extreme left wing, 4 center, and 7 extreme right wing;
iv) voting behavior in the last European political elections (June,
2009).
Participants were also shown the face of each character and
asked to rate (along five-point Likert scales) the following:
1) Exposure: ‘‘please rate how much do you know the political
character and his personality where 1 is ‘‘I know him very
well’’ and 5 is ‘‘I do not know him at all’’;
2) Influence: ‘‘please rate how much do you think this
character is influent within the Italian political landscape’’
where 1 is ‘‘very influent’’ and 5 is ‘‘not influent at all’’;
3) Positive emotions: ‘‘please rate how much do you think this
character evokes positive emotions’’ where 1 is ‘‘not positive
at all’’ and 5 is ‘‘very positive’’;
4) Negative emotions: ‘‘please rate how much do you think this
character evokes negative emotions’’ where 1 is ‘‘not
negative at all’’ and 5 is ‘‘very negative’’;
Assessment of personality similarity between Voters and
Characters Personality. Participants rated themselves and
separately each the four political characters on the Five Factors of
personality (Energy/Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientious-
ness, Emotional stability, Openness [33]) using a list of 25
adjectives [34]. The list included five markers of: Energy/
Extraversion (happy, determined, dynamic, energetic, active);
Agreeableness (cordial, generous, loyal, sincere, unselfish);
Conscientiousness (efficient, scrupulous, precise, conscientious,
diligent); Emotional stability (optimistic, self-confident, solid,
relaxed, calm); and Intellect/Openness to experience (sharp,
creative, innovative, modern, informed). The adjectives were
selected from a larger list of adjectives that have previously been
identified in the Italian lexicon as being among the most frequently
used to describe human personality and also the most
representative of each of the dimensions of the Big Five. Each
adjective was rated for how characteristic it was of each target on a
1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 5 (‘‘very much so’’) scale. We measured the
perceived personality similarity in personality traits with each
character by adopting procedure used in our previous studies
[35,36]. We started computing the Euclidean distance between the
ratings for the self and the four political characters for each item
(e.g. the square root of the squared difference of item 1 referred to
self and item 1 referred to Berlusconi). We obtained a normalized
dissimilarity score by summing the Euclidean distance of all the
items and divided it for the maximum value (being 4 the
maximum distance for each item, and having 25 items, we
divided the sum for 100). This procedure allowed us to obtain
a dissimilarity score between the voter and each politician.
Dissimilarity scores of 1 and 0 indicate maximal difference and
absence of difference, respectively. By subtracting the dissimilarity
score from 1, we obtained the perceived similarity score which
ranged from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (complete similarity). This score
was entered in the correlation analyses.
In addition, we assessed the similarity between the perceived
personality of each participant and of the four characters as
‘objectively’ assessed by averaging across the whole sample the
ratings on each item.
Results
Ratings
Participants classified Di Pietro and Prodi as belonging to
centre-left wing coalition (ratings 3.21 and 3.00, significantly lower
than 4, ts,23.3, ps,.01) and Berlusconi and Vespa as belonging
to the center-right wing coalition (ratings were 5.75 and 4.73,
significantly higher than 4, ts.3.34, ps,.01).
Media exposure ratings (where 1 = I know him through the
media very well and 5 = I do not know him at all) were entered in
a mixed model 264 ANOVA with group as between-subjects
and character as within-subject factors. We found a main effect
of character (F(3, 75) = 7.41, p,.001), but not of group (F(1, 25)
= 1.13, p..29). The interaction between group and character
was not significant (F(3,75) = .04, p..75). Duncan post-hoc
comparisons showed that Berlusconi is considered more influent
than anyone else (ps,.01). No other comparisons were
significant.
Influence ratings (where 1 = very influent and 5 = not influent
at all) were entered in a mixed model 264 ANOVA with group
as between-subjects and character as within-subject factors. We
found a main effect of character (F(3, 75) = 22.46, p,.001), but
not of group (F(1, 25) = .004, p..94). The interaction between
group and character was not significant (F(3,75) = 1.07, p..36).
Duncan’s post-hoc comparisons showed that Berlusconi is
considered more influent than anyone else (mean 1.4, ps,.001).
Moreover, Di Pietro (mean 2.6) was judged significantly more
influent than Prodi (mean 3.6, p,.001), but only marginally
significantly more influent than Vespa (mean 3.1, p = .05).
Reports of positive minus negative emotions were used to
compute an index of emotional positivity elicited by each
character in each voter. These values were entered in a mixed
model 264 ANOVA with group as between-subjects and
character as within-subject factors. We found a main effect of
group (F(1, 25) = 6.67, p,.05) which was accounted for by the less
positive emotions reported by left-wing (2.93) than right-wing
voters (2.17). The significance of the main effect of character
(F(3, 75) = 3.84, p,.05) was explained by the more positive
emotions elicited by Di Pietro (.56) with respect to the other
characters (Berlusconi =2.77, Prodi =2.97, Vespa =21.03;
ps,.05). Duncan’s post-hoc comparisons suggested that the
significance of the group by character interaction (F(3,
75) = 19.37, p,.001) can be explained by an emotional ingroup
bias. Indeed, significantly higher positive and negative emotion
ratings were given to ingroup and outgroup characters respec-
tively (all ps,.05, see Table 1), with the exception of Di Pietro
who did not differ from Vespa within the right wing group (p..5).
Importantly, within the right-wing voters, emotions toward Di
Pietro and Vespa characters did not differ significantly from zero
(ps..4). Within the left-wing group, emotions towards Prodi did
not differ from 0 (p..65), but were significantly more positive
than emotions toward the outgroup characters (ps,.001). For
each character, the emotions toward him differed significantly
between the two groups (ps,.05).
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Saccadic Reaction Times
To have an index of interference, we computed the interference
index for RTs by subtracting the mean RT in incongruent trials
from the mean RT in congruent trials for each distracter condition
and each subject. No subject had a score above or below 3
standard deviations from the mean of the group in any condition.
We entered this interference index in a mixed ANOVA with
subjects political orientation (rightwing, leftwing) as a between
factor and distracter (Di Pietro, Prodi, Berlusconi and Vespa) as
within factor. We did not find any main effect, nor interactions
(ps..24, partial g2,.05). Means of the two way interactions are
shown in Table 2.
Perceived similarity
We entered the subjective perceived similarity in a mixed
ANOVA with subjects political orientation (rightwing, leftwing) as
a between factor and distracter (Di Pietro, Prodi, Berlusconi and
Vespa) as within factor. We did not find any main effect of the
distractor (F(3, 75) = .66, p = .58). More importantly, we did not
find any effect of the group, (F(1, 25) = .51, p = .48).
Not surprisingly, we found interaction between the participants
orientation and the disctractors (F(3, 75) = 17.60, p,.001).
Duncan’s post hoc test showed that this interaction is accounted
for by a more perceived similarity toward the ingroup than the
outgroup characters. Indeed, left-wing voters perceived themselves
more similar to Di Pietro and Prodi (mean perceived similarity:
0.77 and 0.73 respectively) than Berlusconi and Vespa (.60 and .62
respectively, ps,.01). Similarly, right-wing voters perceived
themselves more similar to Berlusconi and Vespa (.74 and .72
respectively) than Di Pietro and Prodi (.61 and .56 respectively,
ps,.01). Outgroup characters do not differ each other neither
within the left-wing group, nor within the right-wing one (ps..30).
Saccadic Accuracy
To have an index of interference, we subtracted the accuracy
(percentage of correct responses) in incongruent trials from the
accuracy in congruent trials from each condition and for each
subject. We excluded a participant (left-wing, male) from the
analysis because he scored above 3 standard deviations from the
mean of the group in one condition. Interference index values
were entered in a 264 mixed model ANOVA with voters group
(centre-left, centre-right) as between-subjects factor and the
distractor (the Di Pietro, Prodi, Vespa, Berlusconi character faces)
as within-subjects factor. The ANOVA showed a trend towards a
significant effect of group (F(1,25) = 3.79, p = .08), while the main
effect of distractor was non significant (F(3, 75) = 1.53, p = .21).
Importantly, the ANOVA showed that the crucial interaction
between Distractor and Group was significant (F(3,75) = 6.87,
p,.01, partial g2 = .18, see Figure 1). Since interference effect on
accuracy in right wing participants was not distributed normally in
one condition (Di Pietro, W = .83; p,.05) and the variance
between the two groups was different in two conditions (Berlusconi
and Vespa, Levenes’s Fs(1, 25).4.89 ps,.05) we used a
bootstrapping resampling technique [37] to test our null
hypothesis. We simulated 2.000 data sets of the same length of
our original sample by randomly picking up with replacement the
data from our original sample. So, in each simulation, we
randomly assigned each data to each condition, entered the data
in the same mixed model 264 ANOVA, computed the F for each
main effect and for the interaction in order to build an F
distribution from our original data. Finally, we computed the
probability of the null hypothesis using these F distributions
instead of the usual central F distribution. The F distributions that
emerged after bootstrapping were very similar to the usual central
F distribution ones and, consequently, we obtained very similar
results. In particular, the main effect of the group still approached
significance (p = .07), the main effect of the distractor was not
significant (p = .26) and the crucial interaction was strongly
significant (p = .001). As shown in Figure 1, Duncan’s post-hoc
test within groups revealed that Right-wing participants followed
Berlusconi’s gaze (accurate responses in congruent minus incon-
gruent trials: 18.3%) more than Di Pietro’s (8.7%, p,.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.57) and Prodi’s (4%, p,.01, Cohen’s d = 0.95) gaze.
Furthermore, right wing voters followed Vespa’s gaze (17.4%)
more than Di Pietro’s (p,.05, Cohen’s d = 0.52) and Prodi’s
(p,.01, Cohen’s d = 0.90) gaze. The interference effects were
comparable for Berlusconi and Vespa (p = .77, Cohen’s d = 0.05)
and for Prodi and Di Pietro (p = .31, Cohen’s d = 0.33). On the
other side, Left-wing characters’ gaze direction did not exert any
significant influence on the oculomotor responses of left-wing
participants (all ps..14). Also, a difference between the two groups
was found in the Berlusconi’s gaze interference effect which was
greater for right-wing participants than for the left-wing (2.1%,
p,.005, Cohen’s d = 1.20). Similarly, Vespa’s gaze interference
effect has found to be stronger in right-wing participants than in
left-wing (5.2%, p,.05, Cohen’s d = 0.91).
Previous behavioral studies demonstrated that longer or less
accurate responses to incongruent than congruent trials are
robustly and reliably induced by the interferential gaze of stranger
models [11,12,13]. Using a series of one-sample t-tests, we assessed
the strength of this effect by comparing the index of interference of
effect each political character gaze against 0 (which means absence
of interference) for each group. The interference of ingroup
characters’ gaze was significantly different from 0 in both left-wing
(ts(13).3.1; ps,.05) and right-wing participants (ts(12).3.59,
ps,.005).
Since Di Pietro interference effect was not normally distributed
in the right-wing group (Shapiro-Wilk’s W = .83; p,.05), we
bootstrapped this difference data in the 13 right-wing participants
2000 times. So, we computed the mean difference (8.3%) of these
2000 samples and its confidence interval (CI, +95% = 19.9%;
295% = 2.2%). The lower bound of the CI does not include 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that right-wing participants signifi-
Table 1. Mean differential emotion (mean positive emotion
minus mean negative emotions) ratings for each character in
each group (6SD).
Di Pietro Prodi Berlusconi Vespa
Right-wing 20.2(2.2) 22.2(2.0) 1.5(2.0) 0.2(1.2)
Left-wing 1.4(1.9) 0.3(2.3) 23.1(1.4) 22.3(1.8)
Negative scores indicate that negative emotions are predominant. Thus, a clear
ingroup bias can be seen in both voters’ groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025117.t001
Table 2. Reaction times.
Di Pietro (ms) Prodi (ms) Berlusconi (ms) Vespa (ms)
Right-wing 32.9 (17.9) 18.2 (23.7) 35.9 (24.8) 32.1(30.2)
Left-wing 39.7(25.4) 34.5(20.1) 35.3(23.1) 37.1(21.8)
Mean gaze cuing (incongruent minus congruent) in ms (6SD) effect for each
condition in each group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025117.t002
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cantly follow the gaze of this out-group leader. For the other
stimuli, being the data normally distributed (Ws..88, ps..07), we
performed one-sample t-tests against zero.
Interestingly, unlike what reported with stranger gaze characters
where interference is quite a robust phenomenon [11,12,13], some
outgroup characters’s gaze did not induce significant gaze
following effects in right-wing voters (p = .24, for Prodi). On the
other hand a lack of significant gaze following was found for
Berlusconi’s gaze left-wing voters (t(13) = 1.24; p = .23).
We ran the same analysis on the interference effect on RTs. In
this case, all the characters induced a significant interference effect
in both groups (ts.2.76, ps,.05).
Accuracy interference index and ratings
No significant correlation between the interferential effect of
characters’ gaze and their reported influence or mediatic exposure
was found (ps..05).
Accuracy interference index and perceived similarity in
personality
We explored whether the interference effect of each character
on the participants’ oculomotor behavior can be at least partially
explained by the perceived personality similarity between
participant and character. To this aim we correlated the
interference effect scores with the scores indexing the perceived
similarity between the personality of the participants and that of
each of the characters.
We found a positive, significant correlation between the voters’
perceived similarity with Berlusconi and the attracting influence of
his gaze on their oculomotor behaviour (r = .50, p,.01; Figure 2). To
be sure that the above positive correlation was not driven by outliers,
we removed two subjects whose standardized residuals were above
2.5. The correlation became slightly stronger (r = .52; p,.01).
Perceived similarity in personality failed to correlate with the
interference effect induced by the other characters (rs,.26,
ps..17). Because most of the correlated variables (6 out of 8)
were not distributed normally (Ws,92; ps,.05), we ran the
correlation analyses also on bootstrapped samples. 2000 resampled
data sets were created and correlated. This procedure allowed us
to check whether the confidence intervals of the Pearson’s rs from
the resampled data included zero. We found that the Pearson’s r
CI for the correlation between Berlusconi’s interference effect
and the perceived similarity with him did not include zero
(+95% = .70, 295% = .15). Therefore, this correlation is to be
considered significant. Importantly, all the other bootstrapped
correlations between the character interference effect and the
perceived similarity, included zero (CIs +95%,.55, 295%,
2.02). Moreover, we aggregated across the whole sample the
ratings concerning the perceived personality similarity and
correlated this more ‘objective’ index with gaze interference. No
correlation turned out to be significant (rs,.24, p..22).
Discussion
Gaze following behavior has shown to be an automatic
behavior, supposedly impervious to highly complex variables such
as political affiliation. Studies indicate that emotional cues in the
face of a model can affect gaze cuing in human onlookers ([38,39],
but see [40]). Recent studies in monkeys [10] showed that social
status of an individual within the group modulates gaze following
of other members. However, little is known about whether this
modulation can be due to dominance cues in the observed face or
to social knowledge [41].
We anticipated that reflexive gaze following in humans might be
influenced by highly complex cognitive and social dimensions as
politic affiliation and personality dimensions linked to political
ideology [25]. In this study, we investigated the interaction between
the political affiliation of onlookers and distractors in an oculomotor
task where the gaze direction of political characters could be
spatially congruent or incongruent with the instruction to make
directional saccades given to ingroup or outgroup electors. Also,
since previous studies show the role of status in gaze following in
monkey [10] and of familiarity on a gaze-cuing task in humans [41],
we used characters who differed in terms of perceived influence in
the Italian political landscape and in media exposure.
Accuracy results seem to suggest that, in each participant group,
one of outgroup leaders did not exert a significant gaze following
behavior. Specifically, right-wing voters seem not to be influenced
by the gaze of Romano Prodi, a former centre-left Prime minister.
Figure 1. Interaction between participants political affiliation and characters interference effect. Influence of the political characters’
gaze on the voters’ oculomotor response. On the y axis is represented the interference index, deducted by the difference between the accuracy
(percentage of correct responses) in congruent minus incongruent trials. Error bars represent Standard errors of mean (SEM). We reported
significance (* = p ,.05, ** = p,.01) only for the post-hoc comparisons between the characters’ interference effect within the groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025117.g001
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In a similar vein, left-wing voters seem not to be interfered by the
outgroup leader and actual Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. This
pattern of results may suggest that an active suppression on the gaze
of some outgroup leaders is implemented. However, RTs analysis
shows in both left-wing and right-wing voters a significant
interference effect compared to zero for all the characters. Thus,
although attractive, the hypothesis of an active suppression of
attracting power of ougroup leaders gaze is based on a null result
and involves only accuracy. Future studies on this issue are needed.
More importantly, we found that the stronger catching power of
the ingroup political character gaze on voters occurred only in the
right-wing voters, who were influenced by Berlusconi and Vespa
more than by Di Pietro and Prodi. Even though these two
characters have been judged as having a different media exposure
and power in the political landscape (not surprisingly, since
Berlusconi is the leader of the centre-right coalition and Prime
minister in charge at the time of the experiment), they do not differ
each other in their gaze interference power, suggesting that the
result might have to deal more with the group affiliation than with
the status. By contrast, no significant effects of in-group political
characters’ gaze were found in left-wing voters.
A possible explanation of the difference between left-wing and
right-wing voters may involve personality differences in ingroup
loyalty [31]. Indeed, conservatives are found to be more loyal to
their group. Furthermore, conservatives are thought to be more
sensitive to authoritarian figures and rely more on authority
acceptance [27,31]. It is thus possible that they follow the ruling
group, more than simply the group they feel affiliated to. Since, at
the time of data collection the centre-right group was fundamen-
tally ruling the country, this alternative explanation cannot be
disregarded. Future studies in a changed political situation or in
different countries may help to better address this issue.
That left wing-voters lack of gaze-following behavior just with
Berlusconi may be consistent with studies [42] showing that Italian
left-wing voters detest the right-wing leader. Finally, the gaze
interference effect exerted by the right wing leader was correlated
to the voters’ perceived similarity, in keeping with the evidence
that Berlusconi is the leader that mostly capitalized on the
personalization of politics strategy that has characterized several
modern democracy systems in recent years [43].
Previous behavioural and neural studies of politics mainly focused
on the dispositions of the participants [29,30]. It has been shown for
example that conservatorism but not liberalism is associated to the
number of errors in tasks where a prepotent response has to be
inhibited. This better behavioural performance of liberals in
response conflict monitoring paralleled an higher sensitivity to
response conflicts as indexed by the amplitude of No-Go N2 and
Early Related Negativity Event Related potentials [29].
Using a gaze cuing paradigm in which the distractor was a
schematic face, it has also been demonstrated that liberals exhibit a
very large gaze cuing effect compared to conservatives [30].
Authors interpret these data arguing that while conservative
ideology relies more on individuals, liberals are more likely to
attend to social cues. These studies shed light on the notion of
ideology as motivated social cognition [26], and try to link
cognitive styles to Political orientation. Although interesting, the
above studies do not address the important issue of how
fundamental social behaviours like gaze following are modulated
by Political affiliation in the interaction with members of a
different vs. same political group.
In conclusion, unlike studies that investigated the behavioural
and neural correlates affected by political variables by focusing on
the dispositions of the participants, we demonstrate that a
sophisticated blend of situational and dispositional factors
underlies the capture of reflexive gaze following exerted on voters
by the gaze of politicians. Future studies on the plasticity of this
effect may provide new insights in the fundamental aspect of the
human tendency to coalesce in large groups and complex societies.
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Figure 2. Correlation between participants perceived personality similarity with Berlusconi and his interference effect. On the y axis,
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index deducted by the difference between the accuracy (percentage of correct responses) in congruent minus incongruent trials.
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INTRODUCTION 
Gaze following behavior provides a window into social cognition (Shepherd, 
2010): humans automatically follow others gaze (Ricciardelli et al., 2002; 
Crostella et al., 2009, Cazzato et al., 2010) and automatically shift their 
attention accordingly (Driver et al., 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999). This 
automatic shift of the attention triggered by a social signal as gaze seems to be 
the prerequisite of developing other important social cognitive skills, from joint 
attention to the Theory of mind, i.e. our ability to infer others mental states 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Emery, 2000).  
Gaze-following behavior has been studied also in other non human primates 
(Deaner & Platt, 2003) and has found to be underpinned by a mirror-like neural 
mechanism (Shepherd et al., 2009). Gaze following behavior has been found to 
be modulated by status in monkeys (Shepherd, Deaner and Platt, 2006), by 
personality similarity and political affiliation in humans (Liuzza et al., 
submitted). In this study, we found conservative participants to be more prone 
to their in-group politicians gaze than the out-group.  
This suggests that the gaze-following can be considered an automatic behavior 
which implicitly vehicles information about the attitudes toward a group and, 
eventually, preferences toward politicians during a political competition. 
To this purpose we used an established paradigm to study the gaze-following 
(Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Crostella et al., 2009; Cazzato et al., 2010) using the 
two candidates of the most important coalitions (Centre-left, Centre-right) who 
ran for the governorship of the Lazio Region in Italy during the month that 
preceded these local elections (March 2009).  
The same subjects underwent to some explicit measures as their voting 
intentions toward the two candidates in order to assess if their major proneness 
toward one of the two candidates could be predictive of the likelihood to vote for 
her.  
In order to compare the vote intention predictiveness of gaze following with the 
the Implicit association test (Greenwald et al., 1998), a measure which has 
already shown to predict election outcomes (Arcuri et al., 2008), the same 
sample underwent to a IAT adapted to measure their attitude toward the two 
candidates. 
We predicted that both these measures, independently, could predict the major 
likelihood of the participants to vote for one of the two candidates. 
METHODS 
Participants 
Fifty-Four participants took part in both the gaze following paradigm and 
IAT (35 female, age 19 – 35 years old, mean age 24.9±3.27). All had normal or 
corrected to normal vision with no history of neurological or psychiatric disease 
and were naïve to the purposes of the study. After having received an 
explanation of the procedures, they provided their written informed consent to 
participate in the study. The study was approved by the independent Ethics 
Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Scientific Institute for Research 
Hospitalization and Health Care). 
Ratings 
Self reported past political behaviour and voting intentions 
Participants were administered a self-reported questionnaire in order to 
collect: a) socio-demographic variables, as gender, age, and education level; b) 
voting intention for the forthcoming (March 2010) regional elections. Subjects 
were asked to rate in a ten Likert type scale the probability to vote for each of 
the two most important candidates (Bonino, centre-left; Polverini, centre-right). 
Post-election interview 
After the elections, we were able to reach telephonically a subsample of subjects 
(N=20, 14 F, mean age=24.4±2.98 deviation standard) who were actually voters 
in the Region Lazio and asked them who they voted for and coded their 
response as 1 if they voted for the Centre-left candidate Bonino, -1 if they voted 
for the Centre-right candidate Polverini and 0 if they didn’t vote fore neither of 
the two. 
 
Implicit measures  
An IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) was used, in which the stimuli of the target-
concept categories (Polverini vs. Bonino) were pictures of the candidates, 
whereas the stimuli-words of the attribute-dimension (pleasant vs. unpleasant) 
were emotionally loaded attributes (e.g. positive, good vs. negative, bad)1.  
In the IAT the participants performed two types of categorization tasks, with 5 
stimuli for each category. The words were presented in random order within 
each block of trials. As described by Greenwald et al. (1998) the entire 
procedure consisted of seven blocks of trials: 1 (Polverini vs. Bonino), 2 
(Pleasant vs. Unpleasant) and 5 (Bonino vs. Polverini) were single 
categorization blocks of 20 trials whereas 3-4 and 6-7 were combined blocks 
(Polverini or Pleasant vs. Bonino or Unpleasant) of 20 (3-6) and 40 (4-7) trials. 
Subjects were requested to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the 
stimuli-words that appeared on the monitor.  
Following Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji (2003), data from blocks 3-4 and 6-7 
were used to compute IAT difference scores, Dbiep=MIB–MCB/SD (Dbiep: SE-IAT 
scores according to the built-in error penalty method; MIB = mean latency for 
incompatible blocks; MCB = mean latency for compatible blocks; SD = pooled 
standard deviation for compatible and incompatible blocks). 
Positive scores indicate high implicit attitude toward Bonino and negative 
scores indicate high implicit attitude toward Polverini. Internal consistency was 
estimated by a split-half index, based on two partial scores, Dbiep1 and Dbiep2,, 
respectively computed from blocks 3 and 6 (20+20 trials), and from blocks 4 
and 7 (40+40 trials).  
 
Gaze following task 
Stimuli and Procedures 
                                                
1 A complete description of the test with the full list of stimuli may be requested to the following address: 
francesco.dentale@libero.it .   
The study was performed in a quiet room with medium illumination (about 64 
cd/m2). Subjects sat on a comfortable chair in front of an LCD monitor, 
positioned at about 57 cm from their eyes. Eye position and eye movements 
were measured monocularly in real-time by means of an infrared video-based 
system (ASL 504 Remote Tracker, Applied Science Laboratories, USA). The 
experiment was created and ran with E-Prime software (version 1.1, Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) on an IBM compatible computer.  
Saccadic eye movements were collected via a event-related protocol in a 2x2 
factorial design. In each block, stimuli comprised the factorial combination of 
the two Observed faces (Bonino, Polverini) and the two Condition respect to the 
imperative cue (congruent and incongruent).  
Each trial started with the appearance of a black central fixation mark 
(0.21° x 0.21° in size) presented on a light gray (about 47 cd/m2) background, 
and of two black squares (0.43° x 0.43°) presented at 10.2° of eccentricity in the 
left and the right visual field. After 500 milliseconds, the color of the central 
mark changed to either blue or orange. This was the imperative signal for 
making a fast and accurate saccade toward the left (change into blue) or the 
right (change into orange) target square. The coloured cue remained visible 
until the end of the trial. A distractor’s gaze was presented behind the central 
fixation mark, at an intervals of 75 milliseconds from the onset of the 
instruction-cue (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) because we demonstrated  
that gaze following specifically occurs at this interval (Ricciardelli et a., 2002, 
Crostella et al., 2009, Cazzato et al., 2010). For each observed-face we prepared 
a RGB digital photography (6.76° x 6.76°). To enhance their saliency, the stimuli 
were animated by two frames presented in rapid sequence. The first frame 
(lasting 500 milliseconds) was replaced by a second frame lasting 875 
milliseconds. The first frame depicted a straight gaze. The second frame 
depicted a gaze which could be oriented leftward or rightward (see Figure 1). 
The direction of the distractor and that one indicated by the instruction-cue 
could be congruent (C) (for instance: both leftward) or incongruent (for 
instance: one leftward and the other rightward). Note that subjects were 
instructed to ignore the distracting stimulus and to focus their attention on the 
central mark colour change. The two instruction cues (leftward or rightward) 
and the two distractors (congruent or incongruent) were equally probable and 
were presented in a random sequence. Each of the 4 possible combinations was 
repeated 20 times, for a total of 80 trials.  
We analyzed subjects’ directional accuracy by focusing on the first horizontal 
saccade that followed the instruction cue and had an amplitude larger than 2°. 
Saccadic RTs were also collected. Only RTs for correct trials were considered. 
Trials in which signal was dirty were excluded (577 out of 4800, 13.5%). 
Incorrect responses were removed from RTs analysis (430 out of 4233, 10.2%). 
Finally, we excluded trials above or under two deviations standard from the 
mean (275 out of 3793, 4.6%). 
Because for 6 out of 49 subjects (12.2%) we didn’t collect at least 10 correct 
trials out of 20 (50%) in each condition, we performed the analysis on the 
accuracy only. In order to assess the strength of the gaze following behavior, we 
created a gaze following index by subtracting the accuracy in the incongruent 
trials from the accuracy in the congruent ones for each distracter. Secondly, to 
have a unique bipolar measure that could predict this implicit embodied 
attitude toward one or the other candidate, we subtracted the gaze following 
effect for Polverini from the one from Bonino. In this way, negative scores mean 
a stronger proneness to  the center-right candidate, while positive ones were 
associated to a bigger proneness to center-left one. This measure doesn’t 
significantly correlate with the mean accuracy of each subject (r= .12, p=.41).  
We computed the voting intention toward each of the candidates by subtracting 
the probability to vote Polverini from the probability to vote Bonino. In this way 
we obtained a bipolar measure in which positive scores indicate high voting 
intention toward Bonino and negative scores indicate high voting intention 
toward Polverini. 
 
RESULTS 
We entered analyzed if the difference in voting intention, the IAT d score and 
the gaze following difference between the two candidates correlated each other. 
The major likelihood to vote for Bonino compared to Polverini correlated 
significantly with both gaze proneness to Bonino’s gaze relative to Polverini’s 
(Pearson’s r=.37, p<.01) and with implicit positive attitude toward Bonino 
compared to Polverini (Pearson’s r=.56, p<.001). Importantly, the latter two 
measures don’t correlate each other (Pearson’s  r=.24, p<.1, ns). 
To assess if voting intention can be predicted independently by both proneness 
to a candidate’s gaze and implicit attitudes, we entered the difference in voting 
intention as the dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis in which 
the predictors were the gaze following difference between the two candidates 
and by the IAT d score. Multiple regression has been revealed to significantly 
predict voting intention (F(2, 46)= 13.78, R2= .37, p<.001). Furthermore both 
IAT (β= .50, t=4.2, p<.001) and, most importantly for our purpose, proneness 
to the candidate’s gaze (β= .24, t=2.03, p<.05) independently predicted the 
intention to vote one or the other of the candidates. Importantly, the two 
measures don’t correlate each other (r=.24, p<.1, ns). 
We performed the same analysis on the subsample who answered to the post 
election question on their actual vote. In this case we entered also the vote 
intention in the correlational analysis. Not surprisingly, the voting intention 
strongly correlates with the actual vote (Pearson’s r=.78, p<.001). gaze 
proneness to Bonino’s gaze relative to Polverini’s implicit positive attitude 
toward Bonino compared to Polverini correlated with the actual vote (both have 
Pearson’s r=.44) even though both the correlations failed to reach the 
significance (p=.05). The multiple regression with these latter variables as 
predictors of the actual vote didn’t reach the significance (F(2, 17)=3.22, p=.06). 
Anyway, is worth note that these analysis may have not reached the significance 
because, considering the smaller sample, they just lacked to reach enough 
statistical power. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Previous studies on Gaze following behavior showed that this behavior, even 
though automatic, can be modulated by the model and the onlooker social 
status in non human primates (Shepherd et al 2006) and by their political 
affiliation in humans (Liuzza et al., submitted). This last finding suggested us 
that gaze following behavior can be used as behavior that may implicitly 
embody certain attitudes toward social groups or even preferences towards 
candidates during political competitions. In the present study we used a well 
known a paradigm to study the Gaze following behavior (Ricciardelli et al. 
2002; Crostella et al., 2009; Cazzato et al., 2010) in which the distractor faces 
were represented by the candidates of the two most important coalition during a 
local electoral campaign in Italy. We predicted that a bigger proneness to one 
candidate gaze compared to the other would predict the participants vote 
intentions. coherently with our predictions, we found a significant linear 
regression between the differential proneness to the candidate's gaze and the 
vote intention.  
Implicit measure of attitudes toward social groups as the IAT (Greenwaldet al., 
1998) have been shown to be predictive of the election outcome (Arcuri et al., 
2008). Here we tested the same participants with the IAT to assess their 
differential implicit preference toward the two candidates. The IAT itself, 
coherently with previous studies, has found to be predictive of the vote 
intentions. 
The most important result of this study is represented by the fact that an 
automatic behavior as the gaze-following vehicles important cues about the 
preference toward a group or a single politician. This result, compared with the 
one relative to a well known implicit measure as the IAT, is particularly striking, 
since the gaze-following is a behavior apparently independent by the association 
between the semantic representation of a group or of a single person and an 
emotional valence. To rule out that a significant part of the predictability of the 
gaze-following behavior can be explained by the strength of this semantic-
affective link measured by the IAT (Fazio & Olson 2003), we entered both these 
measures in a multiple regression analysis. the results showed that both, 
independently, can predict the vote intention. Not surprisingly, the IAT has a 
stronger predictability (R2=.32) since, as underlined by Fazio and Olson (2003), 
this measure can be only partially be considered implicit because the subjects 
can be aware of what is measured, even though the way in which is measured is 
indirect. Even though the variance explained by the gaze-following behavior 
toward the two candidates is smaller (R2=.06), it represents an original 
contribution because, to our knowledge, this is the very first study which uses 
an automatic oculomotor behavior to predict the vote intention. 
A possible limitation of the present study is that, because many of the 
participants didn't vote in the same Region the two candidates were running for 
as governors, we could collect the actual voting behavior of a smaller sample 
(N=20). Even if this represents just a subset of the original sample, the voting 
intentions expressed within the month that preceded the elections and the 
actual voting behaviors of the participants matched significantly. More 
importantly, even though they didn’t reach statistical significance probably 
because of the smaller sample size, the correlations and the multiple regression 
on the actual vote paralleled the results on the vote intentions, suggesting that 
IAT and proneness to gaze, together, may be able to predict the vote behavior. 
Also, as a next step, it would be interesting to see if the gaze following can 
predict future explicit attitudes and voting behavior as has been shown for the 
IAT (Galdi et al., 2008). 
Finally, since a little but strategically important part of the electorship decides a 
the very end without having enough information and relying mostly on 
cognitive heuristics as the personality traits quickly inferred just by facial 
features (Todorov et al., 2005, Ballew  & Todorov, 2007; Olivola & Todorov, 
2010), it would be interesting to test, in the future, if the proneness toward 
unknown faces of politicians gaze can match with their electoral outcomes.   
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Draft in preparation 
 
Neural Responses to In-group and Out-group Political Party predict 
proneness to the gaze of politicians. 
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Vittorio Caprara2 & Salvatore Maria Aglioti2 
1Neuroimaging Laboratory, Santa Lucia Foundation, Rome, Italy  
2Department of Psychology, University of Rome 'Sapienza', Rome, Italy 
 
Summary: Using fMRI, we investigated whether political affiliation, political 
attitudes and perceived personological similarity modulate neural responses of 
the reflexive social attention circuit. Twenty-eight healthy subjects were 
assigned to the left- or the right-wing group on the basis of a questionnaire 
evaluating political orientation and voting behaviour. During scanning, 
participants were requested to detect changes of a central fixation point (FP) 
and to make a left- or a right-ward saccade if the FP turned into blue or red 
respectively. The FP was located on the face of well-known Italian right- or left-
wing political leaders (Berlusconi, Bersani) or right- or left-wing perceived 
opinion makers (Vespa, Floris). Seventy-five msec before the colour change of 
the central FP, the character portrayed in the picture performed a left- or right-
ward saccade which the participants were instructed to ignore. The directional 
instructions provided by the colour cues and the direction of the character 
saccade could be congruent or incongruent. After scanning, participants were 
asked to rate each face about political orientation, influence, exposure and 
emotional valence. The participants rated as more emotional positive and more 
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similar to them, the characters with the same political orientation. The analysis 
of the Incongruence-related BOLD signal (IE: Incongruent > Congruent) 
revealed the expected activation of frontoparietal attentional network involving 
Frontal Eye-Field (FEF), Intraparietal Sulcus and Superior Parietal lobe 
bilaterally plus several clusters in the bilateral Insula, right Supramarginal 
Gyrus (rSMG), right Superior Temporal Sulcus and right Superior Frontal 
Gyrus. In the lFEF, a significant interaction between voters’s affiliation and 
direction of the left/right-wing characters saccades was found. Moreover, in the 
left-wing voters, the IE in rSMG positively correlated with in-group perceived 
similarity. Our results suggest that neural activity in the reflexive social 
attention circuit is modulated more by the gaze of in-group than out-group 
political leader or opinion makers. 
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Results 
Demographics 
Given that the gaze-cuing paradigm required the subject has a strong preference 
for a certain political coalition, we asked to participants to express their explicit 
preference on a scale from 1 “strongly left-wing” to 8 “strongly right-wing”, 
including the “apolitical” condition to assess our critical manipulation. None 
declared to be “apolitical”, therefore no subject of our sample was excluded for 
this reason. A final sample of two right- and left-wing participants groups of 14 
subjects respectively was obtained. Both groups were comparable for age 
[t(1,26) = .241, n.s.], and years of education [t(1,26) = -.192, n.s.]. With regard to 
interest in politics, left-wing participants resulted to be more interested [t(1,26) 
= -3.280, p =.003] and informed about politics [t(1,26) = -2.362, p = .026] with 
respect to right-wing participants.        
 
Self-report measures   
 
Ratings of left and rightedness of the character faces 
 
Participants classified Berlusconi and Vespa as belonging to centre-right wing 
coalition (ratings 5.57 and 5.15, significantly higher than 4,  ts< 14.52, ps < .001) 
and Bersani and Floris as belonging to the center-left wing coalition (ratings 
were  2.68 and 2.50, significantly lower than 4,  ts< -14.71, ps < .001).  
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Ratings of Familiarity, Political Influence and Emotional Valence for 
In- and Out-group Character. 
 
Each Likert scale about Exposure, Influence and Emotional valence was 
investigated by means of a repeated-measures of variance with Distracter (4 
levels: Berlusconi/Vespa/Bersani/Floris) as within-participant factor and Group 
(right- or left-wing voters) as between-group factor. Planned comparisons were 
Bonferroni-corrected. We displayed these results in Figure 2 A-B.  
The analysis on Exposure ratings revealed a significant main effect of Distracter 
[F(3,26) = 17.802, p < .001]. As expected, planned comparisons revealed that 
Berlusconi was the most familiar character, while Vespa significantly differed 
with respect to Berlusconi and Bersani. Bersani instead was less familiar than 
right-wing character and did not differ from Floris. Finally left-wing opinion-
maker Floris only significantly differed from Berlusconi. The interaction 
between exposure of Distracter and Group [F(3,26) = 3.008, p < .05] revealed 
that right-wing participants rated as familiar right- in-group faces more than 
left-wing out-group faces. Not surprisingly, left-wing participants rated as 
familiar left-wing in-group faces less than out-group right-wing faces, being 
Berlusconi the most familiar also for the left-wing group. (See Fig. 2A). As 
illustrated in Fig. 2B, a main effect of Distracter was found when we asked to 
participants to rate how much do they think each character is influent within the 
Italian political landscape [F(3,26) = 27.943, p < .001]. Both group reported 
that Berlusconi was the most influent with respect to the other observed-faces. 
Finally, no interaction between Distracter and Group was observed [F(3,26) = 
.766, n.s.].  
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Figure 2: Ratings of Familiarity (Exposure) and Political Influence 
for In- and Out-group Characters. A) On the y axis, the Exposure scores, 
ranging from 1 (“I know him very well”) to 5 (“I don’t know him at all”). B) On 
the y axis, the Influence scores, ranging from 1 (“Very Influent”) to 5 (“Not 
Influent at all”). On the x axis, right-wing character are depicted in a black 
square line (Berlusconi, Vespa) while left-wing characters are illustrated in red 
square line (Bersani, Floris). Scores for both Likert scales are reported for right- 
and left-wing participants.    
 
The analysis of Emotional Valence scores revealed no main effect of Distracter 
[F(3,26) = .568, n.s.] while a significant interaction between Distracter and 
A) 
B) 
 6 
Group was found [F(3,26) = 34.299, p < .001]. Planned comparison revealed 
that right-wing participants rated as positive in-group right- characters more 
than left-wing out-group faces. Exactly the opposite emotional evaluation was 
expressed by left-wing participants who rated left-wing in-group faces more 
positively than right-wing faces. This “positive in-group bias” was confirmed by 
the fact that right-wing faces were evaluated as positive more by right- than left-
wing group, and right-wing group judged left-wing characters as negative more 
than left-wing group did.  
 
Perceived Similarity Questionnaire  
 
To measure similarity, we asked participants to evaluate whether the following 
traits were applicable to each face: Energy/Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Emotional stability, Intellect/Openness to experience. Than 
we computed an overall index representing the similarity between the self and 
each of the four personalities. A repeated-measures of variance with Distracter 
(4 levels: Berlusconi/Vespa/Bersani/Floris) as within-participant factor and 
Group (right- or left-wing voters) as between-group factor revealed a main effect 
of Distracter [F(3,27) = 3.812, p < .05]. Planned comparison showed that 
Berlusconi had higher perceived similarity ratings than Vespa and Floris 
Opinion-makers. While Vespa only differed from right-wing leader as being 
evaluated as less similar than Berlusconi, no difference was found for Bersani 
with respect to the other face, while surprisingly Floris only differed from right-
wing Leader being perceived more similar than Berlusconi. Importantly, a 
significant interaction between Observed-face and Group was found [F(3,26) = 
31.170, p < .0001]. Planned comparison showed that right-wing voters 
perceived themselves as more similar to in-group faces (Berlusconi/Vespa) than 
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did out-group faces (Bersani/Floris); exactly the opposite pattern was found for 
left-wing participants showing higher mean scores of similarity with Bersani 
and Floris than for Berlusconi and Vespa. These results are in line with the 
emotional valence scores seeing that participants judged as more similar to 
them, the characters with the same political orientation, showing a mere 
preferential “in-group bias” for their political representatives.   
 
 
Behavioural performance in the scanning session.         
 
Since the analysis on Interest in politics showed that left-wing participants 
reported to be more interested in politics with respect to right-wing group, we 
cannot exclude that our critical interferential gaze-cuing effect on behavioral 
measures was affected by interest in politics. Therefore, aimed to control for this 
potential mediator effect, we carried out two separated analysis of repeated-
measures fully factorial ANCOVA on saccadic RTs and Accuracy (numbers of 
incorrect trials) with 2 within-participant factors: Distracter 
(Berlusconi/Vespa/Bersani/Floris) and Congruence (congruent vs. 
incongruent), one between-group factor: Group (Right- vs. Left-wing 
Participants) and “Interest in politics” as covariate.  A fully factorial ANCOVA 
includes all interaction terms between the covariate, within-participants factors 
and between-participants factors. Main effects of repeated-measures factors are 
independent of the between-participant covariate of interest in politics; 
therefore, pure repeated-measures effects are reported from an analysis that 
excludes the covariate, and so degrees of freedom may differ for pure repeated-
measures effects and between-participant effects or interactions. In Table 1 we 
reported mean saccadic RTs in correct trials (in ms) and accuracy (numbers of 
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errors) as a function of the four Observed-face: Berlusconi, Vespa, Bersani or 
Floris and Congruence: Congruent or Incongruent for Right- and Left-wing 
participants respectively.    
 
Saccadic Reactions Times  
 
A trend toward significance was found for the main effect of Distracter [F(3,75) 
= 2.445, p = .07]. Instead, we found a significant interaction between Distracter 
and Interest in Politics covariate [F(3,75) = 2.867, p = .042]. We also found an 
interaction between Distracter and Congruence [F(3,75) = 2.811, p <.045]. The 
result was replicated by means of a significant interaction among Distracter, 
Congruence and Interest in politics covariate [F(3,75) = 3.326, p = .024].    
Finally, the crucial 3-way interaction Distracter by Congruence by Group 
showed a trend toward significance [F(3,75) = 2.544, p = .062]. No others main 
effect or interactions between factors were found.  
Next, we computed an “Interference index” for RTs by subtracting the mean RT 
in incongruent trials from the ones in congruent in each distracter condition in 
each subject. We entered the gaze-cuing effect in a mixed 4x2 ANCOVA with 
distracter (Berlusconi, Vespa, Bersani and Floris) as within-subject factor and 
participant’s political orientation (right-wing, left-wing) as a between-subject 
factor and Interest in Politics as covariate. A main effect of Distracter [F(3,75) = 
2.811, p <.045, η2p = .101] showed that the Right-wing leader (Berlusconi) was 
the less interfering with respect to the other Distracters. The interaction 
between Distracter and Interest in politics resulted significant [F(3,75) = 3.326, 
p = .024, η2p = .117]. Finally, the crucial 2-way interaction Distracter by Group 
showed a trend toward significance [F(3,75) = 2.544, p = .062, η2p = .606]. No 
others main effect or interactions between factors were found.   
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The effect of covariate, was also confirmed by a significant correlation between 
interest in politics and the proneness to follow the gaze of Bersani Left-wing 
Leader only in Left-wing voters (r = .612, p < .05). In addition, the more the 
mediatic exposure of In-group Leaders increased the more right- and left-wing 
voters were prone to follow their gazes, thus reporting a significant correlation 
between the interference index and their relative exposure scores (Right-wing 
voters, Berlusconi: r = .-553, p < .05; Left-wing voters; Bersani: r = .-600, p < 
.05). Instead, this correlation was not found with the interference index of 
Opinion-makers’s gaze. In the same vein, we did not find any significant 
correlation between the proneness to follow each Characters’s gaze and their 
reported Influence (ps>.05).   
 
Accuracy  
 
As well as for saccadic RTs, we entered accuracy in a repeated-measures fully 
factorial 4x2x2 ANCOVA with 2 within-participant factors of Distracter 
(Berlusconi, Vespa, Bersani, Floris) and Congruence (congruent vs. 
incongruent), a between- group factor of Group (Right-, Left-wing voters) and 
“Interest in politics” as covariate. No main effects or interactions reached the 
statistical significance after controlling for Interest in politics covariate [all Fs < 
.877, ps > .358]. This probably was due to the great contribute of covariate in 
modulating the gaze-cuing effect seen that by rerunning the repeated-measures 
ANOVA (without controlling for Interest in politics covariate), we verified that 
we replicated the congruency effect [F(1,26) = 38.870, p < .0001].   
To have an index of interference, we subtracted the accuracy in incongruent 
trials from the accuracy in congruent trials. Neither main effects nor 
interactions reached the statistical significance after controlling for Interest in 
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politics covariate [all Fs < .464, ps > .709]. In addition, no significant 
correlation between the interest in politics, exposure, influence and the 
numbers of erroneous gaze-following movements with respect the right- or left-
wing Characters’s gaze was found (ps>.05).  
 
fMRI Results 
 
To analyze the neural responses of the conflict between the directional 
instructions provided by the colour cues and the direction of the character 
saccade according to political affiliation, we used a region of interest (ROI) 
approach. ROIs were created extracting average BOLD signals (MarsBar 0.41, 
‘MARSeille Boîte À Région d'Intérêt’ SPM toolbox) from voxel activity within a 
10 mm radius sphere centered at coordinates defined with the following criteria: 
whole-brain analysis revealed five main areas within the bilateral Frontal Eye 
Fields (right/left FEF), left Insula, right Supramarginal Gyrus (rSMG) and right 
Superior Parietal Lobule (rSPL) that respond differently to the overall conflict 
effect (Interference Effect, IE irrespective of political affiliation of voters and 
observed-face), therefore ROIs centred on the peak voxel of such clusters were 
selected.  
In addition, following the guideline for independent ROI analyses (Kriegeskorte 
et al., 2009) an independent fMRI study using a similar paradigm (Cazzato et 
al., 2011), and a meta-analysis of 59 brain-imaging experiments confirmed for 
eye movements, as well as for the map of saccadic eye movements, the spatial 
location of the frontal eye fields and parietal saccade-related regions (Grosbras 
et al., 2005). Accordingly, we created further ROIs centered on the reported 
peak voxels in the dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal network (see Table 2). 
Analysis regarding the interaction between Distracter (Berlusconi / Vespa/ 
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Bersani / Floris) x Group (Right- / Left-wing Group) were carried out on the 
mean activation of these areas. Correlation analysis with subjective ratings was 
equally performed within these areas. Reported p-values were Bonferroni-
corrected. 
 
Brain responses associated with the directional conflict between 
gaze and instruction signals: interference effect.  
 
To identify areas associated with greater responses to the conflict between the 
directional instructions provided by the colour cues and the direction of the 
character saccade, we compared incongruent vs. congruent condition 
(Interference Effect: IE), collapsed over Group and Distracter. For this 
comparison, the SPM threshold was set to p(FEW-corr) < 0.05 at voxel-level 
(cluster extent estimated a p-uncorr = 0.001, k = 62), considering the whole 
brain as the volume of interest (See Table II).  
Anatomical 
Area 
Cluster  
Size 
p-
corr 
X Y Z 
z 
Scores 
Parietal Lobe 
R Precu 466 < .001 12 -58 58 4.84* 
R SPL   18 -64 58 4.58* 
R SMG 255 <.01 62 -38 38 4.06* 
R STS   64 
-
40 
24 3.85* 
Frontal Lobe  
L FEF 418 <.001 -24 -2 58 4.74* 
R SMA 958 <.001 18 0 62 4.63 
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R Mid Cingulum   8 20 36 3.98 
L Insula 247 <.05 -32 20 6 3.84* 
R Insula   34 22 8 4.06 
L Lingual G 710 <.001 -10  -74 4 4.29 
 
Table II. Mean MNI coordinates of activation foci associated with 
Incongruence Effect. Anatomical locations, peak coordinates in MNI space 
(Montreal Neurological Institute), and statistical values for the main effect of 
incongruence (incongruent > congruent trials, irrespective of Observed-face and 
Group). p-values are corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level, 
considering the whole brain as the volume of interest. R Precu= Right 
Precuneus; R SPL = Right Superior Parietal Lobule; R SMG = Right 
Supramarginal Gyrus; R STS = Right Superior Temporal Sulcus; R/L FEF= 
Right/Left Frontal Eye Field; R/L Insula= Right/Left Insula; R Cingulum Mid= 
Right Middle Cingulum; L Lingual G = left Lingual Gyrus. With the asterisk (*) 
we indicated the regions of interest (ROIs) within the dorsal fronto-parietal 
attentional network. ROIs were extracted averaging BOLD signals (see 
Methods) from a 10 mm sphere centred on the cluster peak.  
 
As expected, this comparison produced mainly an extensive activation in the 
dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal attentional network including anterior frontal 
regions, namely the Frontal Eye Fields (FEF) bilaterally, and posterior parietal 
regions as the right Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) and bilateral Precuneus 
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Frontal regions also included the Superior 
Frontal Gyrus (SFG), the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) extending to the 
middle portion of the Cingulate Cortex in the right hemisphere and left Insula. 
Furthermore, additional right parietal portion included Supramarginal Gyrus 
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(SMG) extending to temporal region as Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS). 
Finally, a wide cluster in bilateral occipital areas spreading bilaterally from the 
Calcarine Scissure to the Lingual gyri was also activated (See Figure 2). No 
regions were obtained from the reverse contrast (“Facilitation effect”), even at a 
relaxed statistical threshold of p< .005.  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Brain regions activated by Interference Effect [Incongruent 
> Congruent trials]. Clusters showing higher activity in the incongruent than 
congruent condition irrespective of observed-faces and political affiliation of 
voters are rendered on 3-dimensional (3D) views of the SPM template. This 
contrast revealed the activation of dorsal and central attentional fronto-parietal 
networks. The regions included the Frontal Eye Fields (FEF) bilaterally, and 
posterior parietal regions as the right Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) and 
bilateral Precuneus. Frontal regions also included the Superior Frontal Gyrus 
(SFG), the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) extending to the middle portion of 
the Cingulate Cortex in the right hemisphere and left Insula. Furthermore, right 
parietal portion included Supramarginal Gyrus (SMG) extending to Superior 
Temporal Sulcus (STS). Finally, a wide cluster in bilateral occipital areas 
spreading bilaterally from the Calcarine Scissure to the Lingual gyri was also 
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activated. These regions were used as regions of interest to assess any 
differential influence of distracter/instruction signal incongruence on the brain 
responses (SPM thresholds are set to p(FWE-corr) = 0.05 at voxel level).   
 
Brain responses associated with the Interference effect in Right- and 
Left-wing Voters 
  
First we analyzed whether our brain regions were specifically influenced by the 
political affiliation of group. Thus we tested for differential IE BOLD responses 
in Right- and Left-wing voters, irrespective of Distracter and their belonging to 
the same or different political affiliation. A significant interaction IE x Group 
was found in left Middle Frontal Gyrus (lMFG), being the IE of Left- higher 
more than Right-wing Group (t = 2.19, p<.05). In the same vein, parietal ROIs 
as LPPC(IPS+SPL) and L Precuneus showed a significant greater IE for Left- 
more than Right-wing voters (L PPC: t = 2.57, p<.001 ; L Precu: t = 2.29, 
p<.05). Finally, the results were coherent with a significant greater IE effect 
again for Left- more than Right-wing voters in the R Anterior Cingulate ROI (t = 
2.04, p<.05). No other ROIs resulted specifically modulated by this interaction 
or by the IE of Right- more than Left-wing voters.  
 
Brain responses associated with the interference effect of Right- and 
Left-wing Distracters  
 
To analyze the brain regions activated when participants performed a saccadic 
movements incongruently with respect to the gaze direction of Right- and Left-
wing Characters, we tested for the interaction of IE x Right- or Left-wing 
Distracter, irrespective of In-group Leaders/Opinion-makers (Main effect of IE 
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of Right- and Left-wing Distracter). Only left Fusiform Gyrus (lFG) and right 
Cuneus (rCu) resulted specifically modulated by the IE of Right- more than 
Left-wing Faces (lFG: t=1.72, p<.05; rCu: t=2.36, p<.05). No other regions 
resulted specifically modulated by this interaction or by the reverse contrast 
[Left-wing Distracter > Right-wing Distracter].  
Crucially, we hypothesized that our manipulations of IE would affect neural 
responses within the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional systems, depending on 
specific relationships with Distracter and Political Affiliation of voters (Group). 
To test this prediction, we analysed the differences in brain responses when 
participants performed saccadic movements incongruently with respect to the 
gaze direction of Leader and Opinion-makers belonging to the “Same” political 
party. In other words, we were interested in testing the specific IE of gazes 
belonging to the same political party, namely the IE for “In-group members”. 
The unique region of interest resulting specifically modulated by the interaction 
IE x Observed-face x “Same” Political Affiliation of voters was left FEF (i.e. 
IE([Berlusconi + Vespa] > [Bersani + Floris] + [Bersani + Floris] > [Berlusconi 
+ Vespa]); t = 2.05, p = .021). The result is illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, 
the IE of in-group Distracter was greater more than the IE of out-group on 
voters as expressed by significant t-values in Left Insula (t = 1.76, p = .041) and 
R Postcentral/IPL ROIs (t = 2.19, p = .016). No other ROI approached the 
significance for the IE of “In-group Bias” contrast.  
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Figure 3: Brain responses in left Frontal Eye Field elicited d by the 
Interference Effect of In-group Left- and Right-wing characters. Right 
panel: 3D rendering of the canonical MNI template showing the localization of 
the region of interest (ROI) corresponding to the left (pink) frontal eye field 
[FEF] is reported in the coronal section. Left panel: the relative plot shows the 
mean Interference Effect [IE(inc<cong)] of the Right- and Left-wing Faces in 
Right- and Left-wing participants. A significant interaction was observed in this 
ROI: Right-wing In-group faces [R-F = Right-wing Faces] interfered on shifts of 
attention more than the Out-group Left-wing faces [L-F = Left-wing faces] 
distracter. Exactly the opposite pattern was found for Left-wing voters. The level 
of activation is expressed in arbitrary units (a.u., ±90% confidence interval). 
 
Brain responses associated with the interference effect of Leader- 
and Opinion-makers Distracters  
 
Next, we explored whether fronto-parietal regions are called into action when 
participants performed a saccadic movements incongruently with respect to the 
gaze direction of Leaders and Opinion-makers (irrespective to in-group political 
party); thus we contrasted the fMRI signal of Leaders vs. Opinion-makers (i.e. 
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IE[Leaders > Opinion-makers]). The interaction IE x Leaders surprisingly 
revealed no significant greater brain responses in the ROIs we investigated.  
Instead, when we tested for the specific IE of In-group Leaders 
[Berl>Bers]+[Bers>Berl] in both group of voters we found a significant effect in 
L posteriorPC (t = 1.80; p = .038). Interestingly, the same effect of Leader was 
found for r MFG (t = 1.82; p = .036), being the IE of Left-wing Leader Bersani 
greater more than the IE of Right-wing Leader Berlusconi in Left-wing voters (t 
= 2.55; p = .007). The IE specifically related to Bersani Leadership in Left-wing 
voters was marginally significant [Bers>Floris]>[Berl>Vespa] (t = 1.62; p = 
.054).  
Finally, the analysis testing for the effect of Berlusconi vs. Bersani in Right-wing 
voters revealed a significant IE for In-group more than Out-group Leader in left 
FG (t = 1.90; p = .031).   
To the opposite, when we tested for the interaction IE of Opinion-makers vs. 
Leaders, several regions resulted specifically modulated. For example, the IE in 
left FEF was greater for Opinion-makers more than Leaders (t = 1.85, p < .05) 
and a trend toward significance was found specifically for In-group’ Opinion-
makers (irrespective of Left-wing Political Affiliation) (i.e. IE[ Vespa > Floris] + 
[Floris > Vespa]; t = 1.64; p = .053). As well as left FEF, right SMG and right 
SPL showed a greater IE for In-group’ Opinion Makers (right SMG: t = 2.45; p = 
.008; right SPL: t = 2.19; p = .015). Additional comparison, confirmed that this 
effect in right SMG was due to a greater IE for In-group’ Opinion-maker in Left-
wing Voters (i.e. IE[Floris > Vespa]; t = 2.84, p = .003]. Left Insula resulted 
specifically modulated only for Right-wing voters by the interaction IE x 
Opinion-maker x Group (i.e. IE[Vespa + Floris] > [Berlusconi > Bersani]; t = 
1.88, p = .038). Additional comparison revealed that left Insula was only 
specifically activated for: in-group Opinion-makers (i.e. IE[Vespa > Floris] + 
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[Floris > Vespa]; t = 2.02; p = .023) and most important for Right-wing 
Opinion-maker (Bruno Vespa) in Right-wing voters (i.e. IE[Vespa > Floris]; t = 
1.83, p = .035). The analysis on R Postcentral/IPL ROI, showed a significant IE 
of Ingroup Opinion-makers (t = 2.87, p = .003). Additional comparison 
confirmed that this effect was due to a greater IE of Vespa vs. Floris in right-
wing voters (t = 2.03, p = .023) and to the opposite to a greater IE of Floris vs. 
Vespa in Left-wing voters (t = 1.76, p = .041).  
Finally, in R Cuneus a higher IE was found for Opinion-makers more than 
Leaders in right-wing voters (t = 1.70, p = .047), this effect was partially 
confirmed by a trend toward significance for the IE of Vespa vs. Floris Opinion-
makers in right-wing participants (t = 1.62, p = .055).  
 
Correlations with “Perceived Similarity Scores”  
 
To further understand the relationship between subjects’ perceived similarity 
responses relative to in-group characters and their brain activity, we looked at 
how their subjective ratings of the Leaders and Opinion-makers correlated with 
their brain activity while performing incongruent saccadic movements with 
respect to in-group gazes. Surprisingly, only in Left-wing voters, activation in 
right SMG and left IPL (whole-brain analysis: MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -
56, -24, 50, data not shown) was greater during gaze-following shifts towards 
left-wing in-group characters’ gaze with whom participants more strongly 
associated themselves (with respect the out-group political members). That is, 
left-wing participants perceiving themselves as “similar to in-group” 
demonstrated greater engagement of right SMG and left IPL as a function of IE 
for in-group character (more than right-wing out-group characters). In Figure 4, 
we only depicted the positive correlation between In-group “Perceived 
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Similarity scores” (compared to out-group characters) and the relative IE for in-
group characters in right SMG (t = 3.31; p < .001; R = 0.72; p < . 0.0039).    
 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatter plot displaying the relation between BOLD 
responses and “Perceived Similarity Scores” in Right Supramarginal 
Gyrus for Left-wing Participants. The x axis displays the “Perceived 
Similarity score” difference calculated by subtracting the scores for in-group 
left-wing faces minus the scores for out-group right-wing faces for left-wing 
voters (higher values indicate stronger perceived similarity with respect to own 
in-group characters). The y axis displays the difference of the parameter 
estimate associated with incongruent trials minus the parameter estimate 
associated with congruent trials for in-group left- larger than right-wing out-
group faces in left-wing voters (thus, greater  values indicate grater IE for left- 
faces more than for right-wing faces). In right SMG, left-wing voters who 
perceived themselves more similar to in-group than out-group also showed 
larger BOLD response (Interference Effect) while performing saccadic 
movements incongruently with respect to the gaze direction of  their political 
representatives (with respect to the out-group characters).  
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Experimental Procedure  
Subjects  
We recruited volunteers by placing flyers at public places and university campus 
(Città Universitaria at “Sapienza” University of Rome); posting information on 
internet political discussion group and in a virtual social network. Recruitment 
materials requested right-handed men and women, ages 18-36 years, who were 
supporting right- or left-centred wing coalition and were informed about main 
principal political events and the actual Italian political situation. We carried 
out all the screening and scanning sessions from late December 2009 until early 
April 2010, close to the local elections (March the 28th-29th on 2010). Potential 
subjects were screened by phone using a magnetic resonance imaging 
questionnaire (to rule out safety risks, neurological disorder and eyeglasses) and 
a political attitudes questionnaire using general questions to evaluate interest in 
politics and political orientation. We included subjects evaluating themselves as 
strong right- or left-wing politically orientated. In addition after scanning 
session, participants were asked to fill in several Likert scales assessing the 
interest and attitude toward politics. A rating for each face about political 
orientation, influence, exposure and emotional valence as well as answer to 
questionnaire on their personality (See Stimuli and Procedures section) was 
requested to them.  A total of thirty healthy participants were scanned (male: 19; 
mean age: 23.11 years, range: 19-29, female: 11; mean age: 23.73 years, range: 
18-27). The reported analysis were based on 28 normal subject (14 right-wing: 
male, N= 8; female, N= 6; 14 left-wing people: male, N= 10; female, N= 4), 
therefore two subjects were excluded because of technical problems during data 
acquisition. All were Italian citizens, right-handed and native Italian speakers. 
All subjects had normal or contact-corrected-to-normal visual acuity. After 
having received an explanation of the procedures, participants gave their 
 21 
written consent. The study was approved by the independent Ethics Committee 
of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Scientific Institute for Research Hospitalization 
and Health Care).  
 
Stimuli and Procedure  
 
Self-report measures 
1) Likert Scales  
After scanning session, participants were administered a self-reported 
questionnaire in order to collect their degree of interest in politics, from 1 (not 
at all interested) to 5 (highly interested), and the frequency with which they 
discuss about politics with their family members, colleagues at work, 
acquaintances, and friends, from 1 (never) to 5 (every day). In addition, with the 
aim to be sure about their political orientation, participants were asked to: a) 
place themselves on seven Likert type scale, where 1 is extreme left-wing, and 7 
is extreme right-wing; b) express their voting behaviour, namely in the last 
National political elections (April, 2008), the European political elections (June, 
2009) and the intention to vote in the future local political elections (March, 
2010). These measures allowed us to control that participants political attitude 
was coherent and strong with respect to their voting preference about past and 
future political coalition. None of the subjects that declared to vote for the right- 
or left-wing coalition had ever voted for the opponent party in the past. For each 
Likert scale we presented a photograph of each distracting face. Under each 
photograph, participants had to answer in a 1 to 5 Likert scale in order to rate: 
a) Exposure: “please rate how much do you know, through the media, and 
about issues linked to his role, the personality x where 1 is “I know him very 
well” and 5 is “I don’t know him at all”; 
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b) Influence: “please rate how much do you think x is influent within the 
Italian political scenario” where 1 is “very influent” and 5 is “not influent at all”; 
c) Emotional valence: is an overall score computed for each face by 
subtracting negative emotion scores by the positive ones; we asked to 
participants: “please rate how much do you think x arouses positive emotions” 
where 1 is “not positive at all” and 5 is “very positive” and “please rate how much 
do you think x arouses negative emotions” where 1 is “not negative at all” and 5 
is “very negative”. Negative values indicated a negative emotional valence while 
positive values indicated a positive emotional evaluation of each Observed-face.     
Most importantly, subjects had to rate which is the political orientation of the 
distracter, considering his ideas, in a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is “extreme left wing”, 
and 7 is “extreme right wing”. These rating allowed us to categorize the four 
characters accordingly to the participants’ point of view. No subjects rated as 
left-wing politically oriented Berlusconi or Vespa, nor Bersani or Floris were 
judged as belonging to right-wing coalition. Finally, subjects had to answer to 
the item of the following tests, presented in a computer monitor by Cogent2000 
software (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). The presentation of the scales was 
randomized between subjects.  
 
2) Personality traits and Similarity Score 
Participants described themselves using a list of 25 adjectives and provided 
their perceptions of Berlusconi, Bersani, Vespa and Floris using the same list. 
The list included five markers each of: Energy/Extraversion (happy, 
determined, dynamic, energetic, active); Agreeableness (cordial, generous, loyal, 
sincere, unselfish); Conscientiousness (efficient, scrupulous, precise, 
conscientious, diligent); Emotional stability (optimistic, self-confident, solid, 
relaxed, calm); and Intellect/Openness to experience (sharp, creative, 
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innovative, modern, informed). The adjectives were selected from a larger list of 
adjectives that have previously been identified in the Italian lexicon as being 
among the most frequently used to describe human personality and also the 
most representative of each of the dimensions of the Big Five (Caprara & 
Perugini, 1994). Each adjective was rated for how characteristic it was of each 
target on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so) scale. To measure similarity, an 
index was created that represented the similarity between the self and each of 
the four personalities. First, perceived dissimilarity was computed for each 
adjective by using the generalized Euclidean distance measure, (d, Cronbach & 
Gleser, 1953) between the personality ratings of the self and the four politicians 
in question. Dissimilarity was calculated at an overall level, averaging scores 
across all 25 adjectives. These scores were transformed into a range from 0 to 1 
by using the following equation: d = d/dmax, where d is the normalized index 
and d is the raw index. Finally, we subtracted d from 1 by converting the 
distance or dissimilarity scores into similarity scores, ranging from 0 (not 
similar at all) to 1 (completely similar). These scores were entered in the 
correlation analyses. 
 
 
 
Experimental Paradigm: Gaze-cuing task  
 
Participants were positioned in the scanner, in a dimly lit environment. The 
experimental visual stimuli were presented via a mirror mounted on the MRI 
headcoil (total display size 19.5° x 14.6° degrees of visual angle, 1.024 × 768 
screen resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). The visual stimuli were back-projected on 
a screen behind the magnet. Stimulus presentation was controlled with 
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Cogent2000 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). Each trial started with the 
appearance of a black central fixation mark (0.5° x 0.5° in size), presented 
centrally against a grey background, and of two black squares (1.4° x 1.4° in 
size), presented for 500 ms at 7.5° of eccentricity in the left and the right visual 
field. Twelve digital pictures, three for each face, were gathered from the news 
media in internet. The distracting gaze consisted of digital modified 
photographs of the face of well-known Italian right- or left-wing political leaders 
(Silvio Berlusconi, Pier Luigi Bersani) or right- or left-wing perceived opinion 
makers (Bruno Vespa, Giovanni Floris). It is important to note that, while Silvio 
Berlusconi is the actual Prime Minister and the leader of the centre-right 
coalition and Pier Luigi Bersani is the leader of the centre-left coalition, Bruno 
Vespa and Giovanni Floris are both opinion-maker journalist, and are 
categorized by our participants as sympathizers of the right and left-wing 
political coalition respectively (See Results section).  
In addition, at the data collection time, the index of the trust in Berlusconi, 
prime minister in charge and charismatic leader of the right-wing coalition that 
has won local, national elections as well as the elections for sending Italian 
representatives to the EU parliament, varied between 61% (January 2010) and 
58% (April 2010). Instead, Bersani’s trust index, Leader of the Italian 
Democratic Party, varied between 24% and 28% in the same period, as emerged 
by the “CRESPI Ricerche” phone CATI method survey (available at 
http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/) on a 1,000 people sample stratified 
for sex, age, geographic area and population center size. 
The usability of each character’s photograph was determined on the basis of the 
following criteria: a) the individual had no facial hair; b) the individual was 
facing the camera; c) the individual had a neutral or smiling expression (to 
control for emotional content, we choose for each carachter two neutral and one 
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smiling photographs); d) the image had an acceptable resolution; e) the 
photograph was taken under normal condition. For each face, the irises and 
pupils of the eyes were cut from the original photographs and pasted to fit on 
the right or left side of the eyes using Photoshop 8.0.1 (Adobe, CA). To obtain a 
striking attentional-capture effect, the stimuli were animated by presenting two 
frames in rapid sequence. The first frame depicted a straight gaze, while the 
second frame, which depicted a left- or rightward oriented gaze, replaced the 
first frame. The direction of the distracting face and the one indicated by the 
instruction-cue could be 50% of the time congruent or incongruent. Before 
starting the fMRI acquisition each participant was asked to perform outside the 
scanner a training task in which they had to learn with 100% accuracy on 48 
consecutive trials, the association between instruction signal (red or blue) with 
leftward or rightward saccadic movements. In the scanner, each trial started 
with the presentation behind the black fixation mark of a straight gaze which 
lasted 500 ms. At 500 ms, a second frame, that depicted left- or rightward 
oriented gaze, replaced the first frame and created a strong animation effect. 
The directional distracters remained on until the end of the trial. 75 ms after the 
oriented distracter presentation, the black central fixation mark (imperative-
cue) changed to either blue or red colour (Ricciardelli et al., 2002; Crostella et 
al., 2010; Cazzato et al., 2011). This was the instruction signal for the subjects to 
make a saccade movement towards the left (change into red) or the right 
(change into blue) target square. Thus, the direction of the distracter and that 
indicated by the instruction-cue could be congruent (left-red or right-blue) or 
incongruent (left-blue or right-red). The face remained visible until the end of 
the trial. In order to engage automatic processes and minimize expectations, the 
directional gazes were equiprobable (50% congruent) and non-predictive. It is 
worth noting that the subjects were instructed to ignore the distracting gaze and 
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to focus on the central mark colour change. Moreover, they were explicitly 
informed that the instruction cue was not informative on the direction of the 
distracters. In order to avoid subjects anticipating stimuli, a random inter-trial 
interval ranging from 3.5 to 4.5 s was used (See Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trial event with a possible distracting face (incongruent 
condition). At the beginning of the trial, a straight gaze was presented behind 
a black fixation mark (500 ms). Turning the black fixation point into red was the 
imperative instruction signal for leftward saccades. Only incongruent condition 
is represented for the sake of simplicity. 
 
Eight event types were organized in a 4 x 2 factorial design. One factor was the 
Distracter: Berlusconi-Bersani-Vespa-Floris. The second factor was the 
Congruence: congruent-incongruent direction between instruction signal and 
observed-face. Congruent and incongruent directional combinations of 
instruction cues and distracters were presented in unpredictable and 
randomized order. These factors were manipulated among the political 
affiliation supported by the participants, Group: left-wing - right-wing voters.  
Thus, fMRI data were acquired via a mixed, blocked (Distracter)/event related 
(Congruence) protocol. All participants underwent five fMRI runs. Each 
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participant completed a total of 720 trials, therefore each imaging session 
consisted of 36 repetitions for each of the four observed-faces (Berlusconi-
Bersani-Vespa-Floris), respectively 18 for congruent and 18 for incongruent 
conditions (balanced for left/right direction and red-blue imperative-cues). 
Each scanning session lasted approx. 10 min for total experiment duration of 
about 50 min.  
 
 
Eye movements recording 
 
In the training session outside the scanner, subjects sat in front of a computer 
screen. In all subjects, eye position and saccadic movements were monocularly 
monitored using an infrared video camera (Sony EVI D31, color video camera, 
Sony JP). Participants were instructed to look at the location indicated by the 
instruction-cue and then to quickly look back at the fixation point. During the 
scanning session, again the participants’ saccadic movements were monocularly 
monitored in real-time by means of an ASL eye-tracking system that was 
adapted for use in the scanner (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA; 
Model 504, sampling rate: 60 Hz). For each subject the eye-tracking system was 
calibrated before fMRI scanning. The calibration was repeated during the 
experiment whenever necessary. Eye-position traces were examined in a 2500 
ms time window, beginning with the imperative cue onset until the end of the 
trial. Saccadic RTs were calculated from the target onset time to when a 
horizontal eye position exceeded 2°. Mean saccadic RTs and accuracy were 
calculated collapsing left and right directional target trials. We did not compute 
those saccadic movements performed following distracting gaze instead than 
instruction cues (incorrect responses), misses (no response), anticipations (RTs 
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< 100 ms) and retards (RTs > + 2 SD). Overall, we discarded 12.7 % of saccadic 
trials.  
 
Image Acquisition and Analysis 
 
A Siemens Allegra (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) operating at 
3T and equipped for echo-planar imaging (EPI) acquired functional magnetic 
resonance (MR) images. A quadrature volume head coil was used for radio 
frequency transmission and reception. Head movements were minimized by 
mild restraint and cushioning. Thirty-six slices of functional MR images were 
acquired using blood oxygenation level-dependent imaging (3.0 x 3.0 x 2.5 mm 
thick, 50% distance factor, TR = 2.34 s, TE = 30 ms), covering the entire cortex. 
We used the statistical parametric mapping package SPM5 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) implemented in MATLAB (v 7.1, The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA) for data pre-processing and statistical analyses. For all participants, 
we acquired 1.275 fMRI volumes, 255 for each run. The first four image volumes 
of each run were used for stabilizing longitudinal magnetization and were 
discarded from the analysis. Pre-processing included rigid-body transformation 
(realignment) and slice timing to correct for head movement and slice 
acquisition delay. Residual effects of head motion were corrected for by 
including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject as regressors of 
no interest. Slice-acquisition delays were corrected using the middle slice as a 
reference. All images were normalized to the standard SPM5 EPI template, 
resampled to 2 mm isotropic voxel size, and spatially smoothed using an 
isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM. Statistical inference was based on a 
random effects approach (Penny and Holmes, 2004). First, for each participant, 
the data were best-fitted at every voxel using a combination of effects of interest. 
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These were delta functions representing the onsets of the 8 conditions given by 
the crossing of our 4 x 2 factorial design: Distracter [Berlusconi / Bersani / 
Vespa / Floris] x Congruence [congruent / incongruent] convolved with the 
SPM5 hemodynamic response function. The onset of the hemodynamic 
response function was aligned with the onset of the imperative cue with 
duration = 0. Onsets of trials in which an erroneous response or an eye 
movement toward the wrong side occurred were included in the design matrix 
as covariates of no interest, but excluded from any further analysis. With the 
aim to investigate whether the reflexive joint attention mechanism is modulated 
by the interaction between Distracter and Group, linear contrasts were used to 
determine differential brain responses for incongruent minus congruent 
conditions (IE = Incongruence Effect) separately for the 4 Observed-faces (e.g. 
[Berlusconi (Incong) > Berlusconi (Cong)]).  
Four contrasts images were entered in a 4×2 factorial ANOVA with Distracter 
[Berlusconi / Bersani / Vespa / Floris] and Group [Right- / Left-wing] 
separately for each analysis. Finally, linear contrasts were used to compare the 
IE, using between-participants variance (rather than between scans). Correction 
for nonsphericity (Friston et al., 2002) was used to account for possible 
differences in error variance across conditions and non-independent error 
terms for the repeated measures. The analysis aimed at determining: a) the 
brain regions called into action when directional cue and the observed-gaze 
provided conflicting directional information; and irrespective of Political 
Affiliation of voters, whether reflexive joint attention was differentially 
modulated by: b) the Social Role of each Observed-face [Political Leader > 
Opinion-Maker]; c) the Political Coalition of each Observed-face [e.g. (Right-
wing Character) > (Left-wing Character)]. Finally, respectively to the Political 
Affiliation of participants, d) whether any modulation is exerted by In-group’s 
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Political Representatives [e.g. (Right-wing Group (Berlusconi + Vespa)) > (Left-
wing Group (Bersani + Floris))]; e) if reflexive joint attention resulted 
modulated by the social membership of In-group Political Leader with respect 
to Opinion-maker [e.g. (Right-wing Group (Berlusconi > Vespa))].     
 
 
 
 
 
